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THE IRAQI CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, AN INTRODUCTION
DAN. WARNOCK*

The purpose of this article is to serve as a brief introduction to the criminal
justice system, such as it is, in Iraq today. It is based on my review of the Iraqi
Criminal Procedure Code, 1 my discussions with a small number of individualsboth Iraqi and American-familiar with the system, and my own (admittedlylimited) observations of the system during a six-month military deployment to
Baghdad.2
One might argue-as many U.S.-trained common-law attorneys do-that a
criminal justice system that neither adheres to stare decisis nor atomizes crimes
into "elements" can hardly provide true justice. An equally-plausible argument
*Dan. L. Warnock, Major, USAF (J.D., American University) is an attorney with the United States Air
Force Judge Advocate General's Corps. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and
do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government.
1. Criminal Procedure Code No. 23 of 1971 (translated alternately as "Law on Criminal
Proceedings, With Amendments" and "Criminal Procedure Code") [hereinafter Criminal Procedure
Code]. The Criminal Procedure Code contains procedural guidelines for all criminal investigations and
trials of felonies and misdemeanors in Iraq. It appears that an official translation was never published
in the English edition of Al-Waqai AJ-Iraqiya (The Iraqi Gazette), the Government of Iraq's official
weekly register of national-level policy pronouncements (laws, regulations, and Republican Council
Ordinances). However, there are two basic translations of the Code, both undated, both anonymous.
The best sources on the internet for the translations, and a variety of other reference materials, are the
Global Justice Project:Iraq (GJPI) sponsored by the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of
Utah, Criminal Procedure Code 23 of 1971, GLOBAL J. PROJECT: IRAQ, (Apr. 25, 2009),
http://www.gjpi.org/2009/04/25/criminal-procedure-code-23-of-1971/.
and Grotian Moment: The
InternationalWar Crimes Trial Blog sponsored by the Case Western Reserve University Law School,
Iraqi High Tribunal Trials, Grotian Moment: The International War Crimes Trial Blog,
http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/index.asp?t=l (last visited Oct. 7, 2010). The original translations,
including the one posted on the Case Western site, were made between September 1984 (the date of the
most recent amendment annotated therein-see Criminal Procedure Code, art. 160) and October 1988
(the date of the next most recent amendment thereafter-to Article 47, which is not captured in the
translation). The version on the GJPI site (currently dated Mar. 14, 2010) is an update of the same
translation incorporating subsequent amendments. It has addressed many typographical errors and
omissions (e.g., it now includes Article 77 which was previously missing), but it still uses the British
spelling of most words.
2. I was deployed in mid-2007 with the initial contingent of the Law and Order Task Force
(LAOTF), an experimental unit envisioned by General David Petraeus, then-commander of MultiNational Forces-Iraq, and his Staff Judge Advocate (lead attorney), Colonel Mark Martins. One of our
missions was to help with the construction and initial case-processing of the newly-formed Rusafa
Branch of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI). Although I was able to learn much about Iraqi
black-letter criminal law during my deployment, my exposure to the practical aspects of the system is
admittedly limited.
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could be made that true justice cannot be achieved in a system that insists on
having a defendant's fate decided by a lay peer jury with no legal training and that
builds a complex network of evidentiary rules that restrict consideration of relevant
and probative evidence. To a significant extent, one's determination of justice is
based in large part on whether one finds justice in doing right by society (i.e.,
punishing the guilty despite any corruption or misconduct by the government
investigators) or in doing right by the individual (letting an obviously-guilty person
go free in order to "punish" the "system").
Although this philosophical dilemma partly prompted this article, it is beyond
its scope. This article will not conduct a normative analysis of any particular legal
system, nor does it propose to conduct a comparative analysis of the civil law trialby-judge system such as it exists in Iraq and the common law trial-by-jury system
used in criminal trials in the United States. Instead, the goal of this article is to
step through the Iraqi criminal justice system writ large-as it is envisioned in the
Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code and as I have seen it in practice.
I. IRAQI CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM-THE PLAYERS
During its short-lived tenure as the de facto Government of Iraq, the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) attempted a limited overhaul of the Iraqi criminal
justice system. 3 One change was the creation of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq
(CCCI); 4 a court with sweeping, nation-wide criminal jurisdiction5 but a specific
mandate to focus on terrorism, organized crime, corruption, and other serious
cases. 6 Fortunately for the Iraqis, the CPA did not try to impose procedures or
3. For example, the CPA abolished the death penalty (although later it was reinstated by the
Iraqi-elected government). It also deleted a series of political crimes from the Iraqi Penal Code.
Although duly-elected governments subsequent to the extinction of the CPA have directly addressed
some of the CPA's actions, I have no data on which to judge the extent to which members of the Iraqi
bar-and more specifically the Iraqi judges- accept as legitimate, and accord credence to, the sum
total of all changes to Iraqi law made by the CPA.
4. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 13 of 2004 (forming the Central Criminal Court
of Iraq) [hereinafter CPA Order No. 13]. Although the Code translation available on the GJPI website,
GLOBAL J. PROJECT: IRAQ, supra note 1, properly advises at page 3 that "publication in... [The Iraqi
Gazette] would appear to be ... regarded as a de-facto requirement" for legitimacy of any Iraqi legal
decree, I have been unable to determine whether CPA Order No. 13 was properly published in The Iraqi
Gazette. Regardless, the Iraqis obviously accept the legitimacy of the CCCI, as it has been in
continuous operation since 2004 - investigating, trying, and sentencing thousands of Iraqi citizens.
5. CPA OrderNo. 13, § 18(1):
The CCCI shall have nationwide discretionary investigative and trial jurisdiction
over any and all criminal violations, regardless of where those offenses occurred.
Its jurisdiction shall extend to all matters that could be heard by any local felony,
or misdemeanor court.
The traditional Iraqi courts, consisting of investigative courts, misdemeanor (trial) courts, and felony
(trial) courts, have limited geographic jurisdiction. Appeals are lodged in regional courts of appeals,
with final criminal appellate authority residing in the national Cassation Court.
6. Id. § 18(2):
In exercising its discretionary jurisdiction, the CCCI should concentrate its
resources on cases related to:
a) terrorism,
b) organized crime,
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substantive law from common-law systems on the new court. Instead, the CCCI is
configured and runs in the same way as the regular provincial criminal courts in
Iraq. Each branch of the CCCI consists of an Investigative Court and a Felony
(trial) Court. The Court implements Iraqi substantive and procedural criminal law
the same as other courts.8 Appeals travel directly to the Court of Cassation. 9 The
Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code thus applies to all cases processed through the
CCCI, from arrest and detention through investigation, trial, and punishment. 10
A. A Quick Comparison of Roles and Responsibilities
Regardless of the court in which the Code is being applied, it is important to
understand a little about the players in order to understand the Code. Some writers
have made the mistake of trying to compare a civil law trial-by-judge system with
the common law trial-by-jury system used in criminal trials in the United States.11
In the confines of an article such as this, to do any kind of satisfactory comparative
analysis is impossible. However, by referencing the key benchmarks in both
justice systems, it is easy enough to see that they both attempt to arrive at the same
goals-public punishment of criminal offenders-albeit from different cultural and
historical perspectives.
In the United States criminal justice system, the prosecutor is a personage of
enormous power. The prosecutor is the one who reviews data collected by the
police (and who, to some extent, directs the type of information and evidence to be
collected), who decides whether the evidence is sufficient to go forward, who
formulates the nature and content of criminal charges, who controls the offer and
acceptance of plea bargains, who decides the means and method by which
incriminating evidence will be presented to the fact finder, and, finally, whose
charisma and credibility are to some extent in play when lay peer juries are
evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence. The prosecutor and police in our
accusatorial system work together, often with considerable government resources
at their disposal, to investigate allegations of criminal conduct. If they believe a
crime has been committed, they then determine (i) who they believe should be held
to account for the crime, (ii) in what forum and with what charges the alleged

c) governmental corruption,
d) acts intended to destabilize democratic institutions or processes,
e) violence based on race, nationality, ethnicity or religion; and
f) instances in which a criminal defendant may not able to obtain a fair trial
in a local court.

7. Id.§ 1(2).
8. Id. § 4:
The CCCI shall apply Iraqi law as modified by applicable CPA Orders and this
Order.
9. Id. § 21:
All appeals arising from CCCI proceedings shall be heard in accordance with
applicable Iraqi law as modified by CPA orders but the Court of Cassation shall
hear all appeals from the Felony Court.
10. See id. § 18.
11. See, e.g., Michael J. Frank, Trying Times: The Prosecution of Terrorists in the Central
Criminal Court oflraq, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 21 (2006).
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offender should be charged, and (iii) the substance and means of presenting the
facts to a fact finder. 12 In this system, the judge's role is that of a gatekeeper, a
referee who makes sure the charges are supported by reliable and relevant
evidence. In the United States system, in which it is paradoxically almost
impossible for a lawyer to sit on a jury of peers, the fact-finding panel is given
only superficial legal guidance on the legal definitions and presumptions relevant
to the particular case it is considering. The purpose of this practice seems to be a
desire to ensure that the members are focused solely on the facts as they relate to
the charge, rather than on any broad legal consequences of those facts.
In the Iraqi civil-law criminal justice system, the prosecutor and judge
basically switch roles. The Iraqi prosecutor is very much an administrative official
whose job is to review the case file for completeness, and to provide
recommendations to the judges as they try the case and deliberate their findings.
The judges (first the investigative judge, then the trial judges) take center stageliterally-as they run the criminal investigation, issue arrest warrants, interview
witnesses, determine appropriate charges, weigh the evidence, issue findings, and
pass sentences. Whereas the United States criminal justice systems intentionally
separate the pre-trial investigation (in which the judge is only tangentially
involved) from the trial process, Iraqi courts consider fact gathering to be an
integral part of the judicial purview. Although there is obviously a role for some
(even significant) data collection prior to the start of official criminal proceedings,
the process-at least on paper-calls for the investigative judge (or his13 own duly
appointed judicial investigator) to repeat or confirm all critical facts in the case.
While the prosecutor attends the trial (and even remains with the judges during
their deliberations), his role is largely administrative in nature.
To an Iraqi lawyer (and likely the average Iraqi citizen on the street as well),
the idea that an untrained member of the public could or should be involved in
determining something so important as guilt or innocence in a criminal case is
preposterous. Trial judges are the best and brightest of the legal profession and
have significant training and experience prior to being appointed to the bench. The
judges rightly consider themselves
experts in knowing what the law says and, more
14
importantly, what it means.

12. Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally Charged The ProsecutorialCharging Decision and the
Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 2187 (2010); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their
Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 793-94 (2003).
13. The English translation of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code uses the masculine pronoun
throughout, except as required for context; this article will do the same.
14. Although case verdicts, much less judicial explications of the same, are not formally recorded
for future reference in other unrelated cases, there actually is a system in place for checking poor
judicial performance. One of the roles of the Public Prosecutor is to ensure that the law is followed.
They can report a judge if they believe the judge has acted inappropriately. Furthermore, the Minister
of Justice and appellate court presidents review the work product of and have disciplinary authority
over all investigative and trial judges. Judicial Organization, Law No. 160 of 1979 (Iraq), arts. 55-60,
available at http://www.gjpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/jud org law.pdf; CPA Order No. 13, §
5(2) (authorizing removal of judges only upon "clear evidence of unlawful or unethical conduct,
breaches of the requirements of this Order, or incompetence on the part of the member.").
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It is a truism that the standard American lawyer answer to any legal question
is "it depends"-because a slight change in the facts can often lead to significant
changes in legal consequences. However, once all relevant facts have been
determined, a lawyer can give a definitive answer based on the law as it stands at
that time. Of course, the well-entrenched principle of judicial review allows
American courts to decide that one or another social (non-legal) consideration
should affect the outcome of the case.
Iraqi judges do not have such leeway. Their job is to apply the facts to the
plain wording of the law. As such, the concept of following precedent is
meaningless because it is irrelevant: an Iraqi judge is commissioned to determine
whether the accused in a particular case violated the law vel non.15 Looking to
other cases will not tell us whether this accused is guilty or not. To paraphrase
General David Petraeus' September 2007 interviews leading16 up to his testimony
before Congress, the facts inform the law rather than drive it.
This point is further driven home by the simple fact of the timing of the
official charge. In the American court system, the accused is charged prior to trial
proceedings. The entire focus of the prosecution case is directed toward the
specific wording of the charge. On many occasions, the defense case is built
around trying to defeat one or more elements of the specific charge rather than to
completely deny responsibility for any criminality. In the Iraqi system, although
an accused is certainly aware of the type of criminal incident for which he is being
investigated, the official charge is almost anticlimactic as it comes at the end of the
trial. This one procedural change obviates an accused's ability to structure a
defense argument built around hypertechnical attacks on the verbiage of the charge
and holding the government to what it thought it could prove. Instead, it puts the
focus of the entire proceeding on a determination of the facts and their
consequence under the law. The Iraqi judges spend their time trying to determine
what, if anything happened. Only after ascertaining the facts (with or without
counterargument by defense counsel 17) are the Iraqi judges in a position to
formally charge the accused. In Iraq, no one gets off on a technicality.

15. I have no data to justify any discussion of judicial corruption where racial or religious biases
factor into the judges' decisions.
16. Time to Head to Congress: Gen. PetraeusPrepsfor Much-AnticipatedIraq ProgressReport,

ABC NEWS, Sept. 4, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/story?id=3556742&page=l. Gen. Petraeus said
that troop fatigue issues would "inform" rather than "drive" his recommendations regarding troop cuts.
Id.
17. Although all persons accused of felonies or misdemeanors are entitled to court-appointed
defense counsel, Article 19, § 11, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005 ("The court shall appoint a lawyer at the expense of the state for an accused of a felony or
misdemeanor who does not have a defense lawyer."), and an accused has a right to present a defense in
all phases of investigation and trial, Id. at Article 19, § 4 ("The right to a defense shall be sacred and
guaranteed in all phases of investigation and the trial."), the defense bar is still struggling to find its
voice. See infra Section II.E.7. Defense counsel issues.
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B. The Players-Qualification,Training,Appointment, and Tenure
All players in the Iraqi criminal justice system are trained professionals.
Although there appear to be no special training requirements for defense lawyers
(whether appointed or retained), other than graduation from law school,18 Iraqi law
imposes specific requirements on all prosecutors and judges involved in the
investigation and trial of accused criminals. 19
1. The Police
As with American society, the "face" of the criminal justice system that is
most familiar to the average Iraqi is the police officer. Civilian police officersmembers of the Iraqi Police or the Iraqi National Police, both of which fall under
the Ministry of Interior (MOI)--patrol the streets, act as first responders, and
conduct the initial (perfunctory) crime scene investigations. Together with the
Iraqi military, the police units were a major focus of intense rebuilding efforts and
training efforts following the U.S.-led occupation in 2003, most notably from the
Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT), a subdivision of MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). 20 International policetraining teams have been working closely with new recruits to accomplish the goal
of a competent and corruption-free force. One of the primary training facilities for
the Iraqi Police is the Baghdad Police College located in Rusafa, a neighborhood
wedged
along the east side of the Tigris River between Baghdad proper and Sadr
21
City.
The original curriculum at the Police College was a three-year course of study
covering such diverse topics as the Penal Code, constitutional law, economics,
languages (Kurdish, English, and Persian), first aid, fingerprinting and criminal
photography, weapons training, horsemanship, criminal sociology, Islamic law,
and forensic medicine.22 Candidates for the Police College must be young,
healthy, upstanding Iraqi citizens. 2' As it turns out, the Police College is an
interesting cultural experiment in and of itself-bringing Shia and Sunni cadets
together in an environment where they have to learn to rely on each other.

18. Law school in Iraq, as with the Police College, is a four-year post-secondary baccalaureate
program. There is no tuition expense for an individual's first undergraduate degree. Interview with
Zuhair A1-Maliki, former Chief Investigative Judge of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI), in
Baghdad, Iraq (Aug. 6, 2007).
19. Judicial Institute, Law No. 33 of 1976 (Iraq), arts. 1, 8.

20. MNSTC-I was a direct subordinate command of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq, which in turn
reported directly to Multi-National Forces-Iraq.
21. OFF. OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, REPORT No. PA-08-152,

ANBAR RULE OF LAW/JUDICIAL COMPLEX, RAMADI, IRAQ 2 (2009), available at http://www.sigir.mil/

files/assessments/PA-08-152.pdf.
22. See Of the Police College, Revolutionary Command Council Regulation No. 1 of 1969, art.
18.
23. The original regulation creating the modem Police College specified that recruits must be Iraqi
nationals whose father was Iraqi and whose mother was at least from an Arab country, high school
graduates, between sixteen and twenty-two years six months of age, at least 165 cm tall with a chest
measuring at least 80 cm, able to pass a medical examination or physical fitness test, and "of good
conduct and reputation, not convicted on a felony or misdemeanor degrading the Honor." Id. art. 10.
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2. Judicial Investigators
In addition to police detectives and investigators, there are groups of "judicial
investigators" who are lawyers working directly for the investigative judges. Their
duty is to investigate the crime scene in the absence of the investigative judge and
to conduct any other inquiries directed by the investigative judge. 4
3. The Public Prosecutor and the Judges
With a few special exceptions, all prosecutors and judges are graduates of the
Judicial Institute, 25 a two-year specialized course designed to raise the "efficiency"
of those who desire to enter the public judiciary.26 To be eligible for acceptance,
24. Criminal Procedure Code No. 23 of 1971 (Iraq), art. 51:
A. The initial investigation shall be conducted by investigative judges or by
judicial investigators acting under the supervision of investigative judges.
B. In case of necessity and if an investigative judge is not available an immediate
decision may be made or immediate action taken in the course of an investigation
into a felony or misdemeanor, provided that the officer responsible for the
investigation lays the matter before any judge within the investigative judge's
area of competence, or within all adjacent area, so that the judge may consider
what action needs to be taken.
C. Any judge may conduct an investigation into a felony or misdemeanor that has
taken place in his presence if an investigative judge is not available.
D. The relevant documents in the cases specified in sub-paragraphs B and C shall
be submitted as quickly as possible to the investigative judge concerned and the
decisions and action provided for in those two paragraphs shall be subject to the
decision and action taken by the investigative judge.
E. The judicial investigator shall be appointed by order from the Minister of
Justice, provided he possesses a recognized qualification in law or holds a
recognized diploma from the legal department of the technical institutes. Police
officers and sub-officers and legal officers of the Ministry of Justice may be
granted the powers of a judicial investigator by order from the Minister of
Justice.
F. No judicial investigator may perform the functions of his office for the first
time unless he has passed a special course of the Judicial Institute of no less than
three months if he obtained a recognized law degree or no less than a full
calendar year if he holds a recognized diploma from the legal department of the
technical institutes and he has sworn the following oath before the President of
the Court of Appeal:
'7 swear by Almighty God that I shall perform the functions of my office with
justice and shallapply the law faithfully."
25. As an exception, a 2006 Amendment of the Law of Judicial Organization provided:
It is permitted to appoint the lawyer or the public employee who holds a bachelor
degree in law as a judge by a presidential decree in exception from the
requirement of being a graduate from the Judicial Institute provided that he has
spent at least ten years in the law profession or worked in the courts, and that he
is not over fifty years of age.
The author has a copy of the text of the law, but no information regarding its number or date of
publication in The Iraqi Gazette. Amendment to the Judicial Organization Law No. 160 of 1979, 2006
(Iraq). The substance of the law was confirmed in a personal interview with Zuhair A1-Maliki, a former
Chief Investigative Judge for the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI)--who personally benefitted
from it because he himself not a graduate of the Judicial Institute. Interview with A1-Maliki, supranote
18.
26. Judicial Institute, Law No. 33 of 1976 (Iraq), arts. 1, 8.
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one must obviously be a lawyer, and one must demonstrate a solid background and
good credentials.27
The actual application process for the Judicial Institute apparently involves
three steps: a general written test in knowledge of the law, an oral exam in the
form of an interview by a panel of five judges/prosecutors, and-most
importantly-an "appearance" test, which is a separate interview by a panel of five
judges/prosecutors to determine if the candidate looks, talks, and acts like a judge.
An unwritten requirement, which can be a showstopper, is one's judicial
pedigree-coming from the right family and having ties to the right influential
people.28
The curriculum at the Judicial Institute mirrors subjects covered in law
school,29 but the courses are taught by experienced lawyers and former judges who
discuss the practical application of the law.30 At the end of the first year of studies,
the top students are placed in a judgeship track while the rest continue in a public
prosecutor track.31 Thus, lawyers identified as future judges and future prosecutors
train side by side.
To be eligible for appointment as a judge in the courts of Iraq, one must be
Iraqi by birth, married, and a graduate of the Judicial Institute. 32 The original oath
of office read as follows:

27. The Iraqi Judicial Institute Law spells out eligibility criteria, to include being Iraqi by birth,
less than thirty-six years old upon matriculation, never implicated in a non-political crime involving
dishonor, of good conduct and reputation, physically fit, and a law school graduate. Later amendments
relaxed the age requirement to a range of twenty-eight to forty, Revolutionary Command Council
Resolution No. 665 of 1981 (Iraq), but, later amendments also added the requirement that the
applicant's parents both be Iraqi by birth, id, and that the applicant be married. First Amendment to the
Law of Judicial Institute No. 33 of 1976, Law No. 7 of 1980 (Iraq).
28. Interview with A1-Maliki, supra note 18.
29. First year subjects include civil law, penal law, evidence, personal status law, civil procedure,
criminal procedure, Arabic, and French or English. Second year subjects are criminal investigation,
forensic medicine, criminal psychology, and conflicts (for future judges) or comparative public
prosecution (for future prosecutors). Amendment to the Law of Judicial Institute No. 33 of 1976, Law
No. 18 of 1988 (Iraq), art. 5. Note that the study of evidence likely consists of studies related only to
For Evidence Law No. 107 of 1979 (Iraq), art. 11. This law specifically applies to civil, commercial,
and personal status cases. Id. There is no law of evidence applicable to the criminal law.
30. Interview with A1-Maliki, supra note 18.
31. Cf Judicial Institute Law No. 33 of 1976 (Iraq), art. 17 (specifying that graduates assuming
either a judgeship or an assistant prosecutor position must be "among those eligible" for each of the two
respective posts). Note that there appears to be no further specialization. Thus, all future judges take
the same course of studies, regardless of whether their future employment will be in the criminal courts,
the administrative courts, the personal status courts, the juvenile courts, or the labor courts.
32. Judicial Organization Law No. 160 of 1979 (Iraq), arts. 36, § 1, available at http://www.gjpi.
org/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/jud org law.pdf. The requirement, see supra note 27, that applicants
to the Judicial Institute not only be Iraqi by birth but born to parents who themselves were Iraqi by
birth, applies equally to judicial appointees. See Revolutionary Command Council Resolution No. 665
of 1981 (Iraq). On the other hand, the requirement that judicial appointees be graduates of the Judicial
Institute is subject to the exception also noted above-i.e., that non-graduates may be appointed by
Presidential decree. Amendment to the Judicial Organization Law No. 160 of 1979, 2006 (Iraq); see
supranote 25.

2010

THE IRAQI CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

I swear by god that I shall judge among people with justice and apply
the Laws honestly with what comply
with their goals in building the
33
united democratic socialist society.
Judges are eligible for promotion every five years.34 Their rise through the
ranks of four pay grades (from "Fourth Class" or "Grade D" up to "First Class" or
"Grade A" 35) determines, in addition to salary raises, their eligibility for specific
postings (from regional offices to the more exclusive positions in Baghdad, as well
as from investigative to trial judge). Thus, only the more senior members of the
judiciary are eligible for trial and appellate judgeships and other positions of
importance. 36 Judges may continue to serve until mandatory retirement at age
sixty-three 37 unless removed involuntarily after receiving two poor performance
reports while in the same grade or if deemed incompetent.38
Prosecutors are to be pillars of uprightness.39 More specifically, the role of
the Public Prosecutor is to be a check on judicial overbearance and to ensure
justice throughout the criminal justice system. Thus, they are specifically tasked
with a wide and varied set of responsibilities:
* Review and opine on proposed judicial actions (1) transferring a case to
trial, (2) ordering collection of body fluids, hair samples,
or fingerprints,
40
and (3) attaching property of a fugitive or accused;
41
* Oversee cases originating by action of a criminal complainant;
* Inspect detention centers;

42

* Review all death
penalty cases before submission to the Court of
43
Cassation; and
* Attend investigative hearings as well as trials, cross-examine, and advise

the judges on the disposition of a case.

44

The career path of prosecutors mirrors that of judges. Thus, as with judges, a
prosecutor must be Iraqi by birth, married, and a graduate of the Judicial
Institute.45 They take a similar oath.46 They are eligible for promotion every five
33. Judicial Organization, art. 37, § 2.
34. Id.art. 38.
35. Id. art. 45.
36. See id.
arts. 30, 47, 48, 50, 54.
37. Id.
art. 42.
38. Id. arts. 39, 58, 59.
39. Public Prosecution Law No. 159 of 1979 (Iraq), art. 39.
40. Id.art. 4.
41. Id. art. 7, § 1.
42. Id art. 7, § 2.
43. Id.art. 28, § I(C).
44. Amendment to the Law of Public Prosecution No. 159 of 1979, Law No. 15 of 1988 (Iraq),
art. 2.
45. Public Prosecution Law, art. 41, para. 1. Since prosecutors, like judges, must be graduates of
the Judicial Institute, and since applicants to the Judicial Institute must not only be Iraqi by birth but
born to parents who were Iraqi by birth, it follows that prosecutors must be Iraqi born to Iraqi parents.
See supra note 27. On the other hand, the exception allowing judges to be appointed who are not
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years. 47 Furthermore, they, too, rise through four pay-grade levels, and their salary
structure appears to be identical to that of judges.48 Finally, they are subject to
mandatory retirement with pension at age sixty-three.49
II. IRAQI CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM-THE PROCESS

Unlike the United States' criminal justice process, where informal factgathering in preparation for the formal (accusatorial) trial process is largely done
outside the realm of the disinterested judicial branch of government, the Iraqi penal
system-structured similarly to the Egyptian and continental civil law modelsconsiders the investigatory, fact-gathering phase as the actual first step in its
formal (inquisitorial) trial process.50 Although there is obviously a role for some
(even significant) data collection prior to the start of judicial involvement, the
process-at least on paper-calls for the investigative judge (IJ) (or his own staff
"judicial investigator") to repeat or confirm all critical facts in the case.
The remainder of this article will set out both the black-letter law from the
Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code and the way I observed it in practice-with the
caveat that my exposure to the process was meager at best and limited to small
portions of Baghdad.
A. The InitialInvestigation
The initial investigation includes all government-led pre-trial actions taken in
response to a discovery or report of a crime. Criminal cases in Iraq, as in the
United States, begin either when the police arrest a suspect or when an individual
presses charges.51 A complaint can be instigated by an injured party, his
representative, or a government official in the judicial system. Because crimes
are essentially torts where the state sues on behalf of the victim (and society at
Judicial

Institute graduates does not expressly apply to prosecutors. Amendment to the Judicial
Organization Law No. 160 of 1979, 2006 (Iraq); see supranote 25.
46. Public Prosecution Law at art. 42, para. 2:
I swear by God to perform the works of my duty and apply the Laws with [sic]
loyally and faithfully in conformity with its aims in Building the United Socialist
Democratic Society.
47. Id.art. 43, para. 1.
48. Compare Public Prosecution Law, art. 43, with Judicial Organization Law No. 160 of 1979
(Iraq), art. 38.
49. Public Prosecution Law, art. 57, para. 1.
50. See CPA Order No. 13, §§ 1-2 (2004); Criminal Procedure Code No. 23 of 1971 (Iraq), art.
51.
51. Criminal Procedure Code, art. I(A):
Criminal proceedings are initiated by means of an oral or written complaint
submitted to an investigative judge, a [judicial] investigator, a policeman in
charge of a police station, or any crime scene officer by an injured party, any
person taking his place in law, or any person who knows that the crime has taken
place. In addition any one of those listed can notify the Public Prosecution unless
the law says otherwise. In the event of a witnessed offence the complaint may be
submitted to whichever police officers or sub-officers are present.
52. An attorney in fact cannot prosecute a case on behalf of an estate. See id art. 9(D):
If a person who had the right to submit the complaint dies, the right to submit the
case does not transfer to his heirs.
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large), the Iraqi system melds any private tort cause of action with the public
prosecution. The criminal complaint is thus not only a claim for criminal justice
and request that punitive action 53be taken against a perpetrator, but it includes the
concomitant civil action as well.
Some complaints must be filed by the victim alone,54 but other individuals
can provide information on a criminal case-such as eyewitnesses, 55 persons who
1
encounter evidence of a crime, 56 police officers,57
and certain professionals

53. Id. art. 9(A):
The submission of the complaint should include the claim for criminal justice
which is a petition that penal measures be taken against the perpetrator of the
offense and for the penalty to be imposed on him. The written complaint
includes the claim for civil justice as long as the complainant does not declare
otherwise.
54. See id. art. I(A); see also supra note 51. The victim ("aggrieved party") or his representative
must personally file the complaint in cases involving such crimes as adultery, polygamy, defamation,
divulging secrets, verbal assault (if the victim was not engaged in public service), theft, rape, breach of
trust, fraud, damage to or sabotage of private property, trespass, or throwing objects at vehicles,
buildings, gardens, or compounds. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 3(A). Such complaint must be filed
within 3 months (of the crime or notice thereof), absent compelling extenuating circumstances. Id. art.
6. If there are multiple victims, only one need file the complaint. Id. art. 4(A). If there are multiple
accused, a complaint against one is a complaint against all-except in the case of adultery (where
complaints must be filed separately against both perpetrators, including one's spouse). Id. art. 4(B).
55. Criminal Procedure Code, art. I(B):
An offense is considered to have been witnessed if it was witnessed whilst being
committed or a [sic] shortly afterwards or if the victim followed the perpetrator
afterwards or if shouting crowds followed him afterwards or if the perpetrator
was found a short while later carrying the equipment or weapons or goods or
documents or other things pointing to the fact that he was a perpetrator or
participant in the offense or if traces or signs indicate this at the time.
56. Id. art. 47(1):
Any person against whom an offense is committed and any person who learns
that an offense has been committed in respect of which proceedings have been
instituted without a complaint being submitted, or who learns that a suspicious
death has occurred, may inform the investigative judge or the [judicial]
investigator or the Public Prosecution or any police station.
57. Id. art. 49:
A. Any policeman in charge of a police station receiving information that a
felony or misdemeanor has been committed shall immediately record the
informant's statement in writing and require the informant to append his
signature. He shall then send a report of the matter to the investigative judge or
[judicial] investigator. If the information he has received makes it clear that the
felony or misdemeanor took place in the presence of witnesses then he shall take
the action specified in Article 43.
B. If the information he has received makes it clear that an infraction has been
committed he shall send a summary report of the offense to the judicial]
investigator or investigative judge. The report shall give the name of the
informant, the names of witnesses and the section of the law that applies to the
incident.
C. The policeman in charge of a police station must in every case enter in the
station logbook a summary of the information received concerning an offense
and the time at which the information was received.
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designated as mandatory reporters, including public servants and medical
professionals.58
Once a complaint has been filed or a case opened, it has a life of its own. It
cannot be withdrawn; nor can execution of the judgment be stopped59-- not even in
the event of the death of the complainant.60
In theory, the investigative process appears redundant. The Code identifies at
least three types of investigating officials-crime scene investigating officers,6 1

58. Id. art. 48:
Any public servant who, in the course of performing his duties or as a
consequence of performing his duties, learns that an offence has been committed
or suspects that an offence has been committed in respect of which proceedings
have been instituted without a complaint, and any person who has given
assistance in his capacity as a member of the medical profession in a case where
there are grounds for suspecting that an offence may have been committed us
[sic] well as any person who is present when a felony is committed must
immediately inform one of the persons specified in Article 47.
59. Id. art. 2:
The complaint may not be dropped, cancelled or withdrawn from nor can the
judgment issued on it be withdrawn from or not executed, except under the
circumstances explained in the law.
The exceptions seem to include the fact that the victim-complainant may withdraw from the complaint.
Id. art. 9(C):
The person who submitted the complaint has the right to withdraw from it. If a
number of persons submitted the complaint and some of them withdraw, this
does not invalidate the rights of the others.
Withdrawal of one of several complainants does not affect the case. Id. art. 9(E):
If there are many persons accused and the complaint against one of them is
withdrawn, this does not extend to the others, unless the law stipulates otherwise.
60. Id. art. 7:
If the aggrieved party passes away after submitting the complaint, this death will
have no effect on the processing of the complaint.
Contrast this with the situation where a complainant in an existing case later dies. Id. art. 9(D):
If a person who had the right to submit the complaint dies, the right to submit the
case does not transfer to his heirs.
61. Id. art. 39. "Crime scene officers" or investigating officers-not to be confused with the
judicial investigators working at the behest of the investigative judge-include, "according to their
areas of competence." Id.:
i. Police officers, police station commanders and sub-officers.
ii. Mayors of villages and of urban neighborhoods-in respect of the notification
of offenses, the apprehension of suspects and the safe custody of persons who
should be detained.
iii. Railway stationmasters and their deputies, train guards/conductors, port
managers/harbormasters, airport managers and captains of ships and aircraft and
their deputies-in respect of offenses committed within their areas of
responsibility.
iv. Heads of government departments and official or semi-official establishments
and agencies-in respect of offenses committed within their areas of
responsibility.
v. Public servants authorized to investigate offenses and take appropriate action
within the limits of the powers accorded to them by the relevant laws.
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judicial investigators (sometimes simply called "investigators"), 62 and the
investigative judge (IJ) himself. Regardless of their organizational affiliation, the
on-scene investigating officers, when acting in that capacity, report directly to the
Public Prosecutor's Office. 63 However, if they are derelict in their duties, they
answer directly to the IJ.64 These first responders conduct an initial round of data
66
collection 65 before reporting the matter to the IJ or the Public Prosecutor's Office.
The investigating officer's duty is to "go immediately" to the situs of the
crime and proceed to take statements (including from the alleged perpetrator),
62. Id. art. 51; see also supra note 24 and corresponding text, discussing judicial investigator
authorities as defined in Article 51.
63. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 40(A):
Each crime scene officer acts within the bounds of his area of competence, under
the supervision of the Public Prosecution and in accordance with the provisions
of the law.
64. Id. art. 40(B):
Crime scene officers are subject to the control of the investigative judge, who
may request the superiors of such officers to look into any case where an officer
acts in a manner inconsistent with his duties or is remiss or negligent in his work
and to institute disciplinary proceedings against him, such proceedings being
without prejudice to the officer's liability to criminal proceedings should he
commit an act that constitutes an offense.
65. Id. art. 43:
When a crime scene officer, within his area of competence as specified in Article
39, is informed or becomes aware that an offense has been committed in the
presence of witnesses, he is required to notify the investigative judge and the
Public Prosecution of the occurrence of the offense, to go immediately to the
place where the offense occurred, to take down in writing a statement from the
victim of the offense, to orally question the person about the accusation made
against him, to impound any weapons and anything that may appear to him to
have been used in the commission of the offense, to examine and preserve any
material traces of the offense, to establish the status and whereabouts of the
persons involved and or [sic] anything else that may assist in investigating the
offense, to hear statements by any person who was present or that can obtained
[sic] from other persons concerning the facts of the case or the perpetrator of the
offense and to cause a written record of all such information to be duly made.
66. See id. art. 46:
The crime scene officer's task ends when the investigative judge, [judicial]
investigator or representative of the Public Prosecution arrives, except in regard
to any matter for which they assign responsibility to him;
see also id art. 50(A):
As an exception to the first sub-paragraph of Article 49, the policeman in charge
of a police station shall conduct an investigation into any offense if he is
instructed to do so by an investigative judge of [sic] [judicial] investigator or if
he considers that referring the informant to an investigative judge or Dudicial]
investigator would delay necessary action and result in evidence of the offense
being destroyed or lost, the course of the investigation being impaired or the
suspect fleeing, provided that the officer submits the documentary record of the
investigation to the investigative judge or the [judicial] investigator as soon as he
has completed it;
id. art. 51(A):
The initial investigation shall be conducted by investigative judges or by
[judicial] investigators acting under the supervision of investigative judges.
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collect evidence, and make inquiries.67 They have authority to "forbid" the
movement of witnesses/personnel at the scene and to issue summonses for the
appearance of other necessary witnesses, but they apparently do not have
enforcement authority; 68 instead, they simply note any refusal to cooperate in their
official record of the case. 69 This investigation is preliminary to the official
investigation conducted by the IJ or the IJ's own judicial investigator: the
investigating officers merely pass all information and evidence received (there are
no specific chain-of-custody requirements70 ), including their own narrative71 report
of their investigative actions, to the court authorities as part of the case file.
B. The InitialInvestigation,Some Observations
Following the 2003 U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, and the subsequent violent
backlash from the various groups hostile to Coalition operations, the security
situation worsened to the point that traditional police could not conduct criminal
investigations as they had done previously during the relatively secure
environment managed by the Saddam regime.7 2 Thus, for several years, the
civilian police-through lack of training and resources, were unable to perform
their regular crime-prevention and crime-investigation roles. This responsibility
thus fell to various Coalition groups who conducted patrols either on their own or
as training missions for Iraqi forces. 73 Given the high level of violence, it simply
was not feasible, in most instances, for first responders to cordon off a crime scene
and collect forensic evidence-even if they had been so inclined. Furthermore,
67. Id. art. 41:
Crime scene officers are authorized within their areas of competence to inquire
into offenses and to receive any statements and complaints that may be made in
regard to these offenses. They are required to assist the investigative judge,
[judicial] investigators, police officers and sub-officers, to pass on to them any
information concerning the offenses that may come into their possession, to
apprehend those who committed the offenses and to deliver them to the
appropriate authorities. They are also required to record all action taken in
official reports signed by them, stating the time and place the action was taken,
and to deliver immediately to the investigative judge all statements, complaints,
reports and other documents and all impounded items and substances.
68. But see id. art. 45:
The crime scene officer may request the assistance of the police if necessary.
69. Id. art. 44:
When a crime scene officer goes to the place where a witnessed offense has
occurred he may forbid those present to leave or move away from the scene of
the offense until an official record has been made. He may also summon
immediately any other person who may be able to supply information
establishing the facts of the case; if any person refuses such summons the
investigating officer shall note the refusal in the official record.
70. See id. art. 42:
Crime scene officers are required to use all possible means to preserve evidence
of an offense.
71. Id art. 41; see also supranote 67.
72. See ROBERT M. PERITO, U.S. INST. PEACE, THE COALITION'S PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY'S
EXPERIENCE WITH PUBLIC SECURITY IN IRAQ, 3-5 (2005), available at http://www.usip.org/resources/
coalition-provisional-authoritys-experience-public-security-iraq-essons-identified.
73. See id.
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during the heady days of the 2007 surge, most arrests were of terrorism suspectsmany of whom were treated as security internees rather than as criminal
detainees. 7
C. PretrialInvestigation-The InitialJudicialPhase
Once the police or other investigating officer has concluded the initial factgathering phase and turned over all reports, statements, and evidence, the
investigative judge takes over the case. The Code anticipates that the JJ's
investigation will occur in two phases. The first phase is an "initial" investigation
of the crime scene and related environs 71 in which the IJ travels about-even
outside his geographical jurisdiction, if necessary-making arrests, conducting
searches, and collecting evidence.76 The second phase of the investigation is a
formal hearing conducted in the IJ's offices.77
The purpose of the IJ's investigation is to create a dossier, which will be used
as the official record during the trial.78 In a very real sense, the IJ is the
quintessential finder of fact because testimony at trial-if there is any at all 79 -is

often a formality, merely confirming the facts already established by the IJ. As
such, this pretrial investigation may have more bearing on establishing the ultimate
fate of the accused than does the trial itself.
In establishing the facts of the case, the IJ holds almost unlimited authorityover the scope of the inquiry, the format and substance of testimony, the witnesses,

and even public access to the proceedings.

Thus, for example, other than

74. See Criminal Procedures, CPA Memorandum No. 3 of 2003 (Iraq), § 7; see also infra note 109
and corresponding text for more discussion about security internees.
75. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 52:
A. The investigative judge shall conduct the investigation into all offences in
person or by means of [judicial] investigators. He may authorize any crime scene
officer to carry out any particular action on his behalf
B. The scene of the incident shall be examined by the [judicial] investigator or
judge so that he may take the action specified in Article 43, record the nature of
any material trace or evidence of the offence and of the injury sustained by the
victim, note the apparent cause of any death that has occurred and arrange for a
sketch-map of the scene of the incident to be made.
C. If the investigative judge is notified of an offence that has occurred in the
presence of witnesses he must, whenever possible and without delay, go to the
scene of the incident in order that he may take the action specified in subparagraph B and notify the Public Prosecution accordingly.
76. Id. art 56(A):
The investigative judge may move to any other place within his area or
jurisdiction to conduct any part of his investigation, if such a move is required in
the interest of the investigation, he may move to any place outside his area of
jurisdiction if the exigencies of the investigation so require. In this case he shall
have powers of apprehension, arrest and search, and authority to hear witnesses,
to question suspects and persons connected with the incident under investigation
and to release persons with or without bail, provided that he notifies the
investigative judge of the district of the measures he has taken in that district.
77. See id. art. 57; see also infra note 80.
78. See infra note 240 and corresponding text.
79. See Criminal Procedure Code, art. 167; see also infra text accompanying note 300.
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individuals specifically authorized by the IJ to attend the hearing, only the accused
and the plaintiff (victim) are allowed in the room-and even they may be excluded
by the IJ for good cause shown.80
The closed nature of the hearing obviously does not extend to necessary fact
witnesses. In fact, although there is provision for collection and consideration of
"hard" evidence, Iraqi criminal procedure writ large is clearly slanted in favor of
witness testimony-and lots of it. In an interesting chicken-and-egg phenomenon,
Iraqi praxis and the Code have both evolved to disfavor consideration of forensic
or other non-testimonial evidence.81 It is true that the Code does provide for
appointment of expert witnesses (who obviously work for the court, not for the
prosecution or defense),8 2 and authorizes the IJ to collect 83 forensic evidence (from
both accused and victim)8 4 and to conduct exhumations.85 However, the primacy
80. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 57:
A. An accused person, a plaintiff, a civil plaintiff, a person responsible in civil
law for the actions of the accused and their representatives may attend the
investigation while it is in progress. The judge or the [udicial] investigator may
prohibit their attending if the matter in hand so requires, for reasons that he shall
enter in the record, with the proviso that they shall be granted access to the
investigation as soon as the need to prohibit their attendance ceases and that they
shall not have the right to speak unless permitted to do so and that if permission
is withheld a note to that effect shall be entered in the record of the investigation.
B. Any person who makes a request may receive a copy of the papers unless the
investigative judge considers that to provide them would affect the course or
confidentiality of the investigation.
C. No person other than those previously mentioned may attend the investigation
unless the investigative judge gives permission.
81. See id. art. 61:
A. Testimony is to be given orally but permission may be given for the witness to
refer to written notes if the nature of the evidence so requires.
B. Any person who is unable to speak may give his evidence in writing or in
conventional sigh [sic] language if he is unable to write.
C. If a witness does not understand the language in which the investigation is
being conducted, or is deaf or dumb, a person must be appointed to translate what
the witness says, or interpret the witness's sign language, after taking an oath that
he will translate or interpret truthfully and faithfully.
82. Id art. 69:
A. The [investigative] judge or riudicial] investigator may, of his own accord or
based on the request of the parties, appoint one or more experts to offer opinions
on matters connected to the offense being investigated.
B. The investigative judge or [judicial] investigator may ask the expert to attend
when called.
C. The [investigative] judge may permit the wages of the expert be borne by the
treasury as long as the price is not unreasonably high.
83. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
84. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 70:
The investigative judge or [udicial] investigator may compel the plaintiff or
defendant in a felony or misdemeanour case to cooperate in physical examination
or the taking of photographs, or through fingerprinting or analysis of blood, hair,
nails, or other items for the purposes of the investigation. Physical examination
of a female should be conducted by another female.
85. Id. art. 71:
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of testimony is firmly entrenched: the first order of business during the formal
investigation
is a thoroughgoing exposition of facts by the complainant and
86
victim.
So compelling is the preference for witness testimony that, while the rules
regarding physical evidence are minimal or hardly referenced in the Code, the
details regarding calling of witnesses are extensive. Witnesses can be summoned
to appear and testify under penalty of arrest for contempt.8 7 More importantly for
the accused, although there is a right against self-incrimination, 8 the protection is
not without its limits (either in theory or in practice) given the significance laid on
in-court confessions. 89 For example, spousal communications are the only
recognized category of privilege, but the privilege is not absolute. 90 All of-age
witnesses questioned during the hearing speak "on oath." 91 They must identify
The investigative judge may, if necessary, give permission for the exhumation of
a corpse by an expert or specialist doctor, in the presence of those with a
connection who are able to attend, in order to establish the cause or [sic] death.
86. Id. art. 58:
An investigation is to commence with the recording in writing of the deposition
of the plaintiff or informant, then of the testimony of the victim and other
prosecution witnesses and of anyone else whose evidence the parties wish to be
heard, and also the testimony of any person who comes forward of his own
volition to provide information, if such information will be of benefit to the
investigation, and the testimony of any other persons who the investigative judge
or [judicial] investigator learns is in possession of information concerning the
incident.
87. Id. art. 59:
A. Witnesses are to be summoned by the investigative judge or [judicial]
investigator to attend during the investigation by means of a writ of summons
which will be served upon them by the Police or by an official of the department
issuing the writ or by a village or district mayor or by any other person
authorized by law. Writs of summons addressed to persons employed in
government establishments or agencies or in official or semi-official departments
may be served on them by their departments.
B. In the case of offences committed in the presence of witnesses the witnesses
may be summoned orally.
C. An investigative judge may issue an order for the arrest of any witness who
fails to attend in due time and for him to be compelled to attend in order to give
evidence.
88. Id.art. 126(B):
The accused is not required to answer any of the questions he is asked;
see also infra Section II.E.8. Self-incrimination.
89. See infra text accompanying note 114.
90. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 68:
A. No married person shall be a witness against his or her spouse unless he or she
is accused of adultery or an offence against the spouse's person or properly [sic].
B. One of the persons aforementioned may be a defense witness for the other and
any part of his or her evidence leading to the conviction of the accused shall be
deemed to be invalid.
91. Id. art. 60(B)-(C):
B. Each witness who has attained the age of fifteen years is to be required, before
he gives evidence, to swear on [sic] oath that the evidence he will give shall be
the truth. Any person who has not attained the aforementioned age may be heard
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their relationship to the accused, the victim, and the complainant. 92 Pains are taken
to accommodate the live testimony of witnesses, to include the use of memory
aids, sign language, and translators.93 Each witness' statement must be reduced to
writing and witnesses may be recalled to clarify previous testimony. 94 The
preference for a live witness is so strong that the Code provides for payment of
witness travel costs95 and instructs the IJ to travel to the witness' location if
necessary to procure live testimony.96 On the other hand, once a witness is under
examination, the IJ controls the nature, substance, and delivery of all questions

92.

93.
94.

95.

96.

for the purpose of evidential inquiry without being on [sic] oath.
C. A complainant and a civil plaintiff may be heard as witnesses and may take
the oath.
Id. art. 60(A):
Each witness is to be asked to state his full name, occupation, place of residence,
relationship to the accused, to the victim, to the complainant and to the civil
plaintiff.
Id. art. 61; see supra note 81.
Id. art. 63:
A. Statements by a witness shall be entered in the record or the investigation
without any erasures, crossings out, amendments or additions to the text, which
when complete shall be read through and signed by the witness, or if the witness
cannot read shall be read out to him and then signed by the person who entered it
in the record. No correction or alteration shall be accepted unless signed both by
the investigative judge or [judicial] investigator and by the witness.
B. The accused and the other parties may make observations on evidence given
and may ask for a witness to be questioned again, or for other witnesses to be
questioned about other facts to which they refer, unless the investigative judge
considers that a response to the request would be impossible or impracticable or
would delay the investigation unjustifiably or would pervert the course ofjustice.
Id. art. 66:
If so requested by a witness the investigative judge shall assess the travel
expenses and other necessary expenditure incurred by the witness, as well as any
wages he has been deprived of, as a result of his attendance away from his
normal place of residence, and shall order their reimbursement from Treasury
funds.
Id. art. 67:
If the witness is ill or if there is anything else which prevents him from attending
then the investigative judge or [judicial] investigator shall go to the witness's
current place of residence in order to receive and record his evidence.
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propounded to the witness.97 Furthermore, equal in importance to the substance of
the witness' testimony 98 is the IJ's assessment of the witness' credibility. 99
Most interestingly, oral testimony is not presented seriatim in the type of
individual-witness question-and-answer format used in American courts; rather,
witness testimony is more conversational (albeit potentially confrontational).1 °°
The conversational nature of the testimony goes beyond a witness' own
observations of fact-to include observations about other evidence and even
asking or suggesting that other witnesses be summoned. 10 1 The only real limits on
witness testimony are that (1) all questions must be vetted through
the IJ, and (2) a
10 2
witness' statement can be curtailed if it is irrelevant or offensive.
Throughout this process, an accused is, of course, entitled to representation by
a retained or appointed defense attorney. 103 However, the Code does not identify
any specific role the defense bar is to play.

97. Id. art. 64:
A. No question may be addressed to a witness without the permission of the
investigative judge or Uudicial] investigator and no questions may be put to a
witness that are not relevant to the case or which impinge upon others. A witness
may not be addressed in a declaratory or insinuating manner and no sign or
gesture may be directed at him that would tend to intimidate, confuse or distress
him.
B. A witness may not be prevented from giving evidence that he wishes to give
and may not be interrupted while giving it, unless he speaks at undue length on
matters not relevant to the case or on matters that impinge on others, offend
common decency or infringe security.
98. See infra text accompanying notes 113-115 (noting that the IJ actually writes the summary of
testimony, highlighting or downplaying facts as the IJ, in his sole discretion, deems appropriate).
99. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 65:
The investigative judge or Uudicial] investigator must note in the record of the
investigation anything he observes about a witness that may affect his fitness to
give evidence or to sustain the process of giving evidence because of his age or
physical, mental or psychological condition.
100. Id. art. 62:
The evidence of each witness shall be heard separately but witnesses may
confront each other and the accused.
101. Id. art. 63(B):
The accused and the other parties may make observations on evidence given and
may ask for a witness to be questioned again, or for other witnesses to be
questioned about other facts to which they refer, unless the investigative judge
considers that a response to the request would be impossible or impracticable or
would delay the investigation unjustifiably or would pervert the course ofjustice.
102. Id. art. 64; see also supranote 97.
103. Id. art. 144:
A. The Head of the Court of Felony appoints a [sic] attorney for the accused in
felonies if he has not appointed one and the court sets remuneration for the
lawyer during judgment on the case. The decision to appoint the representative is
considered an order of delegation. If the attorney can demonstrate a legal excuse
for not accepting the brief, then it is for the head of the court to appoint an
alternative [sic] attorney.
B. The appointed attorney must prepare the submission and defend the accused,
or be replaced by an appointed attorney, with the court imposing a fine
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The IJ's role in the judicial process ends in one of three ways: he dismisses
the case with prejudice,1 0 4 he closes the case temporarily due to lack of evidence or
because the perpetrator cannot be identified (or, interestingly, because the incident
was an act of God),1 0 5 or he finds sufficient evidence that a crime has been
committed and that this accused committed the crime-in which case he binds the
accused over for trial.10 6 The IJ prepares a formal dossier with summaries of all
witness testimony and the statement of the accused, as well as an executive
summary describing the relevant details of the case. 107
D. PretrialInvestigation-TheInitialJudicialPhase,As Observed
Each opportunity I had to witness an Iraqi court proceeding 10 8 created lasting
impressions. First, was the indelicate ballet of shuffling prisoners-marched from
buses to holding cells, then to the IJ's chambers-dressed in sandals and brightlycolored jumpers. In the morning, there would be a line marching into the building,
the continuity broken occasionally by an amputee hobbling in on crutches or being
carried in by his fellow detainees. Their overseers orchestrated their movements at
implemented by a memo written by the head of the court to the department of
implementation, without violating the procedural rules of the court, in accordance
with the Law of Lawyers. He shall be exempt from the fine if at any time it is
proved that he was excused from attending the session in person or through a
representative;
see also supra note 17; infra Section II.E.7. Defense counsel issues (discussing defense
counsel roles and issues).
104. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 130(A):
If the investigative judge finds that the action is not punishable by law or that the
complainant has withdrawn the complaint, or that the offence is one over which
he has no authority without reference to the judge, or that the accused is not
legally responsible because he is a minor, he issues a decision rejecting the case
and closing the case file definitively.
105. Id. art. 130(B)-(C):
B. If the act is punishable by law and the investigative judge finds that there is
sufficient evidence for a trial, a decision is issued to transfer the accused to the
appropriate court. If there is insufficient evidence he is not transferred, an order
is issued for his release and the case file is closed temporarily, with a statement
containing the reason for the closure.
C. If the investigative judge finds that the perpetrator is unknown or that the
incident was an act of God, he issues a decision to close the case temporarily.
106. Id.art. 130(B).
107. Id. art. 131:
A decision of transfer should list the name of the accused, his age, profession,
place of residence and the offence of which he is accused as well as the time and
date of its occurrence and the Article of law which applies, the name of the
victim and the evidence obtained, along with the date of issue of the decision,
signed by the investigative judge and stamped by the court.
108. I readily admit that my personal observations may not be at all representative of the criminal
justice system as it occurs in the court systems that have been extant throughout Iraq since the original
adoption of the Criminal Procedure Code. The totality of my observations of investigative hearings
occurred at the main (Al Karkh) branch of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI), while all of my
observations of trial hearings were at the Rusafa Branch of the CCCI. The relevant players were Iraqis,
but the forum was a Coalition creature. Nevertheless, I am confident that the process is not significantly
different elsewhere.
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every phase-first to the dusty holding cells, then to the internal hallways adjacent
to the IJs' chambers to await the calling of their case. The courthouse almost had
an atmosphere of a crowded marketplace. When their case was called, they would
be ushered into the office. The IJ would sit at his large desk, which was situated in
such a way that it was obvious to all present that this was his show.
The Al Karkh facility processed all criminal cases investigated and presented
by Task Force 134, the Coalition unit tasked with processing persons captured by
MNF-I forces. An initial review process determined whether the MNF-I detainees
should be released to the Iraqi criminal justice process or held indefinitely as
Coalition security internees-either because they were a potential source of
ongoing actionable intelligence or because they were deemed a persistent threat,
but there was insufficient releasable (unclassified) information to use against them
in a criminal prosecution.109 Those released to Iraqi authorities were processed in
the new CCCI court system, with Iraqi judges applying Iraqi law.
The investigative hearing was an intimate setting. It was rare to have more
than seven or eight people in the room, including the IJ, his recorder (judicial
investigator?), the accused, the prosecutor (usually played by a U.S. military
lawyer), a defense counsel, a translator or two for the U.S. military members
present, a few witnesses-usually U.S. military members who had arrested the
individual while on patrol-and maybe an observer or two (like me). Only on rare
occasions did the defense counsel say a word during the entire hearing. Whereas
one (male) Iraqi witness might be considered sufficient to establish a case ready to
move forward (providing the accused confessed110 ), it was understood (maybe
even a policy) that Iraqi IUs would not accept the testimony of just one U.S.
military witness in any case-no matter how many photographs, diagrams, or other
pieces of evidence there might be.
Task Force 134 apparently had a working relationship with the Public
Prosecutor's Office at CCCI whereby military attorneys were deputized as
"Special Prosecutors",1 although they were obviously not Prosecutors under Iraqi
law-not having been to the Judicial Institute nor falling under the Office of Public
Prosecution. Although the Code does not really envision any participation by the
Public Prosecutor during the investigative phase, 1 2 the Prosecutor does,
109. Criminal Procedures, CPA Memorandum No. 3 of 2003 (Iraq), § 7, available at
http://www.ictj.org/static/MENAIraq/iraq.cpamemo3.062704.eng.pdf.
110. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 213(B):
One testimony is not sufficient for a ruling if it is not corroborated by
background information or other convincing evidence or an admission from the
accused. The exception to this rule is if the law specifies a particular way of
proving a case, which must be followed;
see also infra text accompanying notes 280-283.
111. This assertion is made based on a variety of Task Force 134 documents in the possession of
the author.
112. Criminal Procedure Code, arts. 40(A), 43, 46, 47(A), 84 (enumerating the duties of the Public
Prosecutor); see also Public Prosecution Law No. 159 of 1979 (Iraq); supra text accompanying notes
39-44. The involvement of the Public Prosecutor's Office in any particular criminal case is fairly
superficial until a formal trial is called. The Public Prosecutor is available as a sort of Inspector General
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nevertheless, have an institutional interest in monitoring developments in each case
to ensure compliance with law and procedure. It was my experience that the
military attorneys' participation was limited to preparing military witnesses for the
hearing and accommodating their presence. It was rare that the attorneys were
allowed to question a witness directly. Instead, depending on the indulgence of the
IJ, they often had to request or suggest that the judge question the accused on a
certain point to try to bring out some fact the attorney considered relevant. The
judge might ask the question just as the attorney had suggested, he might reword it,
or he might not ask it at all.
To me, the most striking aspect of the investigative hearing was that the
dossier prepared and submitted by the IJ did not seem to contain any primary
evidence.113 Instead, the IJ would dictate a summary of each witness' testimony,
as well as a review of all diagrams and photographs mentioned during the hearing.
The IJ's recorder (perhaps his judicial investigator?) would sit at the comer of his
desk and transcribe his dictation in longhand onto blank sheets of paper-making a
simultaneous file copy by use of carbon paper slid between two sheets of paper
held by a binder clip (reportedly an Iraqi practice in all walks of life). It was this
handwritten dictation that became the case file forwarded to the trial court.
The Iraqi judiciary apparently has a saying that "the confession is the master
of evidence."' 114 The IJ's true power is most poignant in the surprisingly-large
majority of cases where there is a confession. On the one hand, confessions were
transcribed in the same quotidian way as the IJ's executive overview of the entire
case and other witness statements. On the other hand, it was in fact the IJ's
terminology, not the accused's, that was ultimately adopted as the confession. I
witnessed more than one IJ dictate his version of the confession and even get in
sidebars-sometimes involving some amount of obvious disagreement-with the
accused over just how the facts should be portrayed. In the end, the accused would
adopt the statement and affix to it his mark or signature.
The foregoing practice was in sharp contrast to the level of acceptance by the
IJ and trial judges alike with respect to extrajudicial confessions. Even though the
Coalition forces had an extensive training program to ensure that their police
patrols thoroughly documented the crime scene with photographs, diagrams, and
tape recordings,11 5 the judges appear chary of accepting any confessions made to
the police/military agents who effected the arrest. The judges feel a strong need to
witness the confession themselves (and perhaps to massage it in their own
verbiage). Accordingly, such out-of-court confessions typically hold little to no
weight.
to ensure that the investigators and judges properly adhere to legal requirements. But see Amendment
to the Law of Public Prosecution No. 159 of 1979, Law No. 15 of 1988(Iraq), art. 2.; supranote 44 and
accompanying text (Public Prosecutor is entitled to attend investigative hearings).
113. See supratext accompanying notes 81-85.
114. Interview with Al-Maliki, supra note 18.
115. See Rita Boland, Battlefield Crime Scene Investigators Gather Evidence to Stop Terrorists,
SIGNAL, Nov. 2009, at 34, available at http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGNAL_
ArticleTemplate.asp?articleid=2104&zoneid=54.
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E. SpecialIssues Under the Code
The Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code addresses a variety of issues that are not
part of the investigation and trial process per se, but have significant bearing on
them.
1. Searches and Seizures

116

The rules regarding searches of persons or places are not unlike American
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 1 7 For example, although government officials
looking for evidence of a crime may not search a person or place without prior
authorization,1 1 8 the IJ's authority in ordering searches is quite broad.11 9
As in other areas of the law, the legal standard for the investigative judge is
hazy: he simply must have reason (probable cause?) to believe that useful evidence
will be found which will shed light on the investigation. 120 If necessary, authorities
116. I was never in a position to witness a field investigation, so I cannot offer any observations of
whether praxis differs from theory. I can say, however, that the investigative hearings and trials I
observed did not seem to utilize any seized items as evidence-relying, instead, on witness statements,
photographs, and pictures drawn by the witness at the scene. To my recollection, I never observed any
discussion of an objection to any search or seizure.
117. See Article 17, Section 2, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005:
The sanctity of the homes shall be protected. Homes may not be entered,
searched, or violated, except by a judicial decision in accordance with the law.
118. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 72(A):
The searching or any person or entry of any house or any business premises for
the purposes of a search are not permitted other than in cases stipulated by law;
see also id art. 73(A):
The searching of any person or entry of a house or other business premises for
the purpose of a search is not permitted unless based on an order issued by the
competent legal authority.
119. See id. art. 70:
The investigative judge or Dudicial] investigator may compel the plaintiff or
accused in a felony or misdemeanour case to cooperate in physical examination
or the taking of photographs, or through fingerprinting or analysis of blood, hair,
nails, or other items for the purposes of the investigation. Physical examination
of a female should be conducted by another female.
120. Id. art. 74:
If it appears to the investigative judge that a particular person is holding items or
papers which would inform the investigation, he may issue a written order for the
items to be submitted. If he believes that the order will not be obeyed or is
worried that the items will be removed, he may conduct a search procedure in
accordance with the paragraphs below;
see also id art. 75:
The investigative judge may order the searching of any person or house or any
other place owned by the person accused [of] committing an offence if the search
may reveal the presence of documents, weapons, tools or persons who have had a
part in the offence or are held against their will;
id. art. 76:
If it appears to the investigative judge, based on information or an indication, that
a residence or other place is being used to keep stolen money, or that it contains
items involved in an offence, a person who is being held against his will or a
person who has committed an offence, he may order the search of that location
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may use force to effectuate a search. 121 On the other hand, despite a seeming lack
of standards regarding the level of suspicion required to justify a search, searches
are theoretically conducted under the aegis of an investigative judge. Thus,
although there are no legal standards set forth in the Code, they are likely
discussed both in law school and at the Judicial Institute. It should also be noted
that there is a panoply of rights reminiscent, and perhaps more protective, of
individual concerns than in American jurisprudence:
The police may not deviate from the scope of the authorization.1
*
*

The search authorization requirement extends even to areas
outside the control of the accused-where an123American suspect
would not have standing to contest the search.

*

The default rule is that searches take place in the accused's
presence; furthermore, impartial witnesses
observe the search to
124
safeguard against police impropriety.

*

Notwithstanding the lack of a specific requirement to maintain a

and take legal measures in relation to the money or persons, whether or not the
location is owned by the accused;
id. art. 77:
The person undertaking the search may search any individual at the search site on
the basis that such individual may be hiding something for which the search is
being conducted.
Note that Article 77 was not included in any of the original English translations of the Criminal
Procedure Code. It is now extant in the GJPI version. See supranote 1.
121. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 81:
The person to be searched, or whose property is to be searched, in accordance
with the law, must allow the persons searching to perform their duty. If he
prevents the search, the person undertaking the search must carry it out through
the use of force or may request police assistance.
122. Id. art. 78:
A search is not permissible except when looking for the items to which the search
relates. If the search reveals the existence of another item indicating an offense,
it may be seized.
123. There must be an authorization to search not only the person or real property owned by an
accused, see Criminal Procedure Code, art. 75; see supranote 120 and accompanying text, but locations
not owned by the defendant as well. See Criminal Procedure Code art. 76; see also supranote 120 and
accompanying text.
124. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 82:
The search should take place in the presence of the accused and the owner of the
house or place of business, if appropriate, and in the presence of 2 witnesses,
along with the mayor or his appointee. The person conducting the search is to
prepare a record in which are recorded the procedures and time of the search
along with the location, items seized with descriptions, names of those present in
the location as well as a note of the accused and those connected with the case
and the names of witnesses. This record should be signed by the accused, the
owner of the place, the person who carries out the search and those present. Any
refusal to sign should be noted in the record. The accused should be given a copy
or [sic] the record on request, as may those connected to the case, and copies of
letters or documents should be given to their owners, if that is not detrimental to
the investigation.
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125
chain-of-custody paper trail,
the Code has direct safeguards
126
tampering.
evidence
against

*

Personal privacy

considerations

even

extend to personal

effects. 127

*

Female body searches must be conducted by other females.128

*

Suspects9 may even raise objections during the course of the
search

12

Iraqi law also recognizes some of the same types of exceptions to the
warrant/order requirement:
130
Emergency circumstances entry
*
131

*

Plain view seizure

*

Search incident to arrest

132

125. See id. art. 42; see also supranote 70 and accompanying text.
126. Id. art. 83:
The person carrying out the search must place seals on all locations and items
containing evidence needed for the investigation, which should be protected. It is
not permissible to break this seal except by order of the investigative judge and in
the presence of the accused and owner of the property and the person who
checked the goods. If one of them is unable to attend or send a delegate, it is
permissible to break the seal in his absence.
127. Id. art. 84:
A. If, amongst the articles in the location being searched, there are letters,
documents or other personal items, it is not permissible for anyone to read them
other than the person conducting the search, the investigative judge, the [judicial]
investigator and a representative of the Public Prosecutor.
B. If the items seized are papers which have been sealed in any way, it is not
permissible for any person other than the investigative judge or the investigator
to open them and read them. This reading should take place in the presence of
the accused and those connected with the location. If the papers have no
connection with the case, they should be returned to the owner and not made
public.
128. Id. art. 80:
If a female is to be searched, the search must be conducted by a female appointed
for the purpose, with the identity or [sic] the searcher being recorded in the
record;
see also id art. 70:
Physical examination of a female should be conducted by another female.
129. Id.art. 86:
Objections to the search procedures should be submitted to the investigative
judge who must make a quick decision.
130. Id.art. 73(B):
It is permitted to search any location without prior permission in the event of a
request for assistance from a person inside the location, or in the case of fire,
drowning or other similar case of necessity.
131. Id art. 78:
If the search reveals the existence of another item indicating an offense, it may be
seized.
132. Id.art. 79:
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Finally, it is worth noting that the Iraqi Penal Code, 135 the main source of
substantive criminal law in Iraq, makes it a crime for public officials
to enter a
136
home to conduct a search without consent or proper authorization.
137
2. Compulsory Appearance--the Summons
At any time during the fact-gathering phase, the official may issue a summons
to any person with knowledge of the case. 3 8 The summons is prepared in
duplicate and signed by the process server and the recipient, with each receiving a

The [judicial] investigator or crime scene officer may search the person arrested
in cases in which the arrest is permitted by law. In the event of the deliberate
commission of a felony or misdemeanor [sic] which has been witnessed, he may
inspect the house of the accused, or any place in his possession, or seize persons,
papers or items which inform the investigation if there is a strong indication of
their presence.
133. Id. art. 85:
Any person conducting a search outside the area of jurisdiction of the judge who
issued it, must, before the search is carried out, refer to the investigative judge of
the area in which the place to be searched is located. In urgent cases he may
carry out the search immediately and then inform the investigative judge of the
area.
134. Id. art. 107:
Anyone who arrests someone in accordance with the law must take from him any
weapons he is carrying and hand them over immediately to the person issuing the
arrest warrant or to the nearest police station or to any member of the police.
135. Penal
Code
No.
111
of
1969
(Iraq),
available
at
http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/raqiPenalCode_1969.pdf
The author is not aware of an
English translation of the Code being published in the English version of The Iraqi Gazette, but this
version appears to be an official translation commissioned by the Iraqi Ministry of Justice.
136. Id. 326:
Any public official or agent who, in the course of his official duty, enters the
house of a person or any part thereof without the consent of that person or causes
another to enter the house in circumstances other than those in which the law
sanctions such entry or without due care to the procedures laid down for making
such entry is punishable by detention plus a fine or by one of those penalties.
The same penalty applies to any public official or agent who carries out a search
of a person, house or location without the consent of the owner or causes another
to carry out the search in circumstances other than those in which the law
sanctions such search or without due care to the procedures laid down for such
search.
137. As with searches and seizures, I had no opportunity to observe the summons process either in
action or being discussed during a judicial hearing.
138. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 87:
The court, investigative judge, [judicial] investigator or policeman in charge of a
police station may issue a summons to the accused or to a witness or to anyone
connected with the case. There should be two copies of the document on which
are recorded the person issuing the summons and the person summoned, along
with their place of residence, the time and place of the requested attendance, the
type of offense being investigated, and the legal paragraph on which it is based.
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copy.139 In cases where the recipient refuses to sign or cannot sign (due 1 to
40
illiteracy?), a witness can sign the documents attesting to their delivery.
Personal service of a summons is not required: if it is known that the witness is 1in41
country, the summons may be served on a spouse, close relative, or coworker.
In fact, if no one is available to accept service of process, the summons may
simply be affixed to the recipient's door, with the server and witnesses attesting to
the posting.1 42 If the witness is in-county but outside the jurisdiction of the official
issuing the summons, the server can send it to a process server who has jurisdiction
in the witness' location.1 43 If the witness is outside Iraq, service is accomplished
by mail using the same procedures used in civil cases. 1 " A witness who presents
to the investigative judge without being summoned must submit a written pledge to
appear when requested.1 45 This places the individual under the same legal
requirement to appear as a person summoned.
In consequence, failure to appear is
14 6
a basis for the issuance of an arrest warrant.
139. Id.; see also id. art. 88:
The person summoned notes the contents of the summons and signs the original
document with his signature or finger print. The other copy is handed to him and
an indication is made on the original document that notification has been carried
out, which includes a statement of the time and date of notification. If the person
summoned will not accept the summons or is unable to sign, the person tasked
with notification must ensure that he is informed of the contents in the presence
or [sic] witnesses, and leave him the other copy, after noting this on both copies,
followed by his signature and those of the witnesses.
140. Id. art. 88.
141. Id. art. 89(A):
If the person summoned is not present in his home or place of work and it is
found that he is present in the country, the summons can be presented to his
spouse, other relatives or relatives by marriage living with him, a person working
for him or an employee at his place of work, who should sign the original copy
and pass him the copy. If he does not, or cannot, sign, the procedures given in
Article 88 above should be followed.
142. Id. art. 89(B):
If the person tasked with notification does not find any of the persons mentioned
above, he pins a copy of the paper on the outer door of the residence or place of
work, after signing in front of witnesses, explaining the steps taken on both the
copy and the original.
143. Id. art. 91:
A summons to a person outside the geographical jurisdiction of the authority
issuing that summons is sent to a [sic] authority within the geographical
jurisdiction for notification in accordance with the rules stated above.
144. Id. art. 90:
The notification of persons outside Iraq and of corporate bodies is done through
use of a written summons in accordance with the procedures outlined in the Code
for Civil Procedures.
145. Id. art. 96:
If a person who should have had a summons or arrest warrant issued against him,
appears before the judge or [judicial] investigator, the judge must ask him for a
written pledge, with or without bail, saying that he will attend at the required
time. If he does not attend, and does not have a legal excuse, the judge must
issue an arrest warrant.
146. Id. art. 97:
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3. Arrest and Detention
The Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code, consistent with the overarching theme of
the investigative judge leading the charge to determine whether and by whom a
crime has been committed, envisions an orderly process where an arrest is
authorized by the investigative judge only once the investigation has progressed
sufficiently to identify a suspect. In fact, the default position in the Code is that
arrests must be effectuated pursuant to a judge-issued warrant, 147 barring other
legal authority.1 48 The warrant specifically identifies the suspect and the general
nature of the crime he is accused of committing. 49 Unlike summonses, which are
issued for witnesses or petty criminals, 50 arrest warrants are not limited by the

If the person does not attend after being summoned, without a legal excuse, or if
there is a fear that he will abscond or influence the investigation, or if he does not
have a specific place of residence, the judge may issue a warrant for his arrest.
147. Id.art. 92:
Arrest or apprehension of a person is permitted only in accordance with a warrant
issued by a judge or court or in other cases as stipulated by the law.
148. See id. art. 102:
A. Any person may arrest any other person accused of a felony or misdemeanor
without an order from the authorities concerned, in any of the following cases:
i. If the offence was committed in front of witnesses.
ii. If the person to be arrested has escaped after being arrested legally.
iii. If he has been sentenced in his absence to a penalty restricting his
freedom.
B. Any person may, without an order from the authorities concerned, arrest any
other found in a public place who is in a clear state of intoxication and confusion
and has created trouble or has lost his reason;
see also id. art. 103:
Any policeman or crime scene officer must arrest any of the following if they
encounter them:
i. Any person against whom an arrest warrant has been issued by the
competent authorities;
ii. Any person carrying arms, whether openly or concealed, violating the
provisions of law;
iii. Any person thought, based on reasonable grounds, to have deliberately
committed a felony or misdemeanor and who has no particular place of
residence;
iv. Any person who impedes a member of the court or public official from
carrying out his duty.
149. Id.art. 93:
The arrest warrant should contain the full name of the accused, with his identity
card details and physical description if these are known, as well as his place of
residence, his profession, and the type of offence to which the warrant relates, the
legal provision which applies and the date of the warrant. It should be signed and
stamped by the court. In addition to the details given, the warrant should contain
an instruction to members of the police force to arrest the accused, by force if he
will not come voluntarily.
150. See id. art. 99:
In the case of an offence punishable by a period of detention exceeding one year,
the accused is called to attend by the issue of an arrest warrant against him,
unless the judge sanctions the issue of a summons. However, the issuing of a
summons for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment is not
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judge's 1jurisdictional
limits and thus are enforceable throughout the entire
51
country.

Police or court officers have authority to make warrantless arrests under a
variety of specified circumstances.152 Citizen's arrest is also authorized.153 Force
(apparently including lethal force in cases where the alleged offense merits the
death penalty) may be5used
to enter a place to accomplish an arrest or to subdue a
4
person being arrested.
The orderly process anticipated by the Code is that the accused is presented to
the investigative judge for initial questioning 5 5 within twenty-four hours of
arrest. 5 6 Following this interrogation, the judge determines whether the arrestee
permitted.
151. Id. art. 94:
A. The arrest warrant is valid in all areas of Iraq and must be executed by anyone
to whom it is sent. It remains current until it has been executed or cancelled by
the party issuing it or by a higher authority with legal right to do so.
B. The wanted person must be informed of the warrant which has been issued for
his arrest and be brought before the party who issued the warrant;
but see id art. 100:
If the arrest warrant is to be executed outside the area of jurisdiction of the judge
who issued it, the person charged with its execution should present it to the
appropriate judge in the area for permission to execute it, unless he believes that
the opportunity to arrest the person will be missed;
see also id. art. 101:

A. If the arrest warrant is executed outside the jurisdiction of the judge who
issued it, and if there is no permission to release the accused by pledge or bail as
stipulated in Article 95, the judge must detain him and send him under escort to
the judge who issued the warrant.
B. If the bail put forward by the accused is not accepted, or if he is unable to
make the pledge as stipulated in Article 95, the judge must detain him and send
him under escort to the judge who issued the warrant.
152. See id. art. 103; see supranote 148 and accompanying text.
153. See id. art. 102; see supra note 148 and accompanying text.
154. Id. art. 105:
Any person who is sent an order to arrest someone, and any person charged with
making an arrest in a witnessed offence must pursue the accused in order to arrest
them, and if the presence of the accused is in doubt, or he hides somewhere,
persons in that place should be asked to hand him over or to offer all possible
facilities to enable his arrest. If this is not allowed, the person making the arrest
must enter this place or any place in which the accused has taken refuge, by
force, in order to arrest him;
see also id art. 108:
If the accused resists arrest or tries to escape, the person arresting him in
accordance with the law may use reasonable force to enable him to carry out the
arrest and to move him without allowing him to escape, provided that this does
not lead to the death of anyone who has not committed an offense for which the
death penalty or life imprisonment is prescribed.
155. For discussion of the right against self-incrimination, see infra Section II.E.8.
incrimination.
156. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 123(A):
The investigative judge or [judicial] investigator must question the accused
within 24 hours of his attendance, after proving his identity and informing him of

Self-
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should be detained and for how long. The Code prescribes a range of pretrialrestraint time periods, depending on the punishment prescribed for the crime of
which the person is accused:
*

Death penalty
cases: the judge may order the accused to be held
15 7
indefinitely.

*

Crimes punishable by up to three years detention, imprisonment
for a term of years, or life imprisonment: the judge may order
successive fifteen-day periods, but
may release either on bail158
59
appear.1
to
pledge
written
a
or on

*

Crimes punishable by no more than three years of detention or a
fine: the judge must order the release of the accused
unless "he
1 60
considers" that such release will frustrate justice.

*

Persons accused of mere "infractions": no pretrial restraint may
be imposed unless the person is homeless. 61

Under all of the foregoing circumstances, detention should not exceed onequarter of the maximum potential sentence, and in no case longer than six months;
the criminal court must approve any detention beyond six months and may not
approve any detention longer than one-quarter of the maximum potential
sentence.162 Detention is meant to be a temporary status 63-i.e., a person is to be
the offence of which he is accused. His statements on this should be recorded,
with a statement of evidence in his favour. The accused should be questioned
again if necessary to establish the truth.
157. See id. art. 109(B):
If the person arrested is accused of an offence punishable by death the period
stipulated in sub-paragraph (A) may be extended for as long as necessary for the
investigation to proceed until the investigative judge or criminal court issues a
decision on the case on completion of the preliminary or judicial investigation or
the trial.
158. Bail issues regarding amounts, handling of funds, and seizure of personal property to satisfy
debts to the court are set forth in Criminal Procedure Code, arts. 114-122.
159. Id. art. 109(A):
If the person arrested is accused of an offence punishable by a period of detention
not exceeding 3 years or by imprisonment for a term of years or life
imprisonment, the judge may order that he be held for a period of no more [than]
15 days on each occasion or order his release on a pledge with or without bail
from a guarantor, and that he attend then requested if the judge rules that release
of the accused will not lead to his escape and will not prejudice the investigation.
160. Id. art. 110(A):
If the person arrested is accused of an offence punishable by a period of detention
of 3 years or less or by a fine, the judge must release him on a pledge with or
without bail unless he considers that such a release will obstruct the investigation
or lead to the accused absconding.
161. Id art. 110(B)
If the person arrested is accused of an infraction, he may not be held unless he
has no particular place of residence.
162. Id art. 109(C):
The total period of detention should not exceed one quarter of the maximum
permissible sentence for the offence with which the arrested person is charged
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held only so long as is necessary to conduct165the investigation.1
exonerated, he is to be released immediately.

64

If a detainee is

The foregoing plethora of specific provisions in the Iraqi Criminal Procedure
Code is bolstered by a variety of others elsewhere in Iraqi law. For example, the
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq Constitution provides a number of references to
minimum standards regarding treatment of criminal suspects. Starting from the
idealized concepts that human dignity is to be "protected,"1 66 that the accused is
presumed innocent until proved guilty, 167 and that individuals have the right to be

treated with justice in all judicial proceedings,1 68 the Constitution specifically
prohibits "unlawful detention."' 169 The Constitution also goes so far as to specify
that "no person may be kept in custody or investigated except according to a

judicial decision" 170 and that preliminary investigative documents must be
submitted to an IJ within twenty-four hours of "arrest"-this period being
extended at most only once for an additional twenty-four hours. 171 All persons

and should not, in any case, exceed 6 months. If it is necessary to increase the
period of detention to more than 6 months, the judge must submit the case to the
Felony Court to seek permission for an appropriate extension, which must not
itself exceed one quarter of maximum permissible sentence, or he should order
his release, with or without bail, under the terms of sub-paragraph (B).
163. But see Modifications of Penal Code Proceedings Law, CPA Order No. 31 of 2003 (Iraq), § 6:
Notwithstanding the bail provisions contained in Paragraph 109 of the Criminal
Proceedings Law No. 23 of 1971 the reviewing judge may order a person
suspected of committing an offense punishable by life imprisonment to be held
without bail until trial.
164. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 111:
The judge who issued the decision to detain the accused may decide to release
him on a pledge, with or without bail, before the end of the period of detention
stipulated in sub-paragraph (B) of Article 109, and he may return him to the
holding detention if necessary for the investigation.
165. Id.art. 130(D):
An accused who has been detained will be released once the decision to reject the
case or to release him has been issued.
166. Article 37, Section 1(A), Doustour Joumhourait al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005:
The liberty and dignity of man shall be protected.
167. Id.Article 19, Section 5:
The accused is innocent until proven guilty in a fair legal trial. The accused may
not be tried for the same crime for a second time after acquittal unless new
evidence is produced.
168. Id Article 19, Section 6:
Every person shall have the right to be treated with justice in judicial and
administrative proceedings.
169. Id Article 19, Section 12(A):
Unlawful detention shall be prohibited.
170. Id.Article 37, Section 1(B):
No person may be kept in custody or investigated except according to a judicial
decision.
171. Id.Article 19, § 13:
The preliminary investigative documents shall be submitted to the competent
judge in a period not to exceed twenty-four hours from the time of the arrest of
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accused of felonies or misdemeanors have a constitutional right to court-appointed
defense counsel 172 and to present a defense in all phases of investigation and
trial. 173
The Iraqi Penal Code 174 actually enumerates several crimes applicable to
government officials who violate a suspect's rights regarding detention:
*
It is a crime to arrest, detain, or imprison 175any person in
circumstances other than those stipulated by law.
*

It is a crime for detention facility and prison officials to accept
prisoners without a valid detention or imprisonment order. 176

*

It is a crime to willfully fail to execute the duties of one's
177
office
or to commit an act in breach
of one's duties with intent
178
to harm the welfare of an individual.

*

It is a crime to maltreat a private citizen, causing him to suffer a
loss of esteem or dignity or to experience physical pain. 179

the accused, which may be extended only once and for the same period.
172. Id.Article 19, § 11:
The court shall appoint a lawyer at the expense of the state for an accused of a
felony or misdemeanor who does not have a defense lawyer.
173. Id.Article 19, Section 4:
The right to a defense shall be sacred and guaranteed in all phases of
investigation and the trial.
174. Criminal Procedure Code No. 23 of 1971, art. 107; see supranote 134.
175. Penal
Code
No.
111
of
1969
(Iraq),
art.
322,
available
http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IraqiPenalCode_1969.pdf:
Any public official or agent who arrests, imprisons or detains a person in
circumstances other than those stipulated by law is punishable by a term of
imprisonment not exceeding 7 years or by detention. The penalty will be a term
of imprisonment not exceeding two years or detention if the offence is committed
by a person wearing an official uniform to which he is not entitled or who uses a
false identity or makes use of a counterfeit order claiming it to have been issued
by an authority that is entitled to issue such orders.
176. Id.
art. 324:
Any public official or agent who is entrusted with the administration or
supervision of a centre, prison or other institution set aside for the discharging of
a penalty or precautionary measure and who admits a person without an order to
do so from a competent authority or refrains from implementing an order issued
for the release of such person or for his continued detention following the period
prescribed for his custody, detention or imprisonment is punishable by detention.
177. Id art. 330:
Any public official or agent who unlawfully refrains from executing the duties of
his office or wilfully [sic] fails to fulfil [sic] his duties in response to a request or
instruction or to mediation by another or for any unlawful reason is punishable by
detention.
178. Id.
art. 331:
Any public official or agent who wilfully [sic] commits an act in breach of the
duties of his office or refrains from executing the affairs of that office with intent
to harm the welfare of an individual or to benefit one person at the expense of
another or at the expense of the state is punishable by detention plus a fine or by
one of those penalties.

at
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In sum, legal authorities abound for ensuring that no individual is held longer
than appropriate. Unfortunately, as noted in the next section, a disconnect exists
between black-letter law and reality.
180
4. Arrest and Detention, Some Observations
Arrest and detention truly deserve their own treatment as they literally
became an issue of overwhelming importance. In 2007, my task force was created,
in part, to try to address the issue of the large number of detainees-some four to
five thousand-being held at Rusafa Prison on the outskirts of Baghdad. This
group was a mix of unfortunate souls: most were in pretrial detention and had been
there for two or three years without having seen a judge. Some of them were
accused of crimes whose maximum potential sentences were less than the time
they had spent in detention; some had actually been through the judicial process
and were either acquitted or deemed releasable due to insufficient evidence. The
prison was literally bursting at its seams, and officials were scrambling to create a
permanent tent city in the adjacent field to relieve the pressure.
A number of causes exist for the overcrowding problem: the religious
prejudices of judges who were ill-inclined to release an individual not of the
judge's own religious persuasion; the dismal state of security at courthouses, which
directly impacted the number of hours judges dared to work; and the successes of
the Coalition-backed patrols, which apprehended accused terrorism suspects in
large numbers. 181 However, perhaps the biggest culprit was the all-entrance, noexit nature of the detention system: judges simply had no realistic incentive to
release prisoners. This, in turn, was a function of the process in which detainees
entered the system.
Most on-scene criminal investigations are conducted by Ministry of Interior
(MOI) personnel-either Iraqi National Police, Iraqi Police, or investigators from
the MOI Criminal Investigations Division (CID). 18 2 Many police precincts, at least

179. Id.art. 332:
Any public official or agent who cruelly treats a person in the course of his duties
thereby causing him to suffer a loss of esteem or dignity or physical pain is
punishable by a period of detention not exceeding 1 year plus a fine not
exceeding 100 dinars or by one of those penalties but without prejudice to any
greater penalty stipulated by law.
180. This paper will not address the collateral issue of security detainees-i.e., those persons seized
by coalition forces following the 2003 occupation of Iraq. A review process was created to determine
whether such individuals should be released to civilian authorities to be prosecuted for their crimes
under substantive Iraqi criminal law-including the provisions of the well-used Anti-Terrorism Law
No. 13 of 2005 (Iraq), promulgating a capital offense of "terrorist acts"-or whether they should be
retained by coalition forces and held indefinitely without charge-either because they were deemed to
be a potential source of valuable intelligence or they were deemed a security risk but there was
insufficient releasable (read unclassified) information to secure their conviction in an Iraqi tribunal. See
Criminal Procedures, CPA Memorandum No. 3 of 2003 (Iraq), §§ 5-6 (providing specific substantive
and procedural rights for criminal detainees and MNF Security Internees).
181. Interview with Colonel Mazin and Captain Hayder, Officials with MOI Records
Department,in Baghdad, Iraq (Oct. 2007- Nov. 2007).
182. Id.
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in Baghdad, have resident investigative judges (or close access to a judicial
facility) who can issue arrest warrants on short notice. MOI personnel thus bring
the individuals arrested into the system, and their case file is created at the local
level. The MOI personnel eventually transfer them to a regional holding facility
before ultimately passing them to the custody of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ),
which owns both the courts and the prisons. The case file, however, is transferred
to one of3the two main police General Directorates in Baghdad-al-Karkh and al8
1

Rusafa

It appears that the MOJ apparatus does not have accurate copies of the MOI
information. Thus, when the deadline for release comes up, no judge can make an
accurate assessment of whether the individual should be released because the case
file is incomplete.
The normal procedure should be for the investigative judge to issue a "straight
release" (the individual is to be released immediately) or a "conditional release"
(the individual is to be released if he is not otherwise wanted on criminal
charges). 18 4 However, the process of determining whether a person is otherwise
wanted can take days, weeks, or even months.185 The prison officials (MOJ
employees) query the police precinct (MOI employees) that made the original
arrest whether it has any other outstanding warrants on the same person. If that
precinct has other warrants outstanding, it responds directly. If not, a process is
initiated to query all police precincts throughout the country. 18 6 The local police
precinct forwards the request up through its regional police headquarters to the
provincial police headquarters, which sends it to a MOI central office with a
request to query neighboring provinces.187 An MOI official duly notes the request
and sends copies to the other provincial police headquarters, which in turn send the
request on down.188 Responses have to follow the same path up through MOI and
back to the originating police precinct, before returning it to the (MOJ) prison
officials.18 9 This time-intensive process has no real solution in the near term: even
if local police precincts had computers and electricity to run them, no centralized
database exists where such information might be posted. Although there is, as I
was told by an MOI official, a policy that all police units must send a letter to the
Police Affairs Division at MOI informing it of all arrests, there is no similar
process for the issuance of arrest warrants. 190 Of course, the problem is
exacerbated by inter-ministry rivalries: MOI employees have no incentive to
maintain a database of arrest warrants issued by investigative judges (MOJ
employees).

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Sadly, a data stream already exists that could be used to shorten this timeline
significantly. All local precincts mail a report containing copies of all outstanding
arrest warrants and their current detainees to MOI twice a month. 191 The officials
who receive the reports do not enter the information into any database or ledger.
Instead, as I witnessed firsthand, they are permanently "archived" in various boxes
stacked in closets or on top of shelving units at the MOI main headquarters.
Notwithstanding the maximum pretrial detention periods mandated in the
Code, 192 government officials have no incentive to actually order release from
pretrial confinement. Prison funding appears to be based on occupancy rates, so
the warden wants to retain as many individuals as possible. Judges do not want to
be known as having ordered the release of an individual later found to be guilty or
a recidivist. Accordingly, the default is that "temporary" pretrial detention orders
are automatically renewed unless affirmatively overridden.1 93 Correlative to the
foregoing, the granting of bail seems to be a rare phenomenon.
5. Habeas Corpus, Some Thoughts
The dismal track record regarding unjustified pretrial detentions indicates that
the constitutional and codal rights discussed above are not self-executing. It also
indicates that a habeas corpus right of action under Iraqi law does not exist.
Because the IJ really "owns" the entire criminal justice process from initial arrest
through referral to trial (he oversees all investigations and collection of evidence,
he issues the arrest warrants, and he conducts the formal "discovery" process of the
investigative hearing), he is theoretically empowered to dismiss charges or take
any other action necessary to ensure justice in an individual case. A habeas corpus
proceeding is designed to compel the agency with control over a detainee to justify
to an impartial judge its basis for continued detention of the accused. However,
becausethe IJs are both the agency and the judge, a habeas proceeding would
essentially consist of the judge issuing himself a show cause order. Put that way,
the absurdity of the situation is clear.
Is there, then, any remedy in cases where the arrest/detention warrant has
lapsed? According to the attorneys who take cases as appointed defense counsel at
the Rusafa branch of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, no remedy exists. They
assert that if a complainant has filed a formal charge and a suspect has been
formally arrested (pursuant to a warrant issued by an IJ), the judge "has to give" an
extension when the warrant expires.
6. Plea Bargaining, Some Thoughts
The concept of plea bargaining seems just as ill-fitting in the Iraqi system as
does a habeas corpus claim. Because a case still has to be investigated prior to
trial,19 4 an accused's in-court confession speeds the process along only ever so
slightly. However, upon reflection, it would seem that a defendant could spend his

191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
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allotted testimony time introducing mitigating evidence in hopes of leniency in
sentencing. In the end, however, it seems that mitigation factors are something the
judges would adduce during the course of the investigation and trial. As such, the
accused's compliance may not be afforded any weight.
195
7. Defense Counsel Issues
The health of the Iraqi defense bar has been an issue of concern for some
time. Attorneys who support themselves as defense counsel are in an unenviable
dilemma. They simply cannot afford to take work only as appointed defense
counsel because the fees for each case only amount to the equivalent of twenty to
forty U.S. dollars. To make matters worse, the process of paying their vouchers
takes at least a year. On the other hand, in the occasional cases where they are
retained by a client, they can command fees of one thousand to four thousand U.S.
dollars-but then they face animosity from the judges whose salary is significantly
less. They also face the very real possibility of retaliation from a complainant's
family-or from members of the general community-who assume that those
defending suspects accused of terrorism are themselves aligned with terrorist
organizations.
The attorneys readily admit that the low fees definitely impact their
motivation in appointment cases, but they also admit they can have little impact on
a case even when they are motivated. They blame their inability to impact a case
on the lack of motivation of salaried investigative judges who have no incentive to
invest effort in pursuing a missing case file.
8. Self-Incrimination
The Iraqi Penal Code 196 specifically prohibits the use of torture by officials to
extract a confession. 197 In addition, the new Iraq Constitution prohibits
psychological and physical torture as well as inhumane treatment; it specifically
provides that coerced confessions "shall not be relied on." 198 It also provides that
persons made to confess under duress "shall have the right to seek compensation
for material and moral damages incurred in accordance with the law." 199 It is up to
Iraqi judges to ensure that these provisions are meaningful. It may precisely be the
spirit of these provisions that gives rise to anecdotal evidence of judges
discrediting confessions that may have been coerced.

195. See supra note 17.
196. Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 (Iraq), available at http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/
Iraqi Penal Code_1969.pdf; see also supranote 135.
197. Id. art. 333:
Any public official or agent who tortures or orders the torture of an accused,
witness or informant in order to compel him to confess to the commission of an
offense or to make a statement or provide information about such offence or to
withhold information or to give a particular opinion in respect of it is punishable
by imprisonment or by detention. Torture shall include the use of force or
menaces [sic].
198. Article 37, § 1(C), Doustour Joumhourait al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of
2005.
199. Id.
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By law, an accused is questioned shortly after arrest. 2°° Prior to questioning,
the accused must be informed of, and understand, the right to remain silent and to
have an attorney provided at no expense. 20 1 An accused's assertion of rights must
be scrupulously honored,20 2 and the interrogation must otherwise be free of
coercion. 20 3 The IJ or investigator then records the accused's statement 20 4 (which

200. Criminal Procedure Code No. 23 of 1971 (Iraq), art. 123(A):
The investigative judge or investigator must question the accused within 24 hours
of his attendance, after proving his identity and informing him of the offence of
which he is accused. His statements on this should be recorded, with a statement
of evidence in his favour. The accused should be questioned again if necessary
to establish the truth.
201. Id.art. 123(B)-(C):
B. Before questioning the accused the investigative judge must inform the
accused that:
i. he or she has the right to remain silent and no adverse inference may be
drawn from accused's decision to exercise that right;
ii. he or she has the right to be represented by an attorney, and if he or she is
not able to afford representation, the Court will provide an attorney at no
expense to the accused.
C. The investigative judge or investigator must determine whether the accused
desires to be represented by an attorney before questioning the accused. If the
accused desires an attorney, the investigative judge or investigator shall not
question the accused until he or she has retained an attorney or until an attorney
has been appointed by the court.
Note that subparagraphs (B) and (C) were added by Criminal Procedures, CPA Memorandum No. 3 of
2003 (Iraq).
202. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 126(B):
The accused is not required to answer any of the questions he is asked;
see also id. art. 123(C); supranote 201.
203. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 127:
The use of any illegal method to influence the accused and extract an admission
is not permitted.
Mistreatment, threats, injury, enticement, promises,
psychological influence, or use of drugs or intoxicants are considered illegal
methods;
see also Article 37, Section 3, Doustour Joumhourait al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq]
of 2005:
All forms of psychological and physical torture and inhumane treatment are
prohibited. Any confession made under force, threat, or torture shall not be
relied on, and the victim shall have the right to seek compensation for material
and moral damages incurred in accordance with the law.
204. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 128:
A. Statements of the accused are recorded in the written record by the
[investigative] judge or investigator and signed by the accused and the
[investigative] judge or investigator. If the accused is unable to sign, this should
be recorded on the written record.
B. If the statement of the accused includes an admission to the commission of an
offence, the judge must record the statement himself, and read it back after a
period of time. The judge and accused must then sign. If the accused would like
to write down his statement in his own hand, the judge must enable him to do
this, but it must be in the presence of the judge who must sign it, along with the
accused, and after recording this in the written report.
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is unsworn 20 5), including any exculpatory details or evidence adduced by the
accused that the judge deems to be admissible. 0 6
At any time during the investigative hearing, the accused has the right to
make statements, to discuss the statements of other witnesses, and to request that
witnesses be summoned.20 7
If an accused's statement implicates a co-defendant, the cases are severed, 208
presumably so that a co-defendant is not convicted based on the unsworn statement
of his partner in crime. It appears that Iraqi law makes no provision for testimonial
immunity, but it does specifically allow the grant of transactional immunity: an IJ
can, with permission of the trial court, immunize an accused in order to receive
sworn testimony 2°9 against a co-conspirator. 210 If the trial court ultimately accepts
the witness' testimony as "full and true," his charges are released with prejudice.211
If the court doubts his testimony, he not only remains on the hook for his previous
charges, but his testimony is used against him-although (since the court believes
the statement to be a prevarication) the statement at that point is presumably
considered only for its value as a mendacity qualifier rather than for the truth of the
matter asserted.212

205. Id. art. 126(A):
The accused does not swear the oath unless acting as a witness for other accused
persons.
206. Id. art. 128(C):
Testimony which the accused asks to present in his defence should be recorded in
the written report along with investigation of other proof presented by him,
unless the investigative judge decides not to grant the accused's request, because
he believes it be an unjustified attempt to impede the investigation, or to mislead
the judge.
207. Id. art. 124:
The accused has the right to make his statement at any time after listening to the
statements of any witness, and to discuss it or to request that he is summoned for
this purpose.
208. Id. art. 125:
If it becomes clear that the accused is a witness against another accused, his
testimony is recorded and the two cases are separated.
209. Id. art. 126(A); see supra note 205.
210. Id. art. 129(A):
The investigative judge may offer immunity with the agreement of the Felony
Court, for reasons recorded in the record, to any person accused of an offence, in
order to obtain his testimony against others involved in its commission, on
condition that the accused will give a full and true statement. If he accepts the
offer, his testimony is heard and he remains an accused person until a decision on
the case is issued.
211. Id. art. 129(C):
If the Felony Court finds that the statement given by the accused who has been
offered immunity is full and true, then it will halt permanently legal proceedings
against him and release him.
212. Id. art. 129(B):
If the accused does not submit a full and true statement, whether through
deliberate concealment of any important issue or through false statements, he
loses his right to immunity by decree of the criminal court, and procedures are
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9. Hearsay
It appears that the court may accept extrajudicial statements made by a
witness in another case if the court is convinced that it is impossible to procure the
witness to testify in the current case. 213 The same rule seems to apply to

extrajudicial confessions.214
Despite the right to silence during the investigation phase,215 the trial "court
may ask the defendant any questions considered appropriate to establish the truth
before or after issuing a charge against him. 216 Furthermore, "[a] refusal to
answer will be considered as evidence against the defendant. 217 Any previous
statements given by the defendant will then be read and used against him.218 In
fact, the court has "absolute [discretionary] authority" to accept or reject any
statements collected at any time throughout the investigative and hearing
219

process.

taken against him for the offense for which he was offered immunity or any other
related offense. His statements are used as evidence against him.
213. Id.art. 217(A):
The court has absolute authority in evaluating the accused's admission and acting
upon it whether it was given in front of the court, in front of the investigative
judge, during other court hearing of the same case or in another case, even if the
witness subsequently withdraws his statement. The court can accept his
confession to the [judicial] investigator if there is enough evidence to convince it
that the investigator did not have sufficient time to present the accused to the
[investigative] judge so that his confession could be recorded.
214. Id.art. 217(B):
Admissions may not accepted be [sic] if the conditions stipulated in A are not
present.
215. Id.art. 126(B):
The accused is not required to answer any of the questions he is asked.
216. Id.art. 179:
The court may ask the accused any questions considered appropriate to establish
the truth before or after issuing a charge against him.
217. Id. The extensively-annotated version of the Criminal Procedure Code on the Global Justice
Project: Iraq, supra note 1, discusses-in the introductory notes and again in a footnote to CPC Article
179-a botched attempt by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to delete the second sentence of
CPC Article 179, adding that, regardless of the validity of the deletion, the sentence should be correctly
rendered in English as: "A refusal to answer will NOT be considered as evidence against the
defendant." Criminal Procedure Code, art. 179, n.63. It is impossible to know how well the niceties of
this discussion are known to most Iraqi judges.
218. Id.art. 180:
If the accused refuses to answer questions directed to him or if his answers are
contradictory or contradict his previous statements, the court may order the
reading and hearing of the accused's earlier answers and statements.
219. Id. art. 215:
The court has absolute authority in evaluating the testimony. It can either fully
accept it or reject it, accept the statements given by the witness during the police
investigation or during reports from the initial [judicial] investigation or given in
front of another court in the same case, or completely reject the witness'
statements.
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10. Evidence

As noted above, no body of black-letter law exists covering limitations on
collection and consideration of evidence in Iraqi criminal jurisprudence .220 About
the closest the Code comes to discussing evidence is its tangential reference to
chain of custody 221 and a provision stating that the court may consider any
statement made by a victim under threat of death.222
11. Insanity

If it appears that an accused is mentally incapable of preparing his own
defense, a medical committee conducts a mental health examination on him.223
The court places the case on hold and he is institutionalized.224 If the court
authorizes bail, it may release the accused to his relatives on the condition that they
commit to procure appropriate mental health treatment.225 If the medical
committee determines that he was not criminally responsible due to mental illness
at the time of the action under review, the court enters a finding of "diminished
responsibility" and the accused is released
to his family-on the condition that he
226
will undergo appropriate treatment.

220. See supranote 29.
221. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 42:
Crime scene officers are required to use all possible means to preserve evidence
of an offence.
222. Id. art. 216:
The court may accept the statement of a dying victim as evidence relating to the
offence and its perpetrator or any other related matter.
223. Id. art. 230:
If it appears during an investigation or proceedings, that the accused is not able to
conduct his own defence on the grounds of mental illness, or if the situation
requires an examination of his mental faculties in order to test his criminal
responsibility, the investigation or court proceedings are suspended, by decision
of the investigative judge, or court, and, if he has been charged with an offence
for which he cannot be released on bail, he is placed under supervision in a
government health institution, capable of treating mental illness. For other
offences, however, he is placed in a government, or non-government health
institution, at his expense on the request of whoever is acting on his behalf in
law, or at the expense of his family, on payment of a surety by a guarantor. A
specialist government medical committee is charged with carrying out an
examination and presenting a report on the state of his mental health.
224. Id.
225. Id. art. 231:
If it appears from the report of the committee referred to in Article 230 that the
accused is not able to present his own defence, the investigation is postponed
until he has sufficient mental awareness to make his own defence, and he is
placed under the supervision of a government health institution if he is accused of
an offense for which he cannot be released on bail. But in the case of other
offenses, he can be handed over to one his relatives on a surety from a guarantor,
on condition that a commitment is made that he should receive treatment in Iraq,
or elsewhere.
226. Id. art. 232:
If it appears from the decision of the medical committee that the accused was not
criminally responsible owing to mental illness at the time the offence was
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F. The Trial
Iraqi penal courts-as opposed to the investigative courts-are divided by
subject matter jurisdiction between the Court of Misdemeanor, the Court of
Felony, and the Court of Cassation.227 The Central Criminal Court of Iraq, by the
terms of its incorporation, is a hybrid forum with jurisdiction over both felonies
and misdemeanors.228

As a case wends its way from the investigative court to the trial court, the case
and the status of the individual go through a variety of simultaneous transitions.
For example, some available translations of the Code, without explanation, change
the nomenclature of the individual from accused to defendant. 229 The nature of the
case also seems to begin to solidify: whereas an investigation may have covered
multiple accused and multiple crimes, the Iraqi penal system favors separate trials
of the same accused for separate crimes; 230 joinder of criminal charges only occurs

committed, the judge will decide diminished responsibility and the court will
issue a judgment of diminished responsibility and will take whatever action is
necessary for handing him over to one of his relatives, on payment of a
guarantee, to undergo whatever treatment is necessary.
227. Id. art. 137(A):
Penal courts are the Court of Misdemeanor, Court of Felony and Court of
Cassation. These courts have jurisdiction to consider all criminal cases with a
few special exceptions.
The Court of Cassation is an appellate court with "jurisdiction to review provisions and rulings issued
on felonies, misdemeanors, and other cases stipulated by law." Id art. 138(C):
The Court of Cassation has jurisdiction to review provisions and rulings issued
on felonies, misdemeanors and other cases stipulated by law.
It also reviews all death sentences. Id. art. 254(A):
If the Criminal Court has issued a sentence of death or life imprisonment, it must
send a file on the case to the Court of Cassation within ten days of the issue of
the judgment, so that it can be reviewed for cassation, even if an appeal has not
been lodged;
see also id. art. 224(D):
If the court issues a death sentence, it must explain to the person given the
sentence that his case papers will be sent automatically to the Court of Cassation
for review. He may also appeal against the ruling at the Court of Cassation
within 30 days, starting from the day after the ruling has been issued.
228. CPA Order No. 13, § 18 (The CCCI has "nationwide discretionary investigative and trial
jurisdiction over any and all criminal violations," but is commissioned to specifically focus on cases
involving terrorism, organized crime, government corruption, acts against democratic institutions, hate
crimes (violence based on race, nationality, ethnicity, or religion), and cases where individuals would
not be able to get a fair trial in a local court.); see also supratext accompanying notes 4-9.
229. This is the case with the version posted on the Grotian Moment Blog; the GJPI version
continues to use the term "accused." See supra note 1.
230. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 188:
A. One charge is made for each offence ascribed to a particular individual.
B. One charge is made for multiple offences as stipulated in sub-paragraph
132(A).
C. One charge is made for each connected offence as stipulated in sub-paragraph
132(B).
D. It is permissible to make one charge against all the perpetrators of one
offence.
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where the offenses are closely related-as a single string of events, as arising from
231
a single common purpose, or as similar offenses against multiple victims.
However, several defendants' cases will be consolidated if they involve a single
233
crime.232 Furthermore, just as an accused can be tried in absentia,
an absent
defendant's case is not severed when there are multiple accused for a single
crime. 234
Still, every defendant has an inviolable (perhaps unwaivable) right to an
investigation on all crimes with which he will ultimately be charged 235 -even for

E. There will be a trial for each charge.
F. The trial will take place as if for a single case under the circumstances
stipulated in Articles 132 and 133.
231. Id art. 132(A):
If several offenses are attributed to the accused, a single case is brought against
him in the following circumstances:
i. If the offences resulted from one action;
ii. If the offences resulted from actions linked to each other and for a
common purpose;
iii. If the offences are of the same type and are committed by the same
defendant against the same victim, even if they occur at different times;
iv. If the offences are of the same type and occurred within one year against
different victims, on the condition that there are no more than 3 victims for
each case.
232. Id. art. 133; a single case is brought as stipulated in Article 132 if there are several accused,
whether as principals or accessories.
233. Id. art. 135:
If the accused does not appear before the investigative judge or [judicial]
investigator, and is not arrested despite the use of methods of compulsion as
stipulated in this law, or if he escapes after arrest or detention, and if there is
sufficient evidence for a transfer to court, the investigative judge issues a
decision of transfer to the court responsible in order for a trial to be conducted his
absence.
Procedures related to appeal of in absentia guilty verdicts are set forth in Criminal Procedure Code,
arts. 243-48. Notice of the outcome of the case, and issuance of arrest warrants are in Criminal
Procedure Code, art. 149:
A. The trial of an absent accused or one who has absconded is conducted
according to the guidelines for the conduct of trials where the accused is present.
B. Notification of the in absentiajudgement is given to the person against whom
the judgement has been made. If the accused has absconded at the time of
notification, notification is given as stipulated in Article 143.
C. The court issues an arrest warrant against the person who has been sentenced
in absentiato a penalty restricting his freedom, for a felony or misdemeanour;
see also id. art. 151:
In the case of an accused who absconds after presenting his defence but before
the issue or [sic] a verdict, without informing the court of any legal excuse, an
arrest warrant is issued, requiring him to attend for delivery of the verdict.
234. Id. art. 148:
If there are a number of accused and amongst them is one who has absconded or
is absent, the trial of those who are present takes place, as does the trial of those
absent, but the case of those who are present takes precedence over the case of
those who are absent.
235. On the timing of the official charge, see infra Section II.F.I. The Formal Charge.
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felonies committed in open court.236 Thus, if evidence comes to light implicating a
suspect who is not before the court, the case subjudice may be suspended pending
an investigative hearing as to the newly accused, or the single defendant who has
already been before an investigative judge may be tried on his or her own
accord.237
Criminal trials in Iraq, as in other civil law jurisdictions, are meant to be
succinct. 23 The business rules for the entire hearing are laid out in one short
article of the Code:
The trial begins with the summoning of the defendant and other parties
and the formal identification of the defendant. A decree of transfer is
then issued. The court hears the testimony of the complainant and the
statements of the civil plaintiff, then sees the evidence and orders the
reading of the reports, investigations and other documents. The
statements of the defendants are then heard, along with the petitions of
the complainants, civil plaintiff, civil prosecutor and public
prosecutor.239
When a trial court receives a case dossier from an IJ, it sets a trial date and
notifies the defendant and all relevant witnesses and parties.240 If the accused
241
cannot be found, public notice is provided and he may be tried in absentia.

236. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 159:
A. If a person commits a misdemeanor or infraction whilst in the court room, the
court may evaluate the case against him at the time, suspending the initial case
and making a ruling after listening to statements from a representative of the
Public Prosecutor, if present, and statements in defense of the person mentioned,
or transferring him to an investigative judge after making a written record of the
incident.
B. If a felony is committed, the court makes a written record of the event and
transfers the accused to an investigative judge for the necessary legal steps to be
taken.
237. Id. art. 155:
A. It is not permissible to try any accused who has not been referred to the court.
B. If it becomes clear to the court before judgment on a case is made, that there
are other persons linked to the offence, either as principals or as accessories, and
procedures have not been taken against them, it may consider the case with
regard to the accused present, and request that the investigative authorities take
legal proceedings against the other persons or decide to suspend the case until the
investigation has been completed.
238. I have not heard of any trial lasting longer than an hour. Most take less than half that time.
239. Id. art. 167.
240. Id. art. 143(A):
The court, on receipt of the case file, must set a date for the trial and inform the
Public Prosecution, the accused and those with any connection and any of the
witnesses who are to testify, by means of a written summons, at least one day
before the trial in the case of an infraction, three days before for a misdemeanour
and 8 days before for a felony. Informing the accused's attorney of the order to
attend does not dispense with the need to inform the accused.
241. Id. art. 143(C):
If it becomes clear, once the notification has been issued, that the accused has
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As in the investigative hearing, all live witnesses attend the hearing together.
They testify under oath,242 but, as in the investigative hearing, they provide
spontaneous statements rather than simply responding to interrogatories. The
judges, the prosecutor, the defense counsel, the complainant-even other
witnesses-may then ask questions to clarify the witness' testimony. 243 There is
no verbatim transcript of court proceedings, so the entire hearing looks more like
"Question Time" in Parliament than a deposition244-including the fact that the
defendant is standing in a dock at the center of the courtroom rather than sitting at
a defense table or on a witness stand to the side of the judges' bench.245
Any individual with relevant information 246 to provide on the case at hand
may come forward or be summoned as a trial witness. 247 Purposely withholding
information from the court is grounds for a contempt finding.248
absconded, a summons or arrest warrant is pinned up at his place of residence if
known, published in two local newspapers and announced on the radio or
television in the case of significant felonies or misdemeanours, in accordance
with a decision by the court. An appointment is set for the trial within a period of
no less than one month from the last date of publication in the newspaper for a
misdemeanour or an infraction and two months for felonies;
see also id. art. 147(A):
The trial will take place when the two parties attend. If the accused has
absconded or is absent without legal excuse, despite his having been informed, a
trial will take place in his absence.
242. Id art. 168(A):
Before giving testimony each witness is asked to give his full name, profession,
age, place of work and relationship to the parties. Before giving his testimony,
he must swear that he will speak the truth and nothing but the truth.
243. Id art. 168(B)-(C):
B. The witness gives his testimony orally and he may not be interrupted during
its delivery. If he is unable to speak due to disability, the court will give him
permission to write his statement. The court may ask any questions necessary in
order to clarify the facts after completion of the testimony. The Public
Prosecution, complainant, civilian plaintiff, a civil official and the accused may
discuss the testimony and ask questions and request clarifications to establish the
facts.
C. It is permissible to remove the witness whilst the testimony of another witness
is being heard and the witness may be confronted by another witness during the
testimony.
244. See id. art. 175:
The court may, either on its own or at the request of the parties, request
discussion of a testimony or return to its discussion and seek clarification of what
the witness has said in order to establish the facts.
245. This is a personal observation of various courtrooms in Baghdad.
246. Id. art. 169:
The testimony should be based on the facts which the witness is able to recall
through one of his senses;
but see id art. 214:
The court must decide that the witness is not fit to give testimony if it becomes
clear he is unable to remember details of the event or that he is not fully aware of
the of value of the testimony he is giving due to his age or his physical or
psychological state.
247. Id. art. 171:
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In the event a witness is unable or unwilling to testify, the court may use
previous testimony to bolster, supplement, or constitute witness testimony. 249 The
court may dispatch a judge or other representative of the court to take the
testimony of a witness unable to attend the trial, in which case the parties or their
representatives may attend and participate in the taking of the testimony.

The court may hear the testimony of anyone who attends the trial and anyone
who puts himself forward with information. It may summon any person to attend
to deliver his testimony if it is considered that this testimony will help establish
the truth;
see also id. art. 174:
A. If the witness does not attend, the court may, despite his prior notification,
permit that he be re-summoned to attend or it may issue an arrest warrant against
him for attendance to deliver the testimony and the witness may be given a
penalty as prescribed by law for not attending.
B. If the witness attends the court before the trial has been completed and it
becomes clear that he has an acceptable excuse for being late, the court may
retract the judgement issued against him.
248. Id art. 176:
If the witness refuses to swear the oath or give testimony, other than in cases
where this is permissible by law, the court may issue a sentence against him as
prescribed by law for refusal to testify and may order the reading of his previous
statement which should then be treated as a testimony which was given in front
of the court.
249. Id art. 170:
The court may order that testimony, previously given in the written report
collating the evidence or during the initial investigation or before it or any
another criminal court, be heard in front of it, if the witness claims not to recall
all or some of the facts to which he testified, or if the previous statement clarifies
his current statement before the court. The court and other parties may discuss all
of this;
see also id art. 172:
If the witness does not appear or if his testimony cannot be heard because he has
died, is unable to speak or is no longer qualified to testify or because his
whereabouts are unknown or if his appearance before the court would cause
delay or exorbitant expense, the court may decide to hear testimony previously
given in the written record of the collection of evidence or during the initial
investigation, or in front of another criminal court in the same case. This
testimony will be treated as though it were given before the court.
250. Id art. 173:
If the witness is excused due to illness, or any other reason for his inability to
attend, from giving his testimony, the court, after informing the parties, may
delegate a member of the court, an investigative judge or misdemeanour judge, to
travel to the witness's location to hear the witness and send a written report to the
court.
The parties may attend in person or through representatives and direct the
questions they think appropriate. If, after the transfer or sending of a judge to the
location of the witness, the reason is deemed not to be valid, a penalty may be
imposed as prescribed by law for failure to attend.
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Unlike the more intimate-and closed-nature of the investigative hearing
conducted by an IJ, the trial is an open proceeding.25 However, as with the
investigative hearing, the trial judges own their courtroom. Thus, they may:
252
remove the defendant from the proceedings for being unruly,
*
*

(except in capital cases)
order the defendant released or held
253
during the proceedings,

*

hold audience
members in contempt for leaving an open session
54
2

of court,

*

cut off irrelevant argument or testimony, 255
exclude witnesses from court while not testifying, 256 and

*

suspend proceedings, as they deem necessary.

*

7

Likewise, the trial judges also have considerable leeway in limiting their
consideration of testimony and argument.2
As to information not available

251. Id. art. 152:
Trial sessions must be open unless the court decides that all or part should be
held in private and not attended by anyone not connected with the cases, for
reasons of security or maintaining decency. It may forbid the attendance of
certain groups of people.
252. Id. art. 158:
The accused may not be removed from the court room during consideration of
the case unless he violates the rules of the court, in which case procedures
continue as if he were present. The court must keep him informed of the
procedures which took place in his absence.
253. Id art. 157:
The court may, at any time whilst the case is being considered, order the release
of the accused with or without bail unless he is accused of an offence punishable
by death. It may order his arrest or detention following any release, stating the
reasons for this in the order issued.
254. Id. art. 153:
The court and those entrusted with its administration may prohibit any individual
from leaving the court room, and if someone leaves in violation of this
prohibition, without the permission of the court, the court may rule immediately
for detention for 24 hours or a fine not exceeding 3 dinars, with no right to appeal
against this ruling. The court may however issue a pardon before the end of the
session and retract the ruling issued.
255. Id. art. 154:
The court may prevent the parties and their representatives speaking at undue
length or speaking outside the subject of the case, repeating statements, violating
guidelines or making accusations against another party or a person outside the
case who is unable to put forward a defence.
256. Id. art. 168(C):
It is permissible to remove the witness whilst the testimony of another witness is
being heard ....
257. Id. art. 162:
The court may decide on the suspension of a case for a suitable period if
necessitated by circumstances. It must inform the accused, other litigants and
witnesses who have not yet testified that they are to attend the session when it
resumes and the court will meet the cost of their expenses.
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before the court, the trial court has subpoena power2 59 and can order additional
investigation, 26 including the appointment of experts.261 Subpoenaed items must
be presented to all parties present at the trial.262 If a judge is replaced during the
course of the trial, the new judge need not start a de novo review of the case: it is
within his discretion to base his judgment on the procedures and investigations
undertaken by his predecessor.263
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing powers of the trial court, the Code
nevertheless accords a minimum level of dignity to the defendant, even as it offers
a nod to the adage that one is considered innocent until proved 2 6guilty: 264 the
defendant is not subject to physical restraints while in the courtroom. 1
1. The Formal Charge
Perhaps the most vivid difference between common law and civil law
criminal trials is in the timing of the charge. Although the accused is certainly
aware of the type of offense the IJ is investigating, he may not know specifically
with which crime the IJ will charge him. In Iraqi courts, it is not until after the trial
judge has taken and considered all evidence, that the trial judge officially

258. Compare Criminal Procedure Code, art. 154, supra note 255 (trial court may limit testimony
or argument for undue length, offering irrelevant information, repeating statements, violating
guidelines, or making accusations about persons not before the court) and Criminal Procedure Code,
art. 64, supra note 97 (investigative judge may only restrict testimony that is irrelevant, offensive, or
harmful to security).
259. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 163:
The court may order that any investigatory procedure or procedures be taken, or
that any person be ordered to hand over information, documents, or items, if that
will assist the investigation. In the event of a refusal to hand over something in
his possession, a person should be transferred to an investigative judge for legal
procedures to be taken against him.
260. Id.; see also id. art. 165:
The court may proceed to conduct an investigation if it appears that this will
assist in establishing the truth and should allow the litigants to attend the
investigation.
261. Id. art. 166:
The court may appoint one or more experts in matters requiring their opinion and
may permit the wages of the expert to be borne by the treasury as long as the
price is not unreasonably high.
262. Id art. 164:
The court orders that items seized be brought to the courtroom wherever possible,
where the accused and other parties are able to see and note them.
263. Id art. 161:
If the case is being reviewed by a judge whose place is taken by another judge,
the second judge may base his judgement on procedures and investigations
undertaken by his predecessor or he may repeat these procedures and
investigations himself
264. In fact, the current Constitution, adopted long after the Code, specifically provides: "The
accused is innocent until proven guilty in a fair legal trial." Article 19, Section 5, Doustour
Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
265. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 156:
The accused attends the court room without restraint or handcuffs and the court
must use necessary means to ensure the security of the court room.
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determines what crime, if any, the defendant actually committed.266 This practice
obviates the need for litigation of issues, such as specificity of charges, lesser
included offenses, multipliciousness of charges, and the like. After the facts are
firmly established in the minds of the judges, they can turn their legal training to
finding the proper niche for the given facts in the substantive criminal law.
The charge is formalized once all the evidence has been received at trial; its
parameters are not circumscribed by the offense as characterized in the original
arrest warrant or the fmdings of the investigative judge.267 If the complainant has,
during the course of the judicial proceedings, withdrawn the complaint, or if the
facts do not validate a finding of guilt on any possible charge, the judges dismiss
the case.268 (Such an outcome is fairly unlikely, since the IJ would presumably
have weeded out any such cases.) If, however, the judges determine among
themselves that the facts evidence a crime, the defendant is "charged as
appropriate" and asked to enter a plea.269
If there is anything short of a full and valid confession-the defendant pleads
not guilty, appears confused by the proceedings, does not offer a defense, etc."the case goes to trial." The defendant is afforded an opportunity to present any
valid witnesses and evidence he might have. 270 Following the defense case, the

266. Id. art. 203.
267. Id. art. 187:
A. The charge is written down on a special piece of paper in the name of the
judge issuing it, with his position and includes the name of the accused, his
identity details, the place and time of commission of the offence and a legal
description of the offence and the name of the victim or of the item against which
the offence was committed, the way in which it was committed and the legal
paragraphs which apply. The paper is dated and signed by the judge or head of
the court.
B. In setting out the description for the offence, the court is not restricted to the
definition in the arrest warrant or summons or transfer decision.
268. Id. art. 181:
A. If the complainant withdraws the complaint or the court considers that the
complaint has been withdrawn in accordance with the provisions of Article 150
[regarding abandonment or withdrawal of claims] and if the offence is one in
which conciliation is permissible without a court agreement, the complaint is
considered as rejected.
B. If, after taking steps to clarify the situation as described in the Articles above,
it becomes clear to the court that the evidence does not point to the accused
having committed the offence with which he is charged, his release is ordered.
269. Id. art. 181(C):
If it appears to the court, after the aforementioned steps have been taken, that the
evidence indicates that the accused has committed the offence being considered,
then he is charged as appropriate, the charge is read to him and clarified, and he
is asked to enter a plea.
270. Id. art. 181(D):
If he denies the charge or does not offer a defence, if he requests a trial or if the
court considers that his confession is confused, or that he does not understand the
consequences or if the offence is punishable by death then the case goes to trial,
defence witnesses are heard and the remaining evidence in his defence is heard,
unless the court finds it to be an unjustified attempt to impede the investigation or
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parties, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel may
each make a closing
272
statement; 271 however, the defendant gets the last word.
If the defendant confesses to the charge, the court hears him out and the case
is fimished-there is no need for further evidence.273 Several provisions in the
Code are in place to ensure that the confession is valid: the court cannot consider
any part of a confession it deems to be the product of coercion,274 and the court can
parse a non-coerced confession and accept-at face value only-those parts it
deems truthful and corroborated, 275 even if the confession was extra-judicial. 276 It

also follows that the court would have to find the defendant competent the same as
any other witness. 277 Ultimately, however, harkening back to the concept that the
judges are masters of their domain, the judges can accept any confession they, in
their discretion, deem valid.278
In the end, while ex parte communications and a judge's personal extrajudicial knowledge may not have any bearing on a verdict,279 the judges are free to
to mislead the court ....
271. Id. art. 181(D):
When this has been completed, the commentary of the other parties, the Public
Prosecution, and the defence of the accused are heard ....
272. Id art. 181(E):
The defendant should be the last to speak in the judicial investigation or trial.
273. Id. art. 181(D):
If the defendant confesses to the charge against him and the court is satisfied of
the truth of his confession and that he understands its implications, then the court
listens to his defence and issues a judgement in the case without any requirement
for further evidence ....
274. Id art. 218:
It is stipulated that an admission must not have been extracted by coercion.
275. Id art. 219:
It is permissible for the court to divide the admission up, accept the part which it
believes to be correct and reject the rest. It is not however permissible to
interpret the admission or divide it into parts if it is the only piece of evidence in
the case.
276. Id. art. 217:
A. The court has absolute authority in evaluating the accused's admission and
acting upon it whether it was given in front of the court, in front of the
investigative judge, during other court hearing of the same case or in another
case, even if the witness subsequently withdraws his statement. The court can
accept his admission to the [judicial] investigator if there is enough evidence to
convince it that the investigator did not have sufficient time to present the
accused to the [investigative] judge so that his admission could be recorded.
B. Admissions may not accepted be [sic] if the conditions stipulated in A are not
present.
277. Id art. 214
The court must decide that the witness is not fit to give testimony if it becomes
clear he is unable to remember details of the event or that he is not fully aware of
the of [sic] value of the testimony he is giving due to his age or his physical or
psychological state.
278. Id.art. 213(C):
The court can accept an admission only if it is satisfied with it.
279. Id art. 212:
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consider a wide range of information-with the caveat that a conviction cannot be
based on one uncorroborated witness 280 (unless the witness is the defendant2 1 ).
They may consider as substantive evidence all statements made during the trial
hearing, hearsay statements made by a victim under threat of death,282 anything in
the investigation dossier forwarded by the investigative judge, and any other
reports of investigation prepared by other investigating officials (as long as the
official wrote them concurrent with the events "or not long afterward").283
2. The Ruling
After the court gives the defendant the opportunity to make his final
statement, the case is submitted to the court for a verdict. The court declares a
formal recess and "retires." During this recess, the defendant, defense counsel,
witnesses, and gallery are ushered from the room, while the judges and prosecutor
remain inside. The judges vote and formulate their ruling and, if necessary, the
penalty. 28 4 They prepare a formal record of the trial on the spot-there is no
verbatim transcript in civil law systems-with a summary of the procedural

The court is not permitted, in its ruling, to rely upon a piece of evidence which
has not been brought up for discussion or referred to during the hearing, nor is it
permitted to rely on a piece of paper given to it by a litigant without the rest of
the litigants seeing it. The judge cannot give a ruling on the basis of his personal
knowledge.
280. Id art. 213:
A. The court's verdict in a case is based on the extent to which it is satisfied by
the evidence presented during any stage of the inquiry or the hearing. Evidence
includes admissions reports, witness statements, written records of an
interrogation, other official discoveries, reports of experts and technicians,
background information and other legally established evidence.
B. One testimony is not sufficient for a ruling if it is not corroborated by
background information other convincing evidence or a confession from the
accused. The exception to this rule is if the law specifies a particular way of
proving a case, which must be followed.
281. See id. art. 219; see also supra note 275.
282. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 216:
The court may accept the statement of any dying victim as evidence relating to
the offence and its perpetrator or any other related matter.
283. Id. art. 220:
A. Reports of investigations and of the collating of evidence, and all the details in
them about procedures of disclosure, searching, and other official reports, are
regarded as elements of proof to be taken into consideration by the court. The
litigation can discuss them or prove the opposite.
B. The court must treat events written down by the officials in their reports as
part of their official duties as evidence which corroborates their statement,
provided they wrote them when they occurred or not long afterwards;
see also id art. 213; supra note 280.
284. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 223:
A. The court retires before giving its ruling. After it has formulated the ruling,
the hearing is resumed publicly. The ruling is read out to the accused or its
contents are made clear to him.
B. If the verdict is guilty, then the court must issue another ruling at the same
hearing with the penalty and explain them both.
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aspects of the case, from investigation through trial.285 The ruling, which details
the substantive aspects of the case, lays out the foundational basis of the verdict,
the legal ruling, and any dissenting opinions.286 Interestingly, dissenters from a
guilty verdict must still opine on an appropriate sentence.287
If the evidence indicates a more serious offense than was charged, or if there
is variance between the charge and the accusation, the charge is withdrawn and a
new charge issued in its place.2 8 The court notifies the defendant of the change
and allows him time to defend against the new charge.289 On the other hand, if the
court determines that the defendant has been overcharged, it simply adjusts its
verdict accordingly.290

285. Id art. 222:
Everything that takes place in the court is written up in a report. The judge or the
chief justice signs all its pages. The report must include the date of each hearing,
whether it was public or closed, the names of the judge or judges who considered
the case, the clerk, the representative of the Public Prosecution, the names of the
accused, and other members of accused's team, the names of the witnesses, a
report on the papers which were read out, the requests made, the procedures
concluded, a summary of rulings, and everything else that occurred during the
trial.
286. Id art. 224:
A. The ruling should contain the name of the judge or judges who have issued it,
the accused, the other parties and a representative of the Public Prosecution, a
description of the offence he is accused of perpetrating, the paragraph of law
which applies, the reasons for the court's ruling and the reasons for the level of
sentence passed. The ruling on the penalty must contain the principal and
subsidiary penalty penalties impose [sic] by the court; the amount of
compensation for which the court has ruled the accused or person, if any, taking
civil liability to be liable; or the court's decision on the return, confiscation or
destruction of assets or items claimed. The judge or the court's panel signs and
dates every ruling and seals them with the seal of the court.
B. Rulings are issued on the basis of consensus or a majority of them. All those
dissenting from the majority decision must explain their views in writing.
287. Id.art. 224(C):
Any person disagreeing with the guilty ruling must still express his opinion on
the most appropriate penalty for the offence on which a guilty ruling has been
made.
288. Id. art. 190(A):
If it becomes clear that the accused is accused of an offense punishable by a more
severe penalty than that with which he has been charged, or if there is a
difference between the descriptions given in the charge and the accusation, the
charge must be withdrawn and a new charge issued.
289. Id. art. 190(B):
The court notifies the accused of all changes and amendments made to the charge
in accordance with sub-paragraph A and grants a period of time for defence to
challenge this new charge if this is requested.
290. Id. art. 191:
If the accused is charged with an offence consisting of a number of actions, and it
subsequently appears that the accused committed only part of the offence, the
court completes the trial and issues a verdict without the need for a new charge to
be issued.
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Once the paperwork is completed (normally a period lasting no more than five
to ten minutes), the hearing is reconvened; the defendant is notified of the verdict
and (if applicable) the penalty.291 Upon conviction of a capital offense, the court
also notifies the defendant of the automatic appeal process.292
The "burden of proof'-to put it in common-law parlance-seems fairly
vague by American standards: if "the court is satisfied that the defendant
committed the offense of which he is accused, it issues a verdict of guilty and rules
on the penalty to be applied., 293 "If the court is satisfied that the defendant did not
commit the offense of which he is accused or that the action in question is not a
criminal offense, a verdict of not guilty is issued., 2 94 On similarly-vague
standards, the court may also dismiss the charge for lack of evidence, 295 or find the
defendant incompetent.296 In the latter three situations, the defendant is released
(unless other cases remain pending).297
Although cassation and retrial appeals are available to one convicted in 29
an8
Iraqi criminal trial, Iraqi law provides for definitive finality, both as to procedure

291. Id art. 181(D):
[Following closing statements of all parties and the defendant, t]he end of the
trial is then announced, and the court issues its verdict in the same session or in
another session held soon afterward;
see also id art. 223; supra note 284.
292. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 224(D):
If the court issues a death sentence, it must explain to the person given the
sentence that his case papers will be sent automatically to the Court of Cassation
for review. He may also appeal against the ruling at the Court of Cassation
within 30 days, starting from the day after the ruling has been issued.
293. Id art. 182(A):
If, after the trial has been conducted as above, the court is satisfied that the
accused committed the offence of which he is accused, it issues a verdict of
guilty and rules on the penalty to be applied.
294. Id art. 182(B):
If the court is satisfied that the defendant did not commit the offence of which he
is accused or that the action in question is not a criminal offence, a verdict of not
guilty is issued.
295. Id. art. 182(C):
If it becomes clear to the court that there is insufficient evidence to condemn him
the charge is dropped and he is released.
296. Id. art. 182(D):
If it becomes clear to the court that the accused is not legally responsible for his
actions the court issues a judgment of diminished responsibility and follows the
steps stipulated by law.
297. Id art. 182(E):
A detainee is released when a verdict of not-guilty, diminished responsibility,
release or rejection of the complaint is issued, as long as there is no other legal
reason for his detention.
298. Id art. 225:
The court is not permitted to retract, alter or change a ruling it has issued except
to correct a material error. This must be noted down in the margin and
considered a part of the ruling.
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and as to substance. 29 9 Thus, once the court issues a ruling, only clerical changes
may be made and the civil trial can use the finding as conclusive proof of guilt.
G. The Trial,Some Observations
It comes as a shock to most U.S. attorneys that a criminal trial in Iraq lasts on
the order of thirty minutes, and that deliberations take less than five. However,
given a good understanding of the entirety of the process leading up to the trial,
this should really come as no surprise. In my experience, it was rare that the trial
judges would call live witnesses. 00 Why should they? Their statements had been
duly recorded by a trained investigative judge. Thus, the vast majority of the
hearing is comprised of administrative duties: formally reviewing the witness
statements, questioning the defendant on any previous statements he had made,
and propounding the final charge. 0 1 As the judges and prosecutor have already
reviewed the case file beforehand, the hearing is really meant to clarify any
confusion arising from the record. And the deliberations? Because the judges are
familiar with both the law and the established facts, it would be surprising if it took
them any longer to agree on a verdict.
I pause here to note one interesting point about Iraqi justice. The United
States Constitution provides criminal defendants with a right to be confronted by
their accusers. 0 2 There is no such provision in Iraqi law. In fact, to the contrary,
there is a recognized procedure for informants to be granted anonymity in the most
serious cases. 3 They provide an in camerastatement to the IJ and their identities
are never disclosed to the accused/defendant nor to the public. 0 4 Although this
would be heresy (and hearsay) in a U.S. courtroom, the IJ and trial judges have a
fiduciary duty to remain impartial. They accord the testimony only as much
weight as they deem appropriate under the law, considering it in conjunction with
all other evidence in the case. Still, I cannot help but be cynical myself. I
observed a trial where, as far as I could understand through the translation, the
defendant-a frumpy man in his sixties-was ultimately convicted of terrorist acts
and condemned to hang based on the accusations of one or two anonymous

299. Id. art. 227(A):
A final criminal verdict of guilty or not guilty is proof of the event to which the
offense relates, ascribing it to its perpetrator and its legal status.
300. Most of the witness statements are collected by the investigative judge. See supra text
accompanying notes 78-79.
301. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 203; see supra note 266.
302. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
303. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 47(B):
If the complaint is about offences against the internal or external security of the
state, crimes of economic sabotage and other crimes punishable by death, life
imprisonment or temporary imprisonment and the informant asks to remain
anonymous, and not to be a witness, the judge has to register this with the
notification in a special record prepared for this purpose, and conduct the
investigation according to the rules, considering the information included in the
notification without mentioning the informant's identity in the investigative
paper.
304. Id.
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witnesses. Knowing he would never learn the identity of the complainant, he
begged the court to consider that it might be, as he supposed, the vindictive
accusation of his estranged wife. In the end, either the informant was not his wife
or the judges believed her testimony over his plaintive protests.
III. POST-TRiAL ISSUES

A. Cassation
The Court of Cassation is an appellate court with "jurisdiction to review
provisions and rulings issued on felonies, misdemeanors, and other cases stipulated
by law., 30 5 It conducts mandatory review of all capital and life imprisonment
cases. 30 6 Additionally, any party-the prosecutor, the accused, the complainant,
the civil plaintiff-can appeal the substantive ruling or judgment in a finalized
case. 30 7 The Cassation Court can also review a case sua sponte.30 8 Mistakes in the
application or interpretation of the law, as well as material procedural errors, can

305. Id art. 138(C); see supranote 227.
306. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 254(A):
If the Felony Court has issued a sentence of death or life imprisonment in the
presence of the accused, it must send a file on the case to the appellate court
within ten days of the issue of the judgment, so that it can be reviewed for
cassation, even if an appeal has not been lodged.
307. Id.art. 249(A):
The Public Prosecutor, the accused, the complainant, the civil plaintiff and the
person who is liable under civil law have the right to appeal to the Court of
Cassation against the provisions, decisions and judgments issued by the Court of
Felonies on a misdemeanor or felony, if it was based on a breach of the law or a
mistake in the application of the law or in its interpretation, or if there was a
fundamental error in the standard procedures or in the assessment of the evidence
or of the penalty, and this error influenced the judgment.
The civil plaintiff and the person with civil liability can appeal the correlative civil rulings on the noncriminal side of the case. See id art. 25 1(A).
308. Id. art. 264(A):
In addition to the provisions put forward, the Court of Cassation may, either of its
own accord or in response to a request from the Public Prosecution or anyone
else connected with the case, ask for the file on any criminal case to check the
provisions and rulings issued on it, as well as the procedures and orders. In this
case, it has the authority stipulated in this decision to consider an appeal,
although it may not reverse a finding of not guilty or increase the severity of the
penalty, unless it is requested so to do within 30 days from the date of issue of
the judgment or ruling.
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be appealed, 30 9 but jurisdictional or detention determinations cannot. 310 An appeal
petition for any ruling incorporates all prior related judgments or decisions.1
An appellant must submit the petition for appeal through official channels
within thirty days following the date of judgment.3 12 The court issuing the
decision being appealed is responsible for forwarding the case file to the Court of
* 313
Cassation.
The court must also automatically forward files on cases resulting in
sentences of death or life imprisonment within ten days. 314
When the Court of Cassation receives an appeal, it solicits review and input
from the Public Prosecutor,315 and considers any arguments made by the parties.316
309. Id art. 249(B):
A mistake in the proceedings cannot be ignored unless it has not been damaging
to the defense of the accused.
310. Id. art. 249(C):
No individual appeal for cassation will be accepted over decisions issued on
matters ofjurisdiction, over preparatory and administrative decisions or any other
decision on which there has not been a ruling in the case, unless it is subject to a
halt in progress in the case; decisions involving arrest, detention and release on
bail, or release without bail are also excluded.
311. Id. art. 250:
An appeal against a judgment or decision on which there has been a ruling in the
case must include all the judgments and decisions already issued or connected
with it.
312. Id art. 252:
A. The appeal takes place by means of a petition presented by the petitioner, or
his legal representative, to the criminal court which issued the judgment, to any
other criminal court, or directly to the Court of Cassation, within a period of
thirty days, starting from the day after the judgment was issued, if in the presence
of the parties, or from the date it was regarded as having the status of being
issued in the presence of the parties, if it was in absentia.
B. If the petitioner is in prison, in detention, or in any way inhibited, he may
present the petition through a prison, detention centre or appropriate official.
C. The petition contains the name of the petitioner, a summary of the judgment
against him and its date, the name of the court which issued the judgment, the
grounds on which the appeal is based and the final result.
D. The petitioner may show the grounds for the appeal separately on the petition,
or he may give new grounds, before the decision is made. It is the responsibility
of all parties involved in the case to present their own written statements and
applications.
313. Id art. 253:
It is up to the court that issued the judgment or decision for cassation to send a
file on the case to the Court of Cassation, as soon as an appeal petition has been
presented to it, or as soon as the Court of Cassation calls for it, in pursuance of
Article 249, Sub-paragraph C.
314. Id art. 254(A); see supra note 306.
315. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 255:
In accordance with Article 254, the Court of Cassation sends the case file to the
Chief Prosecutor's Office, immediately upon its receipt together with the grounds
for the appeal, petitions and statements received from the parties involved in the
case, presenting their demands and queries about the judgment or decision within
20 days of their receipt.
316. Id.art. 254(C):
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The Court can summon the parties (the accused, the plaintiff, the civil plaintiff, and
the Public Prosecutor) as it deems necessary. 317
The Court has plenary authority to correct jurisdictional problems in a case"'
and to change the substantive outcome, including reformation of the penalty and
redefinition of the offense to conform to the facts adduced by the investigative and
trial judges.3 19 It may confirm a verdict of guilty vel non, confirm or reduce an
adjudged penalty, order a new trial-and even reverse a finding of not guilty or
return a case for consideration of a higher sentence.12 0 Regardless of the action it
takes, the court must identify the grounds for its decision.321

317.

318.

319.

320.

The appellate court shall accept papers submitted by the accused and those
involved in the case before it issues its decision.
Id.art. 258:
A. If it appears to the Court of Cassation that an appeal against a judgment or
decision issued by the criminal court has not been presented within the period
specified in law, it will confirm its formal rejection.
B. It is up to the Court of Cassation to summon the accused, the plaintiff, the civil
plaintiff or person with civil liability (or both), or the representative of the Public
Prosecution to hear their statements or for any purpose it requires in order to
obtain the truth.
Id. art. 261:
If the Court of Cassation reverses the verdict issued by a court which does not
have jurisdiction, the case is transferred to the court which does have jurisdiction
and the court which issued the verdict is given notification.
Id.art. 260:
The Court of Cassation may change the legal description of the offence for which
a verdict of guilty has been issued against the accused to another description
which corresponds with the nature of the act committed and may pronounce him
guilty in accordance with the paragraph of the law which applies to this action,
and review the penalty to see if it is appropriate or to make is more lenient.
Id. art. 259(A):
It is up to the Court of Cassation, after checking the case documentation, to issue
its decision on the matter in one of the following ways:
1. Confirm the ruling on the evidence presented and the principal and any
supplementary penalties passed, as well as any other legal clauses;
2. Confirm the ruling of not guilty, conciliation, diminished responsibility or
the decision to discharge, or any other ruling or decision in the case;
3. Confirm the conviction with a reduced penalty;
4. Confirm the conviction and return the documents, for review of the
penalty, with a view to increasing its severity;
5. Return the documents to the Court once again to review the verdict of not
guilty, with a view to passing a sentence;
6. Reverse the guilty verdict and the principal and supplementary penalties,
and any other legal judgments, with a view to passing a verdict of not guilty,
annulling the charge and releasing the accused.
7. Reverse the conviction ruling and penalty ruling and return the
documentation to the Court for a re-trial, either complete or partial;
8. Reverse the ruling of not guilty, conciliation or diminished responsibility,
or the decision to discharge, or any other ruling or decision in the case,
return the documentation for a re-trial or a repeat judicial investigation.
9. Confirm the ruling issued in a civil case, reverse it completely, or reduce
the amount of the penalty awarded, or return the ruling to the court to
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During the pendency of an appeal, the defendant
is still subject to
3 22
implementation of the adjudged sentence (other than death).
In addition to appeals of final verdicts, the prosecutor may submit an
interlocutory appeal, requesting that the Court terminate a case, temporarily or
permanently, if he or she deems that justice so requires. 323 If the Court orders a
permanent suspension of proceedings pursuant to such an appeal, this ruling is
equivalent to a not-guilty verdict (but it does not affect any civil actions arising out
of the same incident).324
Parties to the case may request a correction of the Cassation decision on
substantive grounds,3 25 but no recognizable right of action exists for correction of

321.

322.

323.

324.

325.

complete the investigation, or to hold a review with the aim of increasing the
amount of the penalty awarded.
Id.art. 259(B):
The Court of Cassation will explain in its decision the grounds on which it is
based.
Id. art. 256:
An application for cassation over judgments and decisions does not imply
suspension of their implementation unless the law so stipulates.
Id. art. 199:
A. The Chief Prosecutor may request that the Court of Cassation put an end to
the procedures of examination or trial, either temporarily or permanently, in any
case up to the point of the issue of the final verdict, if there is a reason justifying
this action.
B. The request must include the justification and, when submitted to the Court of
Cassation, the papers of the court are requested, and the investigative judge or
court must send them for examination on the case.
C. The Court of Cassation checks the request and decides whether to accept it
and suspend proceedings permanently or temporarily for a period not exceeding
three years, if he finds justification. If there is no justification, the request will be
refused.
D. After the Court of Cassation has issued its decision, the file is returned and a
copy of the decision is sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions.
E. If the decision stipulates a suspension of proceedings, the investigative judge
or court must release the accused if he is detained. The issue of this decision will
not prejudice the right of the judicial authorities or court to confiscate items, the
possession of which is illegal.
F. The decision to suspend proceedings temporarily may be converted to one of
permanent suspension in accordance with the provisions stipulated in this section.
Id. art. 200:
A. The investigation and trial will resume after the end of a period of temporary
suspension from the point where they stopped.
B. The decision to suspend proceedings permanently has the same legal effect as
a not guilty verdict, although it does not prejudice potential damages from a civil
case raised, or the payment of compensation.
Id. art. 266:
A. The Public Prosecution, the convicted person and all others connected with a
criminal case may request the correction of a legal error in the decision issued by
the Court of Cassation, provided the request is submitted within 30 days, counted
from the date a convicted, imprisoned or detained person is notified of the
cassation decision or, otherwise, from the date the court dealing with the case
receives the case documentation from the Court of Cassation.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 39:1

decisions ordering additional procedures.326 Only one request may be accepted
(per party?).327 The Court's decision to accept or reject a request for correction is
final-it cannot be corrected.328
B. Retrial
Retrial may be requested through the Public Prosecutor 329 in the following
circumstances: the defendant's putative murder victim has been found alive;
another person has subsequently been convicted of the same crime; the defendant's
conviction was based on an expert's testimony or document's authenticity which is
later proven to be false; previously-unknown exculpatory facts have come to light;
the conviction was based on another judgment subsequently quashed or annulled;
or the offense or sentence no longer applies to the accused. 330 If a request for
retrial is denied, it may not be resubmitted without citing additional grounds.331

326.

327.
328.

329.

330.

B. The request is submitted directly to the Court of Cassation, or through the
court, or prison or centre administration, if the convicted person is already in
prison or detained.
Id art. 267:
A request for correction is not accepted for the following decisions:
A. A decision for reversal and re-trial or a second judicial investigation;
B. A decision issued for the return of case documentation for review of the
judgment;
C. A decision or judgment issued by the Court of Cassation General Board.
Id art. 269(A):
A request for correction can only be accepted on one occasion.
Id. art. 269(B):
Decisions to turn down or accept a request for correction cannot be corrected
after issue.
Id. art. 271:
A request for a re-trial is submitted to the Public Prosecution by the person
convicted, or whoever represents him in law. If the person convicted has died the
request can be submitted by his wife or one of his relatives, but the request must
clearly explain the ground on which it is based and be accompanied by
supporting documentation.
Id. art. 270:
A re-trial can be requested for a case which resulted in a sentence or imposition
of penalties for a felony or misdemeanor under the following circumstances:
A. If the accused was convicted of murder and the person for whose murder
he was convicted is found alive;
B. If a person was convicted of an offense and a judgment was later issued
against another person for committing the same offence since one of the two
judgments must be against a person innocent of the offense;
C. If a person is convicted on the basis of the testimony of an expert or the
opinion of a specialist, or document, and later a definitive judgment is issued
against the witness or expert on the basis of having borne false witness, or
the document is proven to be a forgery;
D. If after the judgment is issued, facts come to light, or documents are
presented which were not known at the time of the trial, and these prove the
innocence of the convicted person.
E. If the judgment was based on a judgment which was quashed or annulled
by lawful means.
F. If a guilty or not guilty judgment, or a final decision for discharge was
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After the petition is submitted, the Public Prosecutor reviews the case file and
submits an opinion on the merits of the petition to the Court of Cassation.33 2 The
Court of Cassation then reviews the case file and the evidence supporting the
334
request 333 to determine whether the legal preconditions for retrial are satisfied.
The retrying court conducts a new trial, which can result in partial or full
annulment of the previous judgment, a confirmation of the previous findings and
sentence, or affirmation of the conviction with a new sentence.335 As with an
application for cassation,336 the defendant is subject to the sentence originally
adjudged during the petition review and any retrial process: the grant of a retrial
petition does not estop the enforcement of any penalty except death.337 Any new
sentence adjudged cannot exceed the original sentence 338 except, presumably in
cases where new evidence of additional crimes has also come to light.
An annulment results in the return of the defendant to his status quo ante in
all respects. 33 9 Thus, a retrial proceeding continues despite the death of the

331.

332.

333.

334.

335.

336.
337.

338.
339.

issued on the basis of a criminal act, either separate or related to the original
offence;
G. If for any lawful reason the offence or sentence no longer apply to the
accused.
Id art. 279:
If the request for a re-trial is turned down, or if a decision is issued for noninterference with the original judgment, the request cannot be submitted for a
second time, on exactly the same grounds as were used in the first request.
Id art. 272:
The Public Prosecution will carry out an examination of the grounds supporting
the request and will check the case documentation. He then submits the papers,
together with his assessment, to the Court of Cassation as quickly as possible.
Id. art. 274:
The Court of Cassation reviews the request by carrying out an inspection of the
case documentation and it is up to the court to undertake whatever inquiries and
questioning of witnesses it considers necessary.
Id art. 275:
If the Court of Cassation finds that the request for a re-trial fails to satisfy the
necessary legal conditions, it will decide to turn it down. If it finds the request
justified, it will return the documentation to the court which issued the judgment,
or to the court which has taken its place, together with its decision for a re-trial.
Id. art. 276:
The trial takes place on the basis of the requested re-trial referred back to it, and
if it decides there is no just cause to interfere with the original judgment, it issues
a decision accordingly; if however it decides on annulment, either total or partial,
and that the person convicted is not guilty, it will issue a new judgment, but this
will not be more severe in its sentence than the previous one. Its judgment will
be in accordance with legal procedures.
Id art. 256; see supra note 322.
Criminal Procedure Code, art. 273:
The request for a re-trial can only halt implementation of a sentence if it was in
respect of [sic] the death penalty.
Id art. 276; see supra note 335.
Criminal Procedure Code, art. 278:
Following the annulment of a judgment, all its civil or criminal consequences are
removed, either in total or in part, and the amount of any fine or compensation is
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convicted defendant3 4 -- presumably to allow posthumous exoneration and the
concomitant restoration of civil and property rights.
C. Custody and Fines
Sentences run from the date of implementation until noon on the date of
release.3 41 Time served in pretrial detention may offset either a sentence of
imprisonment 34 2 or a fine. 141 On the other hand, failure to pay a fine may result in
the fine being converted to a specific amount of imprisonment time.344 Sentences
of married couples where each spouse is convicted of crimes may, upon request

340.

341.

342.

343.

344.

returned together with any impounded or confiscated property. If such items are
no longer present, their value is paid out, unless the confiscation was not a legal
duty.
Id. art. 277:
If the person convicted has died, or if he dies after the request has been
submitted, the court continues with the measures for a re-trial and appoints
someone to be responsible for the defence, if the person who requested the retrial had not already appointed someone to represent his defense. The court then
issues its decision not to interfere with the original judgment, or for annulment,
either in full or in part, or for a declaration of not guilty on the part of the
deceased. Its decision will be in accordance with legal procedures.
Id.art. 294(A):
The sentence is calculated from the day it is implemented against the convicted
until noon on the day he is discharged.
Id. art. 295:
The period of detention is deducted from the period of the sentence issued against
the convicted person for the same offence. If there are several offences within
the same case, this period is deducted from the least severe penalty.
Id. art. 298:
If a person is sentenced to a fine only, and he has already been detained for the
offence of which he has been convicted, the amount of the fine can be reduced
for every day he was detained. If the person is sentenced to imprisonment and a
fine, and the period he spent in detention is longer than the period of the prison
sentence, the amount of the fine is to be reduced by one half of one dinar for
every extra day served. If the number of days in question adds up to exceed the
amount of the fine payable, then the court can decide to discharge him.
Id. art. 299:
A. If a person is sentenced to a fine, whether or not with imprisonment as well,
and he does not pay the money, the court will sentence him to imprisonment for
half of the maximum period for the offense concerned, if he was sentenced to
both prison and a fine.
B. If an offense was punished by a fine only, the period of imprisonment to
which the court can sentence the accused in the event of the fine not being paid is
reduced proportionally to the amount outstanding. However the total period of
the prison sentence must not exceed 2 years.
C. The prison sentence comes to an end, in the event of non-payment of the fine,
upon the discharge of the fine, or a part of it relative to the remainder of the
sentence.
D. Payment of the fine, or a portion of it, can be paid to the court, police station
or prison administration, and when this happens the convicted person can be
discharged immediately.
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(and posting of appropriate bail),345 be ordered to be served consecutively if they
have responsibility for a child under twelve years old.346
D. Terminationof a Criminal Case
With regard to the termination of a case, the Code provides:
A criminal case is concluded upon the death of the accused, the issue of
a guilty or not guilty judgment, or a judgment or decision of diminished
responsibility for the offence concerned, or a final decision for discharge
of the accused or a pardon, or the permanent
cessation of proceedings,
347
or for other reasons stipulated in law.
E. Death Penalty
In capital cases, the condemned is imprisoned pending the final processing of
his case. 348 There is an automatic review of the matter by both the Cassation Court
and the head of State. 349 An execution may not take place until four months
postpartum for a pregnant female,350 on an official holiday or a religious festival
345. Id. art. 297:
The decision to postpone implementation of a sentence is issued in accordance
with Article 296 by the court which issued the sentence, in response to the
request of the convicted person. The court will demand bail to guarantee that he
returns to serve the sentence upon expiry of the period of time in question. The
court calculates the amount of the bail and includes it in the decision issued
granting the postponement of implementation. It is the responsibility of the court
to make appropriate arrangements in this way to ensure the convicted person
does not run away.
346. Id art. 296:
If a man and his wife are both awarded custodial sentences for a period of more
than one year for different offenses, and they have not been in prison before,
implementation of the sentence with regard to one of them can be postponed if
they have responsibility for a young child of less than 12 years and they have a
fixed place of residence.
347. Id art. 300.
348. Id art. 285(A):
The person condemned to death is placed in prison until steps have been taken for
carrying out the sentence.
349. Id art. 286:
If the Court of Cassation confirms the death sentence as issued, it will send the
case file to the Prime Minister, who is responsible for passing it on to the
President of the Republic to seek the necessary decree for carrying out the
sentence.
The President of the Republic issues the decree for carrying out the sentence, or
for commuting it, or for pardoning the condemned person. If he issues the decree
for implementation, the Prime Minister issues an order to that effect, including
the decree of the Republic, in accordance with legal provisions.
350. Id art. 287:
A. If the condemned person is pregnant when the order for implementation
arrives, it is the responsibility of the prison administration to inform the head of
the Chief Prosecutor to present a notification to the Minister of Justice to delay
execution of the sentence, or to reduce it. The Minister of Justice then submits
this notification to the President of the Republic. Implementation of the sentence
is delayed until another order is issued by the Minister of Justice in accordance
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pertinent to the condemned,351 or until the condemned has made a final confession
(if his religion so dictates). 2 The execution is carried out by a reading of the
death decree, 353 a taking of any last statement of the condemned, 354 and the
hanging-the sole authorized means of execution,355 followed by the obligatory
final paperwork annotating the event.356 The condemned's relatives are entitled to
visit the day before the execution 357 and to receive the body afterward. 358 If they

351.

352.

353.

354.

355.

356.

357.

358.

with the decision of the President of the Republic. If the renewed order rules for
implementation of the death sentence, it is not carried out until four months after
the date of delivery of the child, whether the delivery is before or after the arrival
of the order.
B. The judgment in sub-paragraph A is applicable to a condemned person whose
child is delivered before the arrival of the order for implementation if the period
of four months from the date of her confinement has not expired. The sentence is
not carried out until four months have elapsed from the date of her confinement,
even if the renewed order for implementation arrives.
Id.art. 290:
The death penalty cannot be carried out on official holidays and special festivals
connected with the religion of the condemned person.
Id. art. 292:
If the religion of the condemned person requires him to make confession before
death, the necessary arrangements are to be made for him to meet a cleric of his
religion.
Id. art. 289(A):
The director of the prison reads the Republic decree for the implementation of the
sentence to the condemned person at the place of execution, so that the others
present can hear.
Id. art. 289(B):
If the condemned person wishes to make a statement, the judge notes down what
is said and this is endorsed by the other members present.
Id. art. 288:
The sentence of death is carried out by hanging within the prison, or any other
place in accordance with the law after the issue of the decree of the President of
the Republic for the sentence to be carried out in accordance with Article 286.
The execution is witnessed by the Implementation Board, comprising a
Misdemeanor Court judge, a member of the Public Prosecution, if available, a
representative of the Ministry of the Interior, the director of the prison and the
prison doctor, or any other doctor delegated by the Ministry of Health. The
accused's legal representative is excused from attendance if he so requests.
Id. art. 289(C):
Once sentence has been carried out, the director of the prison signs a form, on
which he [sic] doctor confirms death, and the time this took place, and the
remainder of those resent [sic] sign the document accordingly.
Id. art. 291:
It is the responsibility of the relatives of the condemned person to visit on the day
before sentence is to be carried out. It is the duty of the prison administration to
info [sic] them of the date accordingly.
Id. art. 293:
The corpse of the executed person is handed over to relatives if they so request.
Otherwise the prison authorities will carry out the burial at government expense,
but there will be no funeral ceremony.
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decline to9 accept the body, it is given an ignominious burial at government
35
expense.
IV. MISCELLANY

The goal of this article has been to provide a broad overview of the
investigation and trial process in Iraq. There are some topics, however, that are so
esoteric or not germane to that goal as to merit little discussion. Thus, the
following have not been discussed at length elsewhere:
*

Seizure of a felon's property is authorized.360 Seizure of an
absconded accused felon's property is authorized to induce him
to come forward.361
Conciliation, a creature unique to civil law systems (in which the
defendant

may

provide

restitution

or

otherwise

359. Id.
360. Id. arts. 183-86.
361. Id. art. 121:
A. If an arrest warrant issued against the accused for the commission of a felony
is not executed, the investigating judge and criminal court may issue an order for
the seizure of the moveable and immoveable property of the accused. After
execution, papers are immediately sent to the Court of Felony, and if supported
by the court, the authorities who decided on the detention will issue a statement,
published in the local newspapers, on the television and using other methods of
publication as appropriate, which states the name of the accused, the offence of
which he is accused and the property which has been seized. It will ask him to
give himself up to the nearest police station within 3 days. It will also ask that
any person with knowledge of the location of the accused inform the nearest
police station. If the Court of Felony does not support it, the seizure is cancelled.
If the decree of seizure was issued by the Court Felony [sic], it is implemented,
and the statement is issued without need for approval from any other authority.
B. If the accused does not give himself up within the period stipulated, the
authorities which issued the decree of seizure will deposit moveable assets with
the judicial guard for safekeeping and they will be administered under his
supervision. The immoveable assets will be handed over to the Office for
Confiscated Property to administer, in its capacity as property with an absentee
owner. The property will remain confiscated in this way until the death of the
accused is proven; he is sentenced or proved guilty or not liable; he is released; or
the complaint against him is dropped. At that point, the property will be returned
to him or whoever is the rightful owner.
C. If the property seized will deteriorate quickly or is expensive to maintain, or if
the authorities issuing the decree of seizure decide to sell it, it is sold in
accordance with the Law of Implementation based on a memo sent to the person
in charge of implementation.
D. If the accused gives himself up or is arrested, either the seized property or its
value is returned in full.
E. Any person to whom an accused person who has absconded owes money on a
legal basis, shall be paid monthly from the seized assets at the same rate as
payment was being made before the seizure, by decree of the authorities which
issued the decree of seizure.

provide
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satisfaction to the complainant, such that the complainant
362
withdraws the complaint), is available in the Iraqi system.
*

Misdemeanor Courts ruling in cases involving only a penalty of
detention may use the summary trial method in lieu of a more
robust trial.3 63
The summary process entails hearing the
complainant/plaintiff from the associated civil case, hearing the
witnesses, reading the reports, and listening to the defendant.364
There is no formal charging or plea process. 3 65 Instead, the court
issues a verdict-based on whether it "is satisfied" or not that the
defendant committed the offense of which he is accused. 6 6 The
maximum punishment that may be issued following a summary
trial is the maximum penalty for an infraction as set forth in the
Penal Code.367

*

Iraqi law recognizes a version of the double jeopardy principle:
cases that are conclusively fina13 68 usually may not be
relitigated.3 69 The exception is those cases in which new
evidence is found to show material flaws in the facts presented at
trial.370

362. Id arts. 194-98.
363. Id. arts. 201-04.
364. Id art. 203(A):
The process of a [summary] trial entails the court hearing the testimony of the
complainant or civil plaintiff, testimony of the witness, reading reports, then
hearing a statement from the accused, if in attendance, without any charge being
made, and recording a written summary of this, thus covering all aspects of the
case.
365. Id.
366. Id art. 203(B)-(C):
B. If the court is satisfied, after taking the steps described in sub-paragraph A,
that the accused committed the offense of which he is accused, it issues a guilty
verdict and rules on the penalty to be imposed.
C. If the court is satisfied that the accused did not commit the offense of which he
is accused, or if there is insufficient evidence for conviction, or if the action
which was committed is not a criminal offense, a ruling is made that the accused
be released.
367. Id art. 204(C):
If the court reviews a case of misdemeanor in summary form, it may not give a
judgment exceeding the maximum penalty for an infraction as stipulated in the
Penal Code.
368. Id art. 300; see supra note 347.
369. Criminal Procedure Code, art. 301:
There cannot be a return to investigation and court proceedings against the
accused, for whom the criminal case has been concluded, except under
circumstances stipulated in law.
370. Id art. 303:
The investigation or court proceedings against an accused may be resumed after
the criminal case has been closed if, after the issue of the judgment or definitive
or final decision, it emerges that there was an act or consequence of the offense
for which the accuse was tried, or had proceedings taken against him, which was
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Regardless of the outcome of a particular case, contraband taken
from the accused is confiscated.371 Specific provisions describe
the handling of other impounded items, depending on their
nature, establishment of ownership, and outcome of the case.372
The following subjects are specifically addressed in the Code, but not
discussed in this article:
*
The relationship
of a criminal case to its concomitant civil (tort)
3
37

case

*

Geographic jurisdiction 374of the IJ/subject matter jurisdiction of
investigating authorities

*

Bail, and the subsequent
confiscation of property in consequence
3 75
of its violation

*
*

Procedural issues related to investigation of cases committed by
376
juveniles
377
Procedures for handling misdemeanor breaches of the peace

*

Extradition,
foreign service of process, and other extraterritorial
8
issues

*
*
*
*

*

37

379
Conditional discharge (probationary parole)
380
Cash sureties

Handling of impounded goods381
382
Commitment to keep the peace
Commitment to good behavior (a program where the prosecutor
or an investigative judge can recommend that a recidivist or
unemployed person be placed on probation or pay a surety in lieu
thereof for one to three years)383

fundamentally different from the facts as presented in the trial.
371. Id art. 307:
The discharge of a case for any lawful reason does not prevent the confiscation of
goods whose possession is prohibited in law.
372. See id. arts. 308-16.
373. See id. arts. 10-29.
374. See id. arts. 53-55.
375. The authority of a judge to order or allow bail or a written pledge is covered in Criminal
Procedure Code, arts. 95-96. Collateral issues involving the inability to make bail or failure to appear
after posting bail are treated at Criminal Procedure Code, arts. 101, 111-22.
376. See id. arts. 233-42.
377. See id. arts. 321-30.
378. See id. arts. 352-68.
379. See id. arts. 331-37.
380. See id. arts. 325-30.
381. See id. arts. 308-16.
382. See i. arts. 317-20.
383. See id. arts. 321-24.
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Finally, it is simply impossible, in an article of this nature, to address the
myriad of non-Code issues that impact directly the administration of justice in the
Iraqi system. Thus, I have consciously avoided a discussion of the hierarchical
structure of the court system, and the many changes the Coalition Provision
Authority made to Iraqi criminal procedure law, including the elimination of the
death penalty (which was subsequently reinstated by the Council of
Representatives). I have also chosen to avoid any significant reference to the
substantive penal laws of Iraq-or even to the categorization of crimes into
felonies, misdemeanors, and infractions.

384. See id. arts. 338-41.

CRITICAL COMPARISONS:
THE ROLE OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
VALENTINA VADI*

A rose is a rose is an onion
Ernest Hemingway, For Whom the Bell Tolls (1940)
Both comparativists and internationalistshave mostly neglected the interaction
between internationallaw and comparative law. While "[i]nternationalistsseem
comfortable with power and uncomfortable with culture .

.

. comparativists are

eager for cultural understanding and wary of involvement with governance.
However, this attitude is gradually changing, as comparativists and
internationalistshave increasingly acknowledged that they "sharemore than they
realize.,2 This article aims to scrutinize the interplay between international
investment law and comparative law. This interactionhasfour different but related
dimensions: comparative investment law, comparative arbitration law, legal
doctrine, and treaty interpretation. While authors have extensively studied
comparative investment law and comparative arbitration law, which study the
different national legislations regulating foreign investment and the arbitral
process, investment law scholarship and arbitraltribunals' use of comparative law
has received scarce, if any, attention.
While the use of comparative legal reasoningin investment law jurisprudenceand
legal scholarship seems to offer concrete solutions to emerging conceptual
dilemmas and reputed scholars have forcefully argued in favor of it, one may
question whether a more critical approachto the use of comparative law should be
adopted.It is often assumed that comparative law is a neutralprocess, but this is
* Lecturer in international law (Maastricht University), Adjunct lecturer in international trade law
(University of Rome III), PhD (European University Institute), M Res (EUI), M Jur (Oxon), J D and M
Pol Sc (Siena). She may be contacted at v.vadi@maastrichtuniversity.nl. Earlier drafts were presented
at the Comparative Law Session of the Society of Legal Scholars' Centenary Conference, held at the
University of Keele on September 8t , 2009 and at the International Economic Law session of the
Socio-Legal Studies Association Annual Conference, held at Bristol Law School, on March 3 0th 2010.
The author wishes to thank Professor John Bell, Professor Paula Gilliker, Professor Andrea Bjorklund
and Professor Amanda Perry-Kessaris for their comments on previous drafts.
1. David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International
Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 545, 633 (1997).
2. Id. at 557.
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not always the case. Problems of perspective are a central element in the
comparative law discourse. This study focuses on the interplay between
internationalinvestment law and comparative law and proposes the adoption of a
critical method Not only would such awareness limit eventual abuses of the
comparative method, but it would also favour the coherence of the international
legal system as a whole.
I. INTRODUCTION

Not many fields of law use comparative law as extensively as international
arbitration. International arbitration is a method for settling transnational disputes,
involving parties and adjudicators of different nationalities, and requiring the
application of different sets of procedural and substantive norms. For its intrinsic
characteristics, international arbitration constitutes the Walhalla for comparative
law experts, and indeed, an eminent arbitrator, Professor Pierre Lalive, has recently
recognized that "the main duty of the international arbitrator is to be open to other
cultures" and that "[i]n order for international arbitrators to avoid culture clashes,
universities should start training law students much more in international and
comparative law."3 In a previous study he affirmed that "an international
arbitration should be decided by a truly 'international' arbitrator, i.e. someone who
is more than a national lawyer, someone who is internationally-minded, trained in
comparative
law and inclined to adopt a comparative and truly 'international
4
outlook. '

While many comparative lawyers have therefore analyzed international
arbitration through comparative law lenses, 5 investment treaty arbitration has
received scarce if any attention. This neglect may be due to several interlinked
reasons. First, investment-treaty arbitration is often associated with international
arbitration. Second, the boom of investment disputes has only a very recent
pedigree. Consequently, only recently have authors analyzed the phenomenon of
investment treaty arbitration. Third, given the relative scarcity of legal doctrine, it
is logical that comparative law scholars have not had the necessary inputs to start
scrutinizing this particular area of public international law.
However, some have highlighted the distinction between investment treaty
arbitration and international commercial arbitration.6 While international
3. Sarah Dookhun, Q&A with Professor Pierre Lalive, 3 GLOBAL ARBITRATION REVIEW 5, 3
(2008), available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Mvedia/lectures/pdf/Lalive-QandA.pdf (emphasis added).
4. Pierre Lalive, On the Neutrality of the Arbitratorand of the Place of Arbitration, in RECUEIL
DE TRAVAUX SUISSES SUR L'ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL 23, 27 (Claude Reymond & Eugene Bucher

eds., 1984) (emphasis added).
5. JEAN-FRAN0OIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL

ARBITRATION v-vi (Stephen V. Berti & Annette Ponti trans., 2d ed. 2007); JULIAN LEW ET AL.,
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION 2-3 (2003); see also Andreas F.

Lowenfeld, Two-Way Mirror: InternationalArbitrationas ComparativeProcedure,7 MICH. Y.B. INT'L
LEGAL STUD. 163 (1985) (deeming international arbitration as an exercise in comparative procedure).

6. See Nigel Blackaby, Investment Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration (or the Tale of the
Dolphin and the Shark), in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 217, 217-19
(Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2006); Jan Paulsson, InternationalArbitration is Not
Arbitration, 2 STOCKHOLM INT'L ARB. REV. 1 (2008) available at http://www.arbitration-
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arbitration generally involves private parties and concerns disputes of a
commercial nature, investment treaty arbitration involves states and private actors.7
This "diagonal" dispute settlement mechanism is a major novelty in international
law since international disputes have traditionally involved states only.8 In this
sense, investment arbitration represents a successful means to ensure access to
justice at the international level. Because of the peculiar character of investment
treaty arbitration and the recent proliferation of investment disputes, the role of
comparative law in investment treaty arbitration requires an autonomous analysis. 9
This scrutiny is not only theoretically interesting but also concretely useful in light
of the increasing criticisms on investment treaty arbitration. Investment treaty
disputes mainly involve public law adjudication and may have a deep impact on
public welfare. Some authors have pointed out the inadequacies of arbitration,
which is historically rooted in private law, to deal with disputes involving public
law.10 This essay aims at exploring the role that comparative law may play in
investment treaty arbitration and questions whether the use of comparative law
may help solve some aspects of the "legitimacy crisis" of investment treaty
arbitration. 1
The argument shall proceed as follows: First, the characteristics of
investment-treaty arbitration shall be highlighted. Second, this contribution will
scrutinize some essential features of the comparative method. Only by knowing the
merits and limits of the comparative method can interpreters and adjudicators
make an appropriate use of it. Third, this study focuses on the interplay between
international investment law and comparative law. While several studies have

icca.org/media/0/12331138275470/siar_2008-2saulsson.pdf; Giuditta Cordero Moss, Commercial
Arbitration and Investment Arbitration: Fertile Soil for False Friends?, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY-ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 782, 782-84
(Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).
7. Moss, supranote 6, at 784-93.
8. Paulsson, supranote 6, at 5-6.
9. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2006 - FROM
DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT at 29, U.N. Sales No.

E.06.II.D.11 (2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2006 en.pdf. According to the
UNCTAD, a total of 226 investment treaty arbitrations had been brought during the period 1987-2006.
The number of investor state arbitrations, however, is only approximate, because disputes might be
unknown because of the confidentiality requirements. About two thirds of these arbitrations have been
filed since the beginning of 2002 alone.
10. Gus Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007).
11. Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy
of InternationalInvestment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 473 (2009) (discussing the "legitimacy crisis"
of investment treaty arbitration); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: Privatizing Public InternationalLaw Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1521, 1521 (2005); M. Sornarajah, A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES LAW 39 (Karl P.

Sauvant ed., 2008); Joachim Karl, InternationalInvestment Arbitration:A Threat to State Sovereignty?,
in REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 225, 232-38 (Wenhua Shan et al.

eds., 2008); Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World. A Pleafor Reassessing Bias Under
the Specter ofNeoliberalism,41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419 (2000).
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focused on what may be called comparative investment law, 12 much less attention
has been paid to the use of comparative law within investment treaty arbitration.
This phenomenon deserves close scrutiny because investment treaty tribunals use
the comparative method in their reasoning. Arbitral tribunals refer to the
jurisprudence of other international courts and tribunals, the precedents of other
investment tribunals, 13 or even to national precedents. The paper will assess the
functioning of such a "judicial borrowing" and conclude with some reflections on
the important role that comparative law may play in "legitimizing" investment
treaty arbitration. By furthering the judicial dialogue among international courts
and tribunals, legal transplants may constitute a key element to insert human rights
considerations into investment treaty arbitration, and have the potential for
ultimately promoting the humanization of international law.
II.

INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION

While international investment law is one of the most ancient areas of public
international law, investment treaty arbitration is a recent phenomenon. 14 When the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was first
established in 196615 it was hardly foreseen that it would in due course become one
of the most active international tribunals, before which there are now more than
130 cases pending. 16 None could predict that investment treaty arbitration would
move "from a matter of peripheral academic interest to a matter of vital
international concern., 17 Most contemporary investment treaties include investorstate arbitration for the settlement of disputes which may arise between the foreign
investor and the host state. 18 Under this mechanism, foreign investors may bring

12. See infra Section IV.
13. There is no such rule as binding precedent in international law. See Statute of the International
Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/
index.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0 (stating that a "decision of the Court has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.") [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
14. See Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3,
Decision on Jurisdiction (Nov. 27, 1985), 3 ICSID Rep. 131 (1995) (upholding the validity of an ICSID
clause under Egyptian law); see also ANDREW NEWCOMBE AND LLULS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE
OF INVESTMENT TREATIES -STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 45 (2009) (explaining that the Chad-Italy BIT
marked "the true beginning of modem BIT practice" and gives an accurate historical overview).
15. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States arts. 1-3, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
16. List of Pending Cases, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES,

http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtsRH&actionVal=ListPending
(last visited Sep. 24, 2010).
17. Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 435, 435 (2009).
18. See David Sedlak, ICSID's Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration: Can the
Momentum Hold?, 23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 147 (2004) (arguing that investor-state arbitration has
become a standard feature in international investment treaties since the 1980's, and such mechanism has
been used increasingly. From 1995 to 2004 ICSID registered four times as many claims as in the
previous 30 years and the growth rate appears increasing in the last five years. The ICSID renaissance is
probably due to economic globalization and the proliferation of investment treaties. There seems to be a
parallel growth in other fora, but data is not available because of the confidentiality requirements. Also,
some disputes may be unknown because settled before registration).
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claims against the host state before international arbitral tribunals. 19 This
development has transformed the landscape of modem investment protection, 20 as
customary international law did not confer such a right to individuals. 21 Similarly,
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaties and investment treaties that
pre-dated the establishment of the ICSID only provided for State-to-State
disputes. 22 In contrast with this traditional paradigm of states as the only subjects
of international law and the only ones having the capacity to raise international
claims against other states in legal proceedings, modem investment treaties do not
require the intervention of the home state in the furtherance of the dispute.23
Private companies no longer depend on the discretion of their home states in the
context of diplomatic protection as to whether a claim should be raised against
another state.24
Suggestively
described
as
"arbitration
without privity, 25
the
internationalization of investment disputes guarantees a neutral forum and has thus
been conceived as an important valve for adequately recognizing and protecting
the assets of foreign investors from expropriation, host state nationalization or
other forms of regulation. Through arbitration clauses the host state signatory to
the treaty agrees in advance to arbitrate disputes, at the investor's initiative, over
the treaty meaning and application.26 Such clauses are to some degree necessary to
render meaningful the more substantive investment treaty provisions. By
themselves, treaty based provisions are meaningless if they are not accompanied
by an effective dispute settlement mechanism. As the late Professor Thomas Walde
once held, "it is the ability to access a tribunal outside the sway of the host state
which is the principal advantage of a modem investment treaty . . . . The
effectiveness of substantive rights is ... linked to the availability of an effective
enforcement . . . . Right and procedural remedy, are, in practical and effective
terms, one."27
19. Id. at 153-54.
20. See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 5 (2007); JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3

(2005).
21. See

JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL

1-15 (1999); see also Peter Muchlinski, The Diplomatic
Protectionof Foreign Investors: A Tale of Judicial Caution, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY-ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 341 (Christina Binder et al. eds.,
2009).
22. Herman Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties of Friendship,Commerce, and Navigation, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 805, 805 (1957).
23. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supranote 14, at 44-45.
LAW: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES

24. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 61-84 (2000);
Karl-Heinz Bickstiegel, Arbitration of Foreign Investment Disputes- An Introduction, in NEW
HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND BEYOND 125, 125-31 (Albert Jan van

den Berg ed., 2005).
25. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 232,

256 (1995), available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12254614477540/jasparticle - arbitr
ation withoutjirivity.pdf.
26. B~ckstiegel, supra note 24, at 126.
27. Thomas Walde, The "Umbrella" (or Sanctity of Contract/Pactasunt Servanda) Clause in
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Importantly, the paradigm shift is significant in a further respect. In investor-

state arbitration there is a transfer of adjudicative authority from national courts to
arbitral tribunals. In this sense, it has been argued that access to investor-state
arbitration shares many characteristics of the direct right of action before human
rights courts.28 However, arbitral tribunals do not only constitute an additional
forum with respect to State courts, but also an alternative to the same. 29 Thus, not
only can foreign investors seek another decision after an eventual recourse to the
national courts, but they are not required to exhaust local remedies prior to
pursuing an international legal claim. This is in stark contrast to international
human rights treaties which require that claimants exhaust local remedies in the
first instance. 30 Even where contracts between an enterprise and a state expressly
limit recourse to local dispute settlement options, claimants can directly surmount
national jurisdictions and bring investment claims to arbitral tribunals in situations
where the investor's home state and the host state have a BIT in place.31 Under
most investment treaties, states have waived their sovereign immunity and have
agreed to give arbitrators comprehensive jurisdiction over what are essentially
regulatory disputes. Indeed, investment treaty arbitration encompasses the full
panoply of the state's regulatory relations with foreign investors. As a result, some
have pointed out that investment treaty arbitration would replace judicial organs
with private adjudicators in matters of public law.32
Since investment arbitration presents characteristics similar to those in a
typical international commercial arbitration, these features may become
Investment Arbitration: A Comment on Original Intentions and Recent Cases, 1 TRANSNAT'L DisP.
MGMT 4, 13 (2004); Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Enterprise v. State: The New David and Goliath?- The
Clayton Utz Lecture, 23 ARB. INT'L 93 (2007) (noting that the traditional David-Goliath relationship
between private investors and states has been replaced, at least procedurally, by a level playing field
and that in some circumstances, private claimants, as large multinational companies, may well have
more resources available than small state being a respondent).
28. See ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 1-10 (2009)

(Describing the similarity between the situation of private persons claiming international protection of
human rights before the ECtHR, private enterprises hold individual procedural and substantive rights in
international investment law); see Clara Reiner & Christoph Schreuer, Human Rights and International
Investment Arbitration,Human Rights in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 82-97,

94 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2009).
29. See DOUGLAS, supranote 28, at 9.
30. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Human Rights Treaty Bodies - Individual
Communications, Procedure for complaints by individuals under the human rights treaties,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/individual.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
31. Several recent ICSID cases have upheld jurisdiction to hear treaty claims, notwithstanding the
fact that the foreign investor was party to a contract which specified that contract claims would be the
exclusive province of a given domestic court. See Compafilia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi
Universal v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Annulment Decision, 119 (July 3, 2002), 41
I.L.M. 1135, 1159 (2002), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/vivendi annulEN.pdf; CMS
Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/O1/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, (July 17,
2003), 42 I.L.M. 788, 808 (2003), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/cms-argentina"000.pdf;
Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom. ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award,
40-62 (Oct. 12, 2005), available
at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Noble.pdf.
32. See Gus Van Harten, The Public-Private Distinction in the International Arbitration of
IndividualClaims Against the State, 56 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 371, 383 (2007).
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problematic with regard to regulatory disputes.33 For instance, the parties
determine the composition of the arbitral tribunal.34 Although the right to choose
an arbitrator may be considered the very essence of arbitration,35 this may be
problematic from a public policy perspective. As an author highlights, while
"arbitrators... are expected to be both independent of the party appointing them
and impartial ...it is usually conceded that without violating in any way this
theoretical obligation of independence, the arbitrator may quite acceptably share
the nationality, or political or economic philosophy, or 'legal culture' of the party
who has nominated him-and may therefore be supposed from the very beginning
to be 'sympathetic' to that party's contentions or 'favorably disposed' to its
positions. 36 In a sense, independence and neutrality very much depend on the
personality of the arbitrator.
Confidentiality is another feature of the arbitral process. Hearings are held in
camera and final awards may not be published, depending on the parties' will.
Even the names of the parties and much less the details of the dispute may not be
disclosed.38 While confidentiality well suits commercial disputes, the same may be
problematic in investor-state arbitration. The lack of transparency may hamper
efforts to track investment treaty disputes, to monitor their frequency, their
settlement and to assess the policy implications that flow thereby.39 In recent years,
some efforts to make investment arbitration more transparent have been
undertaken in different fora. In response to calls from civil society groups, the
three parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) - Canada, the
US, and Mexico - have pledged to disclose all NAFTA arbitrations and open future
arbitration hearings to the public.40 Similarly, the ICSID Rules provide for the

33. Blackaby, supranote 6.
34. Pierre Lalive, Conclusions, in

THE ARBITRAL

PROCESS AND

THE INDEPENDENCE

OF

ARBITRATORS 119, 123
(1991).

35. See id.
36. Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging,38 S. TEX. L. REv. 485, 506-07 (1997).
37. Arbitrators have clear incentives to adopt a high level standard of conduct because of
reputation. See Andreas Lowenfeld, The Party-AppointedArbitrator in InternationalControversies:
Some Reflections, TEX. INT'L L.J. 59 (1995).

38. For instance, Article 46 of the 2010 Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce provides that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the SCC
Institute and the Arbitral Tribunal shall maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration and the award.
Arb. Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Arb. Rules of the Arb. Inst. of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce art. 46 (Jan. 1, 2010), available at http://www.sccinstitute.com/skilje
domsregler-4.aspx.
39. Because investment disputes are settled using a variety of arbitral rules-not all of which
provide for public disclosure of claims-there can be no accurate accounting of all such disputes. That
some portion of the iceberg remains hidden from view should be a matter of concern given the public
policy implications of such disputes. Luke Eric Peterson, Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Development Policy-Making, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 15 (2004), available at http://www.ii
sd.org/pdf/2004/trade bits.pdf.
40. See, NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Joint Statement, Montreal (Oct. 7, 2003),
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/Statement.
aspx?lang=eng (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
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public disclosure of the dispute proceedings under their auspices.4 1 Increasingly,
investment arbitration tribunals have allowed public interest groups to present
amicus curiae briefs or have access to the arbitral process. These important moves,
however, involve the conduct of the proceedings of a limited number of investment
disputes. Indeed, the vast majority of existing treaties do not mandate such
transparency, which means that most of the proceedings are resolved behind closed
doors.
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, awards rendered against host states
are, in theory, readily enforceable against host state property worldwide, due to the
widespread adoption of the New York and Washington (ICSID) Conventions.42
The decisions have only limited avenues for revision and cannot be amended by
the domestic legal system or a supreme court. 43 Arbitration under the ICSID rules
is wholly exempted from the supervision
of local courts, with awards subject only
44
to an internal annulment process.
Some important issues arise in this context. On the one hand, it seems that the
current framework lacks adequate procedural protection for the public interest.
According to some authors, investment treaty law and arbitration would be facing
a "legitimacy crisis, '45 as "private tribunals consider legal issues that impact the
international economy, public policy and international relations, but they do so in a
vacuum." 46 On the other hand, there is uncertainty over the relevance or
irrelevance of norms external to investment law within investment treaty
arbitration. Furthermore, notwithstanding the substantive similarity of investment
treaty provisions, arbitral tribunals have come to inconsistent decisions on the
meaning of international law norms. Inconsistent arbitral awards create legal
uncertainty and undermine the coherence of the international legal system.
While developing countries have deemed investment treaty arbitration
politically biased against them, 47 emerging economies and industrialized countries
41. ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, Int'l Ctr. For Settlement of Inv. Disputes, at 66
(Apr. 2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ ICSID /ICSID/ RulesMain.jsp.
42. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 1,
June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]; ICSID Convention, supra note 15,
art. 54.
43. New York Convention, supra note 42, art. 6; ICSID Convention, supra note 15, art. 53.
44. ICSID Convention, supra note 15, art. 53. The ICSID annulment process provides for a very
limited review. ICSID annulment committees only have the ability to annul awards and send them back
to the tribunal or to a new tribunal for a new decision, but cannot replace the decision with their own.
The grounds for annulment are very narrow and concern due process issues: the tribunal was not
properly constituted, it manifestly exceeded its powers, there was corruption on the part of a member,
there was a fundamental serious departure from a procedural rule, or the award did not state the reasons
on which it was based.
45. On the "legitimacy crisis" of investor-state arbitration, see supra note 11.
46. Franck, supranote 11, at 1521.
47. Shalakany, supra note 11. More recently, the Bolivian President Evo Morales affirmed that
Bolivia "emphatically reject[s] the legal, media and diplomatic pressure of some multinationals that...
resist the sovereign rulings of countries, making threats and initiating suits in international arbitration,"
adding that "The governments of Latin America ... never win the cases." Latin Leftists Mull Quitting
World Bank Arbitrator,REUTERS, Apr. 30, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldnews/idUSN29
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alike have expressed some concerns about this mechanism. For instance, Australia
has not been at ease with the idea of investment-related arbitrations, and the
investment chapter of the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement leaves out
provisions on investor-state dispute resolution. 8 In the European Union (EU), the
compatibility of the current investment law and EU law is highly debated. The
criticisms concern alleged discriminatory treatment of investors and a perceived
lack of control by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) due to arbitration.49 Turning
our attention to developing countries, Bolivia and Ecuador sent a formal notice to
ICSID declaring their withdrawal from the ICSID Convention and their intention
to pursue revisions to their BITs in order to direct investors' claims solely to
domestic fora. 0 These moves may be due to contingent political reasons.51
Furthermore, the fear of expensive investment disputes may be an additional
reason for withdrawal. However, these moves may also indicate a deeper
dissatisfaction with how the system works.
Before addressing these criticisms, two preliminary observations may be
made. First, it seems that the emerging criticisms on the functioning of investment
treaty arbitration in relation to public goods are evidence of the vitality of the
system. The recent boom of investment treaty arbitrations, as well as the
willingness of states to participate in the system, explain such vitality. For
instance, the EU Member states are willing to maintain the network of BITs that
exists between them despite the above-mentioned concerns of the European
Commission.52 Indeed, EU states believe that their investors are better protected
36448520070430.
48. William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement between Developed Countries:
Reflections on the Australia-UnitedStates Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 2

(2006).
49. Opinion of the Advocate General Poiares Maduro, delivered on July 10, 2008, Comm'n of the
European Communities. v Republic of Austria, Case No. C-205/06, 2009 E.C.R. 1-01301, and Comm'n
of the European Communities. v Kingdom of Sweden, Case No. C-249/06 , 2009 2 C.M.L.R. 49,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62006CO205:EN:HTML.
50. International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID News Release, Bolivia
Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, May 16, 2007, http://icsid.world
bank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=Announceme
ntsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement3; International Center for Settlement
of Investment Disputes, ICSID News Release, Ecuador Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID
Convention, July 9, 2009, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH
&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=A
nnouncement20.
51. For instance, in the case of the US Australia FTA, the parties have shown reciprocal trust of
the respective national courts. Andrew L. Stoler, AUSFTA as "Third Wave" Trade Agreement: Beyond
the WTO Envelope, Address at the 26th International Trade Law Conference, at 5, (Sept. 23, 2004),
available at http://www.iit.adelaide.edu.au/conf/AGC92304_ausfta SpD.pdf.In the case of Bolivia and
Ecuador, the withdrawal from ICSID may be due to the nationalization drive in the Andean gas sector
which is firmly supported by the poorest indigenous minorities. See Marco E. Schnabl & Julie Bddard,
The Wrong Kind of 'Interesting':The Investment Climate in Latin America Recalls a Certain Chinese
Proverb, NAT'L L.J., July 30, 2007, available at http://www.arbitralwomen.org/files/publication/
1910231238362.pdf.
52. The European Commission fears that such parallel regime may create legal uncertainty and
forum shopping in favour of arbitration. Damon Vis-Dumbar, EU Member States Reject the Call to
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under the BITs than under EU law alone.53 Second, the emerging critiques should
54
constitute the steppingstones for the progressive development of the system.
These criticisms need to be taken into account to allow the investment treaty
system to evolve in a harmonious way. Comparative law is an element that can
make it easier for the public good to be taken into account in investment treaty
arbitration.
III.

COMPARATIVE LAW AND METHOD

Before exploring the role the comparative method plays in the context of
investment treaty law and arbitration, it is worth scrutinizing the main
characteristics of comparative law. In a preliminary way, two questions need to be
addressed. The first question relates to the essence of comparative law: is
comparative law a legal discipline or should it be considered a mere legal method?
The second question, which is strictly related to the first, is about the objectives of
comparative law. Due to space limits, this section does not purport to exhaustively
describe what the comparative method does and what those employing it should do
to use it properly. The very existence of comparative law as a legal discipline has
been contested because of lack of agreement among scholars on the appropriate
use of analogy in legal context. The main assumption of this paper is that the
controversial nature of comparative law does not repress its legal nature; by way of
contrast, the awareness of its limits and merits may only benefit legal analysis. In
this sense, while it is not possible to offer a prescriptive analysis of comparative
law - because the same comparative law scholars have different views on the
method of comparative law - this section aims to offer some insights on the
essence of comparative law, its modus operandi,and its purposes.

Comparative law has been defined as "an intellectual activity with law as its
object and comparison as its process. 56 Notwithstanding the apparent clarity of
this definition, there has been a fierce debate among scholars with regard to the
essence of comparative law. While some authors have qualified comparative law
as an autonomous discipline, others have contended that comparative law

Terminate Intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties, INV. TREATY NEWS, Feb. 10, 2009,
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/02/1 /eu-member-states-reject-the-callto-terminate-intra-eu-bilateral-investment-treaties.aspx.
53. Id.Provisions like the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard do not appear in national
legislations or even in EC law. Other provisions, such as those concerning expropriation may be stricter
in investment treaties than in national laws. More importantly, investment treaty arbitration is a
procedural guarantee that EU law does not provide for. Granting investors an independent right to
initiate dispute settlement directly against the host state instead of forcing them to rely either on
domestic courts or on inter state dispute resolution is one of the major 'virtues' of international
investment law.
54. See Anne Van Aaken, Perils of Success? The Case of InternationalInvestment Protection, 9
EUR.BUS. ORG. L. REv. 1 (2008).

55. Francisco Orrego Vicufia, Carlos Calvo, Honorary NAFTA Citizen, 11 N.Y.U. ENVT'L. L.J.
19, 32-34 (2002).
56. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 2 (Tony Weir,

trans., 3rd ed. 1998).
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amounted to the mere utilization of the comparative method.57 Without delving
into the depth of the different schools of thought, it seems that nowadays the
autonomy of comparative law as a science is established.58 Not only is comparative
law a subject studied in many universities around the world, but some basic texts
are almost uniformly adopted worldwide. 59 At the same time, no one could contest
the existence of the comparative method as a tool for relating different objects and
disciplines. Metaphors and comparisons are essential to comprehend new concepts
and organize thought.60 Therefore, the famous dilemma - whether comparative
law is a discipline or a method - is a false dichotomy, because comparative law is
an autonomous discipline based on the comparative method. 61 Discourse on
method is essential because it clarifies the tools of the discipline and its objectives.
More importantly, to keep in mind the co-existence of both discipline and method
helps the scholar apply the comparative method to new subject areas, eventually
contributing to the expansion of comparative law.
The main characteristics of comparative law originate from the fact that it
does not focus on a mere legal system, but on two or more systems of law.62 This
does not necessarily imply that comparative law is a mere theoretical exercise. On
the contrary, comparative law often adopts a functionalist approach and may have
very concrete outcomes. Comparative law explores how a concrete problem is
solved in different jurisdictions and may constitute a useful tool for the
construction or amendment of legal systems. Comparative law has an evolutionary
or dynamic dimension in that it may stimulate change.
There are two main criticisms against comparative law. The first relates to the
scientific rigour of the discipline. Authors highlight that comparative law may be

superficial, as it necessarily investigates two or more legal systems rather than
focusing on one. Furthermore, authors have questioned whether a lawyer trained in
a certain legal system may truly understand another system without pre-judging it
according to the legal categories that constitute her legal imprinting. 63 According

57. W.J. Kamba, ComparativeLaw a TheoreticalFramework,23 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 485, 48687 (1974), quoting Kahn-Freund, Comparative Law as an Academic Subject, 82 LAW Q. REV. 40 (1966)
(explaining that comparative law "has by common consent the somewhat unusual characteristic that it
does not exist"); see Djalil Kiekbaev, ComparativeLaw: Method, Science or EducationalDiscipline?,
7.3 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. (Sept. 2003), http://www.ejcl.org/73/art73-2.html (discussing the different
approaches of comparative law).
58. Comparative law became an autonomous legal discipline at the end of the XIX century.
ALESSANDRO PIZZORUSSO, SISTEMI GIURIDICI COMPARATI 145 (2d ed. 1998); Marc Ancel, Comment
aborder le droit compard (A propos d'une nouvelle "Introduction au droit compard"), in ETUDES
OFFERTES A RENE RODIERE 3 (1981).
59. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 56, at v (noting that the "Introduction to Comparative Law
now has more readers outside Germany than inside it").
60. See ESIN ORVCO, THE ENIGMA OF COMPARATIVE LAW - VARIATIONS ON A THEME FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 11 (2004) (stating that, "Comparison is the essence of understanding").
61. Id. at 1 (explaining that there "is no one single definition of what comparative law and
comparative method are.").
62. Id.
63. Ferdinand Joseph Maria Feldbrugge, Sociological Research Methods and Comparative Law,
in BUTS ET METHODS DU DROIT COMPARE/AIMS AND METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 211, 214
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to this line of thought, being raised in a certain legal tradition or culture determines
certain procedural or substantive choices.64
The second criticism relates to the comparative method. It is claimed that
depending on the perspective adopted, comparisons may have completely different
outcomes. In other words, where one stands on any particular issue is nearly
always dependent upon where one sits. 61 In comparing two elements, scholars may
confuse the two instead of keeping them separate.66 Although the idea of a neutral
referent or tertium comparationis may seem attractive in theory, it may become
misleading in practice. An example may clarify the issue at stake. Let us imagine a
debate on the shade of color alpha which is neither black nor red. Is alpha a red
color with a black glance or is it a black color with a red glance? Some may even
hypothesize that the essence of alpha is violet. Whatever the shade, it is evident
that if alpha is compared to other red colors, it will look black; while if it is
compared to black colors, it will look red. Instead, if alpha is compared to black
and red colors all together, its shade will appear similar to purple. In conclusion,
depending on the particular perspective adopted, the results of the comparative
process may be very different.
These criticisms have the merit of showing certain limits and risks of
comparative law. The interpreter must be aware of the perspective selected to
avoid the risks mentioned above. For instance, with regard to the breadth of the
discipline, one may well focus on certain aspects, leaving other aspects to
subsequent studies. With regard to the constitutive bias of any legal scholar trained
in a certain legal system, this question may have become moot in practice. It is not
rare that scholars are trained in two or more jurisdictions and are therefore exposed
to more than one legal culture. Globalization has globalized legal careers.67 The
fact that scholars often speak one or more foreign languages facilitates access to

(Rotondi ed., 1973); Gilnter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Rethinking Comparative Law, 26
HARV. INT'L L.J. 411, 415 (1985) (referring to the "skeptical assumption that objective comparison is
impossible because the compara[t]ist's vision is totally determined by her specific historical and social
experience and perspective").
64. See Richard Kreindler, Arbitration or Litigation? ADR Issues in TransnationalDisputes, 52
DisP. RESOL. J. 79, 79 (1997); Amanda Stallard, Note, Joining the Culture Club: Examining Cultural
Context When Implementing InternationalDispute Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 463
(2002).
65. Similarly, with regard to the International Court of Justice, the "data suggest[s] that national
bias has an important influence on the decision making of the ICJ. Judges vote for their home states
about 90 percent of the time. When their home states are not involved, judges vote for states that are
similar to their home states--along the dimensions of wealth, culture and political regime." Eric A.
Posner & Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, Is the InternationalCourt of Justice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD.
599, 624 (2005).
66. Talking about comparisons, Wittgenstein pointed out the great risk of confusing the prototype
with the object of comparison, which we are viewing in its light. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE
AND VALUE 14 (G.H. Von Wright ed., Peter Winch trans., 1980).
67. As Tom Ginsburg puts it, " [g]lobalization leads to pressure on legal cultures.., national legal
cultures that were more or less autonomous are now subject to a variety of external pressures because of
the growing rate of cross-national interaction." Tom Ginsburg, The Culture ofArbitration, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1335, 1337 (2003).
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primary sources. Furthermore, the willingness to understand and to appreciate the
particular features of a foreign system should not be perceived as a form of naivet6
but as a humble attempt to decipher a certain system and to contribute to the
development of comparative law, and possibly of the examined legal systems
themselves. With regard to the methodological problem of confusing the elementa
comparationis,this problem does not exist in comparative law alone, but it appears
as soon as analogies are drawn.
In conclusion, to argue that the comparative method is useless because it is a
risky enterprise would go too far. The comparative method requires both audacity
and carefulness: the mapping of foreign lands requires certain methodological
choices and the selection of a particular scale and perspective. What seems
important is not the adoption of a particular perspective, but the awareness that the
comparative method may lead to different results, and therefore, the perspective
adopted needs to be spelled out at the outset.68 Much more critical work needs to
be done.
IV. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW

Comparativists and internationalists alike have almost entirely neglected the
interaction between international law and comparative law. As Professor Kennedy
once put it, "[i]nternationalists seem comfortable with power and uncomfortable
with culture, while comparativists are eager for cultural understanding and wary of
involvement with governance., 69 However, this attitude is gradually changing. On
the one hand, comparativists have highlighted that the traditional focus of
comparative law on national systems is old fashioned and they have argued that
comparative law should integrate the most important transnational regimes.70 On
the other hand, internationalists have similarly emphasized that "[t]he
internationalist and comparativist share more than they realize. 71 It is a matter of
time, but it may be foreseen that the interplay between international law and
comparative law will receive increasing attention. This paper aims to contribute to
this emerging area of study by focusing on the linkage between international
investment law, which is a sub-system of international law and comparative law.
This interaction has four different but related dimensions: 1) comparative
investment law; 2) comparative arbitration law; 3) legal doctrine; and 4) treaty
interpretation. The following sub-sections highlight these four paths. While the
first two dimensions are only briefly mentioned, and reference to the relevant
literature is made, the role of comparative law in legal doctrine and treaty
interpretation is analyzed in more detail.

68. See infra Section IV.
69. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 633. Kennedy also remarked, "For the comparativist,
internationalists seem rather vulgar presentists, always wanting lessons and applications and solutions.
For the internationalist, the comparativist seems a snob or a dilettante .... Id. at 556-57.
70. Mathias Reimann, Beyond National Systems: A Comparative Law for the InternationalAge,
75 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1119 (2001).
71. Kennedy, supranote 1, at 557.
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A. ComparativeInvestment Law
The national legal frameworks regulating foreign investment may be studied
through comparative lenses?. This field of enquiry can be called comparative
investment law, and refers to the study and comparison of the different legal
frameworks regulating foreign investment at the national and/or regional levels. A
number of authors have investigated comparative investment law. 73 From an
international law perspective, however, this approach has only limited merit,
because it focuses on national investment codes. While these national codes often
reflect and implement international law norms, they maintain a national character
as national lawmakers have elaborated on them and national courts have
adjudicated them.
B. ComparativeArbitrationLaw
Comparative lawyers have studied international arbitration as a paradigmatic
melting pot of legal cultures. Professor Ginsburg highlighted that international
arbitration constitutes "a place of convergence and interchange wherein
practitioners from different backgrounds create new practices. 74 Others have
stressed that the emerging arbitration culture fuses together elements of the
common law and civil law tradition.75 From an international law perspective, these
studies provide international law scholars with important theoretical and logical
tools for their profession.

72. Some authors have focused on the adoption by national legislatures of models from foreign
statutes. See Daphne Barak-Erez, An International Community of Legislatures?, in THE LEAST
EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 532, 532 (Richard
W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006); Helen Xanthaki, Legal Transplants in Legislation: Defusing

the Trap, 57 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 659 (2008).
73. Jean-Yves P. Steyt, Comparative Foreign Investment Law: Determinants of the Legal
Framework and the Level of Openness and Attractiveness of Host Economies (May 2006) (LLM
dissertation, Cornell Law School), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps LLMGRP/1/; L.
Yves Fortier, The Canadian Approach to Investment Protection: How Far Have We Come!, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY- ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH

SCHREUER 525-43 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009); Michael Mikiciuk, Foreign Direct Investment
Success in Ireland Can Poland Duplicate Ireland's Economic Success Based on Foreign Direct

Investment Policies?, 14 U. MLkM INT'L & COM. L. REV. 65 (2006); Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Finding
and FacingFactsabout Legal Systems and FDIin South Asia, 23 LEGAL STUD. 649 (2003); AMANDA J.
PERRY, LEGAL SYSTEMS AS DETERMINANT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: LESSONS FROM SRI

LANKA (2001); Amanda J. Perry, Effective Legal Systems and Foreign Direct Investment: In Search of

the Evidence, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 779 (2000); Antonio R. Parra, Principles Governing Foreign
Investment, as Reflected in NationalInvestment Codes, in IBRAHIM F.I.
SHIHATA, LEGAL TREATMENT
OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE WORLD BANK GUIDELINES 311 (1993); Jflrgen Voss, The Protection

and Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: Interests, Interdependencies,
Intricacies,31 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 686 (1982).

74. See Ginsburg, supra note 67, at 1335.
75. See Christian Borris, The Reconciliation of Conflicts Between Common Law and Civil Law
Principles in the Arbitration Process, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES

IN COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES AND NEW TRENDS 1, 1 (Stefan N. Frommel & Barry A.K. Rider eds.,
1999).
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C. Legal Doctrine
In scrutinizing investment law and arbitration, scholars have made use of the
comparative method, albeit in an implicit manner. Since scholars belonging to
different legal cultures produce international legal doctrine, it is inevitable that this
scholarship reflects its multicultural origin and different approaches. Reference to
national and regional case law is a constant feature in articles concerning
international investment law and this does not necessarily reflect a form of
nationalism, as reference is often done to the case law of other countries as well.76
This particular interaction between comparative law and investment law
scholarship is of particular relevance because in international law, the opinion of
legal scholars is deemed to have a certain, albeit subsidiary, legal value. The
Statute of the International Court of Justice (JCJ) expressly enumerates "the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations" as
"subsidiary means for the determination of the sources of law., 77 On the one hand,
as Oppenheim clarified more than a century ago, "the writers on international law.
. have to pronounce whether there is an established custom or not, whether there
is a usage only in contradistinction to a custom, whether a recognized usage has
now ripened into a custom, and the like. 78 On the other hand, international law
scholars "have to ascertain the precise meaning of [the written] rules with the help
of interpretation. 79
With regard to international arbitration, Ginsburg highlighted that "[l]ike the
grand civil law tradition, it is scholarly commentary that produces the law and
technique of arbitration. 80 With regard to investment treaty arbitration, the
influence of scholarly analysis is of utmost importance. On the one hand, scholars
and professors of international law are often selected as arbitrators in investment
treaty disputes. 81 Therefore, it may be expected that their academic experience is
somehow drawn upon in the settlement of the dispute. On the other hand, both
76. For instance, while the Tecmed Tribunal relied on ECtHR cases, none of the members of the
Tribunal were Europeans. See Walid Ben Hamida, Investment Arbitration and Human Rights, 4
TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT. 5, 14 (2007).
77. ICJ Statute, supra note 13, art. 38(1)(d). The ICJ Statute is annexed to the Charter of the
United Nations of which it forms an integral part. U.N. Charter, June 26, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI.
78. Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of InternationalLaw: Its Task and Method, 2 AM. J. INT'L L.
313,315 (1908).
79. Id.at315.
80. See Ginsburg, supra note 67, at 1341-42.
81. For instance, in Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, the late Professor
Walde, acting as an arbitrator, stated that the proper analogy in interpreting investment treaties is not to
international commercial arbitration or public international law, both of which involve disputants who
are seen as equals, but rather to judicial review relating to governmental conduct. Additionally, "[m]ore
appropriate for investor-state arbitration are analogies with judicial review relating to governmental
conduct - be it international judicial review (as carried out by the WTO dispute panels and Appellate
Body, by the European- or Inter-American Human Rights Courts or the European Court of Justice) or
national administrative courts judging disputes of individual citizens' over alleged abuse by public
bodies of their governmental powers." Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, 255
Fed. Appx. 531 (2007) (separate opinion of arbitrator Thomas Walde, at 13, available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Thunderbird/Thunderbird Dissent.pdf).
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advocates and arbitrators make reference to the works of scholars in their pleadings
and awards respectively. 82 Finally, as an arbitrator has emphasized, "[a]wards are
there to be evaluated and criticized -relentlessly
criticized - in the interest of
83
improving international legal systems.
Academics have contributed to the development of international investment
law through both macro-comparisons and micro-comparisons.4 With regard to
macro-comparison, authors have compared international investment law and
arbitration to different legal systems. For instance, investment treaty law has been
compared to administrative law85 and other sets of international law.86
With regard to micro-comparison, authors have compared specific investment
treaty standards to rules belonging to other legal orders.87 In certain cases,
82. For instance, in his separate opinion to the Thunderbird case, Professor Walde made reference
to Professor Gaillard's work: "Emmanuel Gaillard, Jurisprudence du CIRDI, 2004, at 7." Id. at 13, n.7.
In the Malaysian HistoricalSalvors SDN BHD v. the Government of Malaysia, the ad hoc committee
cited the work of Professor Christoph Schreuer (citing CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (2001)) and Yulia Andreeva (citing Yulia Andreeva, Salvaging or
Sinking the Investment? MIS v Malaysia Revisited, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS vol. 7, no. 2, at 161 (2008)). MalaysianHistoricalSalvors SDNBHD v. Gov't
of Malay., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment, 67, 76 (Feb. 28,
2009), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal
=showDoc&docld=DC1030 En&caseld=C247.
83. Jan Paulsson, Awards - and Awards, in INVESTMENT TREATY LAW CURRENT ISSUES III:
REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 97, 98 (Andrea K. Bjorklund et al. eds., 2009).

84. While micro-comparison "has to do with specific legal institutions or problems", macrocomparison aims to "compare the spirit and style of different legal systems, the methods of thought and
procedures ... for resolving and deciding disputes, or the roles of those engaged in the law." ZWEIGERT
& KOTZ, supra note 56, at 4-5.
85. Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global
Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 121 (2006); GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007) (the core argument of the book lies in the accurate analogy
between investment treaty arbitration and administrative courts); Gus Van Harten, A Case for an
InternationalInvestment Court, Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Inaugural Conference
2008 Paper (June 30, 2008).
86. August Reinisch & Loretta Malintoppi, Methods of Dispute Resolution, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 691 (PETER MUCHLINSKI et al. eds., 2008);
Christian Tomuschat, The European Court of Human Rights and Investment Protection, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 636 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).
87. The list of possible examples is endless. See NICK GALLUS, THE TEMPORAL SCOPE OF
INVESTMENT PROTECTION TREATIES 20-21 (2008) (comparing the rule against retroactivity used by
investment tribunals to that used by other international tribunals including the International Court of
Justice, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights); John Y.
Gotanda, Assessing Damages in InternationalCommercialArbitration:A Comparison with Investment
Treaty Disputes, in INVESTMENT TREATY LAW CURRENT ISSUE III: REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 77 (Andrea K.

Bjorklund et al. eds., 2009); Jfirgen Kurtz, National Treatment, Foreign Investment and Regulatory
Autonomy: The Search for Protectionism or Something More?, in NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 311 (Philippe Kahn & Thomas Wdlde eds., 2007) (comparing the doctrinal evolution
on national treatment in investment treaty law with that of GATT Article III (4) under WTO law);
Sylvie Tabet, Application de l'obligation de traitement national et de traitement de la nation la plus
favorisde dans la jurisprudence arbitrale en mati~re d'investissement - Nouveaux problkmes a la
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international legal scholarship has advocated a proactive use of comparative law in
the course of arbitral proceedings. For instance, an author made reference to a
WTO case to critically assess the application of the Most Favored Nation (MFN)
to investor state arbitration.88 In an interesting contribution on the fair and
equitable treatment (FET), another author has advocated an extensive use of the
comparative method, arguing that only by comparing the FET standard with the
national articulations of the Rule of Law, can the meaning of the standard become
concrete:
Instead of primarily relying on prior arbitral decisions, an approach that
is little helpful in particular when disputes concern novel circumstances,
or positing the content of the fair and equitable treatment in an abstract
way without sufficient justification, tribunals should use a comparative
method that draws on domestic and international law regarding the
concept of the rule of law. 89

Other authors have similarly advocated an extensive use of national
precedents with regard to the interpretation of the notion of expropriation. For
instance, on the theme of regulatory expropriation and environmental protection,
Walde and Kolo argued that the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court could
represent a valid persuasive precedent for investment treaty tribunals. 90 Since
investment treaty tribunals are analogous to administrative tribunals or
constitutional courts, the case law of the US Supreme Court would serve as useful
guidance for arbitral tribunals.
While these functionalist approaches seem to offer concrete solutions to
emerging conceptual dilemmas, and highly reputed scholars have forcefully
presented such dilemmas, one may question whether a more critical approach to
the use of comparative law should be adopted. While scholarly analysis has made
extensive use of comparative law, and has deemed it a panacea for solving
interpretative dilemmas, methodology issues have been neglected.
lumi~re de la jurisprudence de l'OMC, in NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 352
(Philippe Kahn & Thomas Wfilde eds., 2007). Perhaps the area of international investment law where
the use of analogy has been more expansively adopted is the concept of property. See, e.g., Christoph
Schreuer & Ursula Kriebaum, The Concept of Property in Human Rights Law and International
Investment Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW: LIBER AMICORUM LUZIUS
WILDHABER 743 (S. Breitenmoser et al. eds., 2007); Helene Ruiz Fabri, The Approach Taken by the
European Court of Human Rights to the Assessment of Compensationfor Regulatory Expropriationsof
the Property of ForeignInvestors, 11 N.Y.U. ENVT'L L.J. 148 (2002).
88. See Walid Ben Hamida, MFN Clause and ProceduralRights: Seeking Solutions from WTO
Experience?, 6 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT 1 (2009). See also Jfirgen Kurtz, The Use andAbuse of WTO
Law in Investor - State Arbitration: Competition and its Discontents' (2009) 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 749,
749-71 (2009); Nicholas Di Mascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Non Discrimination in Trade and Investment
Treaties: Two Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 48 (2008).
89. Stephan W. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an
Embodiment of the Rule of Law 29 (New York University Law School, International Law & Justice
Working Paper No. 6, 2006), available at http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2006-6-GALSchill-web.pdf (last visited June 16, 2010).
90. Thomas Wdlde & Abba Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and
'Regulatory Taking' in InternationalLaw, 50 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 811, 821 (2001).
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It is often assumed that comparative law is a neutral process, but this is not
always the case. The very selection of the elementa comparationis may affect the
outcome of a case. For instance, the Lauder case 91 and the CME case 92- which
were parallel proceedings over the same underlying dispute - had different
outcomes because different BITs governed the substantive law and the arbitral
tribunals gave different weight to the comparative method. While the Lauder
Tribunal referred to a human rights case for establishing the expropriation
standards,93 the other Tribunal did not. As an author put it, "one is left to wonder,
therefore, whether this would explain how the two tribunals came to ... opposite
decisions. 94
Another example may clarify the issues at stake. The ICSID Convention and
95
other arbitral rules leave arbitral tribunals a wide discretion with regard to costs.
In the Thunderbird case, in deciding how to allocate the costs for legal
representation, Professor Walde argued that "[t]he judicial practice most
comparable to treaty-based investor-state arbitration is the judicial recourse
available to individuals against states under the European Convention on Human
Rights; again, states have to defray their own legal representation expenditures,
even if they prevail. 9 6 By contrast, in the Europe Cement case, the Arbitral
Tribunal awarded the respondent full costs to "compensat[e] the Respondent for
having to defend a claim that had no jurisdictional basis and discourage others
from pursuing such unmeritorious claims. 97 Authors have pointed out that
"[r]ecently, some tribunals [in investment arbitration] have adopted . . . the

principle that the successful party should have its costs paid by the unsuccessful
98
party, as adopted in commercial arbitration."
This example clearly shows that

91. Lauder v. Czech Rep., Final Award (Sept. 3, 2001), 9 ICSID Rep. 66 (2001), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LauderAward.pdf.
92. CME Czech Rep. B.V. v. Czech Rep., Partial Award, (Sept. 13, 2001), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-200lPartialAward.pdf; CME Czech Rep. B.V. v. Czech Rep.,
Final Award (Mar. 14, 2003), 9 ICSID Rep. 121 (2003), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/CME-2003-Final_001 .pdf.
93. Lauder v. Czech Rep., supra note 91, at 200 (quoting Mellacher v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1989)).
94. James D. Fry, International Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration: Evidence of
InternationalLaw's Unity, 18 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 77, 84 (2007).
95. ICSID Convention, supranote 15, art. 61(2).
96. Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, 255 Fed. Appx. 531, 141 (2007)
(separate opinion of arbitrator Thomas Walde, at 13, available at http://www.naftaclaims.
com/Disputes/Mexico/Thunderbird/Thunderbird Dissent.pdf) (emphasis added).
97. Europe Cement Investment & Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/07/2, Award, 185 (Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://arbitration.fr/resources/ICSID-ARBAF-07-2.pdf. It is worth noting that the sentence is borrowed from an eminent scholar, Professor
Schreuer, who similarly wrote that such an award "serves the purposes of compensating the victorious
party and of dissuading unmeritorious claims". Id. at 182. Professor Schreuer's position on the matter
reflects the practice adopted in commercial arbitration, and in several national systems. See, for
instance, Article 91 of the Italian code of civil procedure.
98. ADC Affiliate Ltd. and ADC & ADMC Mgmt. Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/16, Award,
532 (Sept. 27, 2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC648_En&caseld=C231
(quoting
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depending on which material is selected for comparison, the outcome may be
different.
D. Treaty Interpretation
A fourth area of intersection between investment law and comparative law is
seen in the increasing cross-fertilization between different international tribunals.
This trend may be called "global comparative jurisprudence," and reflects the fact
that international tribunals look to the decisions of other international bodies on
related or analogous matters. The reliance of both phenomena on the use of
analogy ties judicial borrowing to comparative law. Analogy is a cognitive process
which transfers an argument from one particular to another particular. Analogy
plays a significant role in comparisons, which are the core element of judicial
borrowing. Unlike commercial arbitrators who apply different laws depending on
the subject matter of the disputes, investment treaty arbitrators apply a limited
number of concepts under public international law. The focus of arbitral tribunals
is on both the concepts they are applying and on the decisions of other tribunals.
Indeed, while arbitral tribunals have limited jurisdiction, their authority to
engage in judicial borrowing derives from the fluid nature of international law. In
international law, Article 38(d) of the ICJ Statute considers judicial decisions as
"subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." 99 In parallel, systemic
interpretation is a customary tool of treaty interpretation. 100 In addition, the
consistent interpretation and application of certain treaty norms may consolidate in
the opinio juris necessary to transform a certain treaty provision into customary
international law. Finally, certain investment treaty provisions, such as Fair and
Equitable Treatment, present an obvious analogy with equity as a general principle
of law under the regime set out in Article 38(c) of the ICJ Statute.
Investment arbitral tribunals have made extensive use of systematic
interpretation, referring to the jurisprudence of previous arbitral tribunals, national
administrative and constitutional courts on the one hand, and to the case law of
regional human rights courts and international courts and tribunals on the other. As
arbitrators have made use of comparative arguments albeit implicitly, it seems
crucial to map the current dimension of the phenomenon and to propose a more
conscious use of the comparative method. The unaware use of the comparative
method may determine the abuse of the same, and ultimately lead to undesirable
outcomes. Arbitrators risk acting as "bricoleurs" rather than as "engineers" of legal
norms:101 "As engineers, they would sort through the concepts and assemble them
into a constitutional design that made sense according to some overarching
conceptual scheme. As bricoleurs, though, they.., use the first thing that happens

Matthew Weiniger & Matthew Page, Treaty Arbitration andInvestment Dispute: Adding Up the Costs,
1GLOBAL ARB. REv. 3, 44 (2006)).
99. ICJ Statute, supranote 13, art. 38(1)(d).
100. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT].
101. The metaphor is borrowed from Ldvi-Strauss. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilitiesof Comparative
Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1285-86 (1999).
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to fit the immediate problem they are facing." 10 2 Since the use of the comparative
method in international investment arbitration may have a great impact on the
development of international investment law and international law in general, a
more conscious use of the comparative method needs to be promoted.
V. THE USE OF THE

COMPARATIVE METHOD IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION

While authors have extensively focused on the impact of comparative law on
the procedural aspects of international adjudication, 103 scarce attention has been
paid to the impact comparative law may have on the substantive aspects of the
same. While notable contributions scrutinized the phenomenon of judicial
borrowing in areas such as human rights adjudication, 10 4 the use of comparative
law per se in investment treaty arbitration has never been the object of a specific
study. Therefore, this is the first attempt to chart the substantive world of
investment treaty arbitration through the lenses of comparative law. 105 The
following analysis aims at clarifying an ongoing process and its main
characteristics. For limits of space, this analysis cannot be exhaustive; further
study will be required to complete the mapping of this complex landscape.
In a preliminary way, interpretation is a fundamental part of the implementing
process of a treaty. Whatever the conception of the adjudicative function that
arbitrators adopt, it is generally accepted that adjudicators are neither mere bouche
de la loi, nor authentic law makers.10 6 In a sense, arbitrators have a maieutic role,

102. Id. at 1286.

103. See CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (2007).
Regarding international arbitration, see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral
Procedure, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313 (2003); Borris, supra note 75; Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
InternationalArbitration as Omelette: What Goes into the Mix, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES AND NEW TRENDS 19 (Stefan N. Frommel & Barry A.K.

Rider eds., 1999); Serge Lazareff, International Arbitration: Towards a Common Procedural
Approach, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES AND NEW

TRENDS 31 (Stefan N. Frommel & Barry A.K. Rider eds., 1999).
104. See Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form Versus
Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 391 (2007); Christopher McCrudden,
Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK 371 (Esin Orici &
David Nelsen eds., 2007); David Schneiderman, Property Rights and Regulatory Innovation:
Comparing ConstitutionalCultures, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 371 (2006); Darren Rosemblum, Internalizing
Gender: Why International Law Theory Should Adopt Comparative Methods, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 759 (2007); Sujit Choudhry, Globalizationis Search of Justification:Towards a Theory
of Comparative ConstitutionalInterpretation,74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999).

105. In previous contributions, I have analyzed the merit of judicial borrowing with regard to
investment treaty disputes involving cultural elements and intellectual property rights respectively. See
Valentina Vadi, Fragmentation or Cohesion? Investment versus Cultural Protection Rules, 10 J.
WORLD INV. & TRADE 573 (2009); Valentina Vadi, CulturalHeritage & InternationalInvestment Law:
A Stormy Relationship, 15 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 1 (2008); Valentina Vadi, Mapping Uncharted
Waters: Intellectual Property Disputes with Public Health Elements in Investor-State Arbitration, 6
TRANSNAT'L DiSP. MGMT. 2 (2009); Valentina Vadi, Trademark Protection, Public Health and
InternationalInvestment Law: Strains and Paradoxes,20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 773 (2009).

106. For more on the different conceptions of the adjudicative function, see Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Introduction and Summary: 'Administrationof Justice' in InternationalInvestment Law
andAdjudication?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 3,9-11
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as they give birth to the meaning of treaty provisions, having to identify the
applicable rules, clarify their meaning and relate them to the specific facts of the
case. According to the International Law Commission, "the interpretation of
documents is to some extent an art, not an exact science."10°7 However, to say that
adjudicators' roles are creative would probably be going too far, because it would
undermine their legitimacy.
Customary rules of treaty interpretation, as restated in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 108 provide the adjudicators with the necessary

conceptual and legal framework to perform their function to settle disputes "in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law." 10 9 Customary rules
of treaty interpretation are applicable to investment treaties because investment
treaties are international law treaties. Furthermore, some investment treaties
expressly mention these rules. 110 According to the general rule of interpretation,
which comprises several sub-norms, "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose." '1
Although the VCLT does not make reference to cases, these may be
considered as "supplementary means of interpretation."' 12 As mentioned above, the
ICJ Statute includes cases among the "subsidiary means for the determination of
'
rules of law."113
In most cases, as Professor Schreuer highlights, conversations
across cases take place, 114 and a systemic study of the case law of international
tribunals suggests the "tendency to chart a coherent course within international
'
law."115
Looking at the arbitral awards, there is not only a sort of endogenouspath
coherence by which arbitrators look at previous arbitral awards, but also an
increasingly heterogeneous path coherence
by which arbitrators look at the
116
jurisprudence of other international courts.
The use of the comparative method in investment treaty arbitration is a
frequent phenomenon because investment treaties generally tend to converge and
often present similar if not identical wording. Furthermore, international

(P.M. Dupuy et al. eds., 2009).
107. Int'l L. Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties: Text as Finally Adopted by the
Commission on 18 July 1966, 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 218, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/190.
108. VCLT, supranote 100.
109. Id.at Preamble.
110. See, e.g., Australia United States Free Trade Agreement art. 21.9(2), U.S.-Austl., May 18,
2004, 118 Star. 919, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us fta/final-text/index.html.
111. VCLT, supranote 100, art. 31(1).
112. Supplementary methods of interpretation include, but are not limited to, the circumstances of
the conclusion of a treaty and preparatory work. VCLT, supra note 100, art. 32.
113. ICJ Statute, supranote 13, art. 38(1)(b).
114. Christoph Schreuer & Matthew Weiniger, ConversationsAcross Cases - Is There a Doctrine
of Precedent in Investment Arbitration?, 5 TRANSNAT'L DisP. MGMT. 3 (2008).
115. Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the
Vienna Convention, 54 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 279,289 (2005).
116. Valentina Vadi, Towards Arbitral Path Coherence & Judicial Borrowing: Persuasive
Precedentin Investment Arbitration,5 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 1, 1-16 (2008).
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investment law often presents analogies and overlaps with other international law
sub-systems, regional law and even national law. Consequently, one may identify
three main streams of comparative reasoning. First, arbitrators often refer to
previous arbitral awards. Second, arbitrators refer to other international or regional
cases. Third, they refer to national cases. The following sub-sections will scrutinize
these three streams.
A. Reference to Previous ArbifralAwards
Investment arbitration tribunals are increasingly making reference to previous
arbitral awards. This creates a sort of endogenous coherence (i.e., a coherence
which is internal to international investment law). The fact that most countries,
especially the industrialized ones, have predisposed Model BITs to streamline and
simplify the negotiating process facilitates the process. On the one hand, these
treaties often reaffirm rules of customary law. On the other hand, similar treaty
provisions are gradually coalescing and becoming part of customary law. 1 17 This
phenomenon has a major, notable consequence: when interpreting and applying
investment treaty provisions, arbitral tribunals, albeit selected on a ad hoc basis,
are substantively applying the "common law" of investment protection, a law
which is common to the international community as a whole.
While the rule of stare decisis, or binding precedent, does not apply to
international arbitration and more generally to international disputes, 1 8 arbitrators
refer to previous awards. In the recent case Europe Cement Investment & Trade
S.A v. Republic of Turkey, 119 the Arbitral Tribunal considered the possibility of
issuing moral damages, making reference to the Desert Line case. 120 In the
Feldman Karpa case, the Tribunal reaffirmed that a tribunal award has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of a particular case. However, "in
view of the fact that both of the parties in this proceeding have extensively cited
and relied upon some of the earlier decisions, the Tribunal believe[d] it appropriate
,,12 1
e case,
ae
to discuss briefly relevant aspects of earlier decisions ....
In the Saipem
117. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and InternationalLaw, 42 COLUM. J.
(2003).
118. For instance, previous panel and Appellate Body decisions in WTO dispute settlement
constitute non-binding precedent. See Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisisand InternationalTrade
Law (PartOne of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 845, 849-52 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Precedent
Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 1, 1 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De lure Stare Decisis in WTO
Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 873, 876 (2001). However, the
Appellate Body in US-Stainless Steel, required panels to advance "cogent reasons" to justify departure
from its previous decisions, thus gradually expanding the quasi-binding force of its decisions. See
Appellate Body Report, United States - FinalAnti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steelfrom Mexico,
160, WT/DS344/AB/R (April 30, 2008), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/usstainlessmexico(ab).pdf
119. Europe Cement Investment & Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/07/2, Award (Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://arbitration.fr/resources/ICSID-ARB-AF-072.pdf.
120. Id.at
178 (citing Desert Line Project LLC v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/07, Award (Feb. 6, 2008), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/DesertLine.pdf).
121. Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/9901, Award on Merits (Dec.
TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 128-30
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after stating that previous decisions were not binding, the Tribunal held that it had
to pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals:
[The Tribunal] believes that, subject to compelling contrary
grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of
consistent cases. It also believes that, subject to the specifics of a
given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case, it has a
duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of
investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations
of the community
of States and investors towards certainty of the
122
rule of law.
B. Reference to the CaseLaw of Other InternationalCourts and Tribunals
Arbitrators do refer to the decisions of other international or regional courts
and tribunals. This form of judicial borrowing creates heterogeneous path
1 23
coherence, a dynamic process which may lead to a sort of judicial globalization,
or the development of a "common law of international adjudication., 124 Professor
Slaughter, who first identified the twin issues of global community of courts and
global jurisprudence, 125 highlights the development of judicial comity, a set of
principles guiding courts in giving deference
to foreign courts
"as a matter of respect owed by judges to judges, rather than of the more general
respect owed by one nation to another., 126 Judicial transplant is particularly useful
to cope with systemic lacunae of a given legal system. As a comparative lawyer
once put it, "transplanting is, in fact, the most fertile source of development" as the
"insertion of an alien rul[ing] into another.., system may cause it to operate in a
' 127
fresh way.
With regard to investment arbitration, judicial borrowing has been particularly
useful in interpreting and clarifying human rights concepts. As Justice Claire
L'Hereux-Dubd of the Canadian Supreme Court once said: "More and more courts
...
are looking to the judgments of other jurisdictions, particularly when making
decisions on human rights issues. Deciding on applicable legal principles and
solutions increasingly involves a consideration of the approaches that have been
adopted with regard to similar legal problems elsewhere." 128 Cross-fertilization and
judicial dialogue have created an important body of global jurisprudence. 129 As
16, 2002), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/feldman mexico-award-english.pdf.
122. Saipem S.p.A. v. People's Republic of Bangl., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award, 90 (June
30, 2009), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SaipemBangladeshAwardJune3009 002.pdf.
123. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization,40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1103 (2000).
124. See BROWN, supranote 103, at 4-5.
125. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts,44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191, 193 (2003).
126. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 67 (2004). For more on judicial comity,
see also W. T. Worster, Competition and Comity in the Fragmentationof InternationalLaw, 34 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 119 (2008-09).
127. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 95, 116 (2d ed.

2003).
128. Claire L'Heureux-Dubd, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International
Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 16 (1998).
129. When judges do cite foreign decisions as persuasive authority and they follow similar
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Slaughter highlights: "Increasing cross-fertilization of ideas and precedents among
constitutional judges around the world is gradually giving rise to increasingly
visible international consensus on various issues - a consensus that, in turn, carries
its own compelling weight." 130 The universal recognition of human rights requires
judges to take human rights into consideration in the settlement of disputes "in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law,"
as prescribed in
131
the preamble of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Investment treaty tribunals have often referred to the decisions of other
international courts for guidance. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has been a useful
source of reference for arbitral tribunals.1 2 The Tribunal, which was established to
resolve the political crisis between Iran and the United States in 1979, has decided
inter alia claims which arose out of expropriations or other measures affecting
property rights. Because of the comparability of the subject matter, arbitral
tribunals have referred to its case law with regard to some key issues such as
regulatory expropriation. For instance, in Saipem v. Bangladesh, the Arbitral
Tribunal made reference to a case of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to hold that a
state can expropriate immaterial rights.133 In his Separate Opinion in the
Thunderbird case, professor Walde made reference
to the Iran-US Tribunal' s
14
practice with regard to the award of attorney costs. 1
ICSID Tribunals have extensively referred to decisions of the ICJ 135 and its
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice. 136 Indeed, public
reasoning, cross-fertilization evolves in something deeper resembling an emerging global jurisprudence.
See McCrudden, supranote 104, at 393-94.
130. Slaughter, supra note 126, at 78.
131. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, JudgingJudges: Do Judges Meet Their ConstitutionalObligation to
Settle Disputes in Conformity with 'Principles of Justice and InternationalLaw'?, 1 EuR. J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (2007).
132. The political crisis between Iran and the United States arose when 52 United States nationals
were detained at the United States Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and the United States
subsequently froze Iranian assets. The Tribunal was established out of the Algiers Accords of January
19, 1981. The literature on the Iran U.S. Tribunal is extensive. See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL &
CHRISTOPHER S. GIBSON, THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AT 25: THE CASES EVERYONE NEEDS TO
KNOW FOR INVESTOR-STATE & INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2009).

133. Saipem S.p.A. v. People's Republic of Bangl., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures,
130 (Mar. 21, 2007), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Saipem-Bangladesh-Jurisdiction.pdf
(citing Phillips
Petroleum
Company Iran v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 79 (1989)).
134. Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, 255 Fed. Appx. 531 (2007)
(separate opinion of arbitrator Thomas Walde, at
140, available at http://www.naftaclaims.
con/Disputes/Mexico/Thunderbird/Thunderbird Dissent.pdf) (quoting Sylvania v Iran, 8 Iran-US CTR
298, 324 (1985)).
135. For instance, in Maffezini v. Spain, the Tribunal referred to the ICJ decision Rights of
Nationals of America in Morocco (France v. United States) when deciding on the scope of protection of
the MFN clause. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award on Jurisdiction,
43-50 (Jan.
25, 2000), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Maffezini-Jurisdiction-English 001.pdf.
136. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Award, 11 (July 25,
2007), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LGEEnglish 006.pdf. The Permanent Court of
International Justice was established by the Covenant of the League of Nations. It held its inaugural
sitting in 1922 and was dissolved in 1946. The work of the PCIJ, the first permanent international
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international law can be considered the legal framework or system of which
international investment law is a sub-system. Before the inception of investment
treaty arbitration, investment treaties provided for an interstate process only;
governments therefore had to "sponsor" private claims. Nowadays, recourse to
diplomatic protection has become "residual," 137 and primarily international
investment treaties, rather than customary international law alone, now protect
foreign investors. Against this background, arbitral tribunals still take into account
the case law of the ICJ and PCIJ to clarify the meaning of legal concepts. A
notable example relates the nationality issue.138 In Soufraki v. United Arab
Emirates, the Arbitral Tribunal referred to the Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v.
Guatemala)when discussing the question of the nationality of the claimant.13 9
However, other arbitral tribunals refer to the dicta of international tribunals as
a starting point for further enquiry. For instance, in the Europe Cement case,140
when the respondent alleged that the claimant had abused the process and
requested declaratory relief (i.e., a declaration that there had been such abuse), the
Arbitral Tribunal stated: "Declaratory relief is a common form of relief in
international tribunals in state-to-state cases, but no cases were cited to us of
tribunals established under the ICSID Convention. . . or under international
investment treaties more generally where declarations were granted as a form of
relief., 141 In conclusion, the Tribunal acknowledged that declaratory relief had
been used in the Corfu Channel Case and the Rainbow WarriorCase,142 but it also
questioned whether previous arbitral tribunals had adopted such declaration. In
tribunal with general jurisdiction, made possible the clarification of a number of aspects of international
law, and contributed to its development. See Antonio S. de Bustamante Y Sirven, The PermanentCourt
of InternationalJustice 9 MINN. L. REv. 240 (1924-1925); OLE SPIERMANN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENTS

IN

THE

PERMANENT

COURT

OF

INTERNATIONAL

JUSTICE:

THE

RISE

OF

THE

INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY (2005).

137. While in the seventies, the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case found it "surprising" that the
evolution of international investment law had not gone further in the light of the expansion of economic
activities in the preceding half century, in the more recent Diallo case, the Court has recognized the
residual nature of the exercise of diplomatic protection and recourse to the Court in case of investment
disputes. These different obiter dicta reflect the recent flourishing of investment treaties and investment
treaty arbitration. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3,
at 89 (Feb 5); Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), (Preliminary
Objections), at
88-91 (Judgment of May 24, 2007), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/103/13856.pdf.
138. The nationality issue concerns the determination of the nationality of the claimant. See ICSID
Convention, supranote 15, art. 25.
139. Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. U.A.E., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, Decision on Jurisdiction,
45 (July 7, 2004), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Soufraki 000.pdf.
140. Europe Cement Investment & Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/07/2, Award (Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://arbitration.fr/resources/ICSID-ARB-AF-072.pdf.
141. Id. at 148.
142. Id. at
148, n.32 (explaining that the "Respondent cited to the Tribunal both the Corfu
ChannelCase (UK v.
Albania) (Merits), [1949] ICJ Reports 4, RLA-15 and the Rainbow Warrior Case (New Zealand v.
France),
Award, 30 Apr. 1990, 20 RIAA 215, RLA-42.").
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other words, notwithstanding the persuasiveness of the ICJ decisions, the Arbitral
Tribunal was enquiring into further developments of the investment treaty
arbitration case law.
Arbitral tribunals have cursorily relied on WTO case law for interpreting
investment treaty and NAFTA Chapter 11 provisions. For instance, in ADF v.
United States of America,143 the Arbitral Tribunal referred to the Shrimp Turtle
case and Hormones AB reports when applying customary rules of treaty
interpretation. 144 In his Separate Opinion in the Thunderbird case, 145 Thomas
Walde made the argument that "gambling services, in particular if not typically
accompanied by criminal by-products, have to be treated as a fully 1legitimate
46
investment," relying inter alia on WTO panel and Appellate Body cases.
The case for drawing from these different bodies of law is evident. On the one
hand, authors have noted that "international courts essentially do share the same
functions" by settling international disputes in accordance with law, and ensuring
the proper administration of justice. 147 On the other hand, certain international
treaties present an articulated regime that the investment treaties presuppose. 148 For
instance, with regard to intellectual property, investment treaties restate or enhance
the intellectual property guarantees provided in the WTO Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS Agreement). 149 When arbitrators
have to interpret TRIPs-plus standards, they must first refer to the TRIPs standards.
Other authors support such an approach, as it would impede the dilution of
multilateral norms while providing predictability.150 As Hsu points out, such
borrowing offers direction in substantive interpretation of treaty language as

143. ADF Group Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB/AF/00/1, Award, (Jan. 9, 2003), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ADF-award 000.pdf.
144. Id. at
147 (citing Appellate Body report, United States- Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); Appellate Body Report, ECMeasures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
165, 181, WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
145. Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, 255 Fed. Appx. 531 (2007)
(separate opinion of arbitrator Thomas Walde, available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com/
Disputes/Mexico/Thunderbird/Thunderbird Dissent.pdf).
146. Id. at 18 (citing to "the WTO Appeals Body decision in Antigua/Barbuda v US case of 7
Apr. 2005 ;
WT/DS285/AB/R [which] follow[s] on the earlier panel decision.").
147. Chester Brown, The Use of Precedents of Other International Courts and Tribunals in
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 5(3) TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 1, 2 (2008).
148. Christina Pfaff, Alternative Approaches to Foreign Investment Protection, 3(5) TRANSNAT'L
DIsP. MGMT. 1, 15 (2006).
149. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement),
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments- Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1994. For commentary, see the following texts:
DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2003);
ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A
(2007).
150. Locknie Hsu, Applicability of WTO Law in Regional Trade Agreements: Identifying the Links,
in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 449 (Lorand Bartels & Federico
Ortino eds., 2006).
CARLOS

M.

CORREA,

TRADE

RELATED

COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
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arbitral panels would be "able to draw upon the expertise of WTO dispute panels
and the Appellate Body in the development of legal concepts and principles" albeit
maintaining the possibility
to contract away such jurisprudence by setting their
151
own interpretation.
In parallel, arbitral tribunals have made reference to and relied on human
rights jurisprudence, to varying degrees, to determine the content of investment
law. 152 For instance, in Lauder v. Czech Republic, the UNCITRAL Tribunal made
reference to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case Mellacher 15v.3
Austria to derive the distinction between a formal and a defacto expropriation.
The Teemed Tribunal made reference to an Inter-American Court of Human Rights
case, Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, to determine the content of indirect
expropriation. 11 4 In Saipem S.p.A v. Bangladesh, the Tribunal cited several cases
from the ECtHR for affirming that arbitral awards confer on parties a right to the
sums awarded. 15 5 In the Biloune case, 156 the investor argued that the government of
Ghana had breached both the investment treaty and human rights obligations, and
in the Euro-Tunnel case the claimant argued that the obligations of the United
Kingdom and France should be read in conjunction with the European Convention
on Human Rights and its First Protocol. 15 7 Also amicus curiae may recall noninvestment provisions in their briefs.158 Finally, human rights obligations have also

151. Id. at 551-52.
152. Fry, supranote 94, at 83.
153. Lauder v. Czech Rep., Final Award, T 200 (Sept. 3, 2001), 9 ICSID Rep. 66 (2001) (quoting
Mellacher v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989)), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/LauderAward.pdf.
154. Tdcnicas Medioambientales S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/00/2,
Award, T 116, n.36 (May 29, 2003) 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004) (quoting Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru,
2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74, at
120-24 (Feb. 6, 2001)), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Tecnicas_001.pdf [hereinafter Tecmed].
155. Saipem S.p.A. v. People's Republic of Bangl., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, T 130 (Mar. 21, 2007), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Saipem-Bangladesh-Jurisdiction.pdf (citing Stran Greek Refineries and
Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, App. No. 13427/87, Eur. Ct. H.R, 1 59-62 (1994), available at
http://worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1994/48.html and Brumarescu v. Rom., App. No. 28342/95, Eur. Ct.
H.R., 10 Hum. Rts. Case Dig. 237-41 (1999), available at http://worldlii.org/eu/cases/
ECHRI1999/105.html.
156. Biloune & Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Invs. Ctr. & Gov't of Ghana, Award on
Jurisdiction and Liability, UNCITRAL, (Oct. 27, 1989), 95 ILR 183..
157. Moshe Hirsch, Conflicting Obligations in International Investment Law: Investment
Tribunals' Perspective, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY-ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR

RUTH LAPIDOTH 323, 324-25 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008). In particular, in the EuroTunnel Case, the two claimants complained, inter alia, about the repeated delays and costs related to the
intrusions in their French terminal of illegal immigrants intending to enter in the United Kingdom.
Further they complained that the use of the Tunnel by illegal immigrants has led the United Kingdom to
impose civil penalties on the concessionaries. Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. & France Manche S.A. v.
Gov'ts of U.K. & Fr., Partial Award on Jurisdiction, TT 107, 110 (Jan. 30, 2007), available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/ET PAen.pdf.
158. Hirsch, supra note 157, at 325; see, e.g., Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., NAFTA, Non-Party
Supplemental Submission: Submission of the Quechan Indian Nation (Oct. 16, 2006), available at
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been invoked in the determination of remedies phase. 159 Other cases have made
indirect reference to human rights cases. For instance, Azurix Corp. v. Argentine
Republic indirectly cited human rights jurisprudence by relying on the relevant
portions of the Tecmed decision. 160 Similarly, the EnCana Tribunal cited a
domestic arbitration case that quoted a human rights case. 161 While some
commentators have highlighted the "reluctance of tribunals to openly and
systematically consider the public interest,"'162 others have stressed that arbitral
tribunals increasingly
rely on human rights cases "in their decisions, not merely in
16 3
their obiter dicta."
However, arbitral tribunals have generally adopted a cautious approach to the
issue. 164 While the TECMED Tribunal relied on the proportionality test which has
been formulated by the ECtHR, 165 the Arbitral Tribunal in Biloune held that its
jurisdiction was limited to disputes in respect of the foreign investment and that it
lacked "jurisdiction to address, as an independent cause of action, a claim of
violation of human rights."' 166 Arbitral tribunals are forums of limited jurisdiction,
empowered to hear claims on treaty violations. Similarly, the Siemens Tribunal
rejected the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine in investment
arbitration, holding that "Article I of the First Protocol to the European Convention
on Human Rights permits a margin of appreciation not found in customary
international law or the Treaty." 167 In the Euro-tunnel case, the Tribunal defined its
jurisdiction as arising only from the Canterbury Treaty and the related
concessionary contract. 16 Therefore, the Tribunal deemed that its jurisdiction was
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/75016.pdf.
159. See, e.g., Compafhia del Desarollo de Santa Elena v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No.
ARB/96/1, Final Award, 1 64-68 (Feb. 17, 2000), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
santaelena award.pdf.
160. Azurix Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 11 311-12 (June 23,
2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AzurixAwardJuly2006.pdf.
161. EnCana v. Ecuador, London Ct. Int'l Arb., Award, 176, n.124 (Feb. 3, 2006), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/EncanaAwardEnglish.pdf.
162. Charles H. Brower II, Obstacles and Pathways to Consideration of the Public Interest in
Investment Treaty Disputes, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 347, 347
(2008-09).
163. Fry, supra note 94, at 81, n.15 (noting that "[alrbitral tribunals are not throwing in references
to human rights cases merely for the sake of appearances.").
164. Hirsch, supranote 157 at 324, 331.
165. Thcnicas Medioambientales S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/00/2,
Award,
122 (May 29, 2003) 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents
/Tecnicas_001.pdf. The arbitral tribunal made extensive reference to the dicta of other international
courts and tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Id. at 11 116,
120.
166. For commentary see Hirsch, supranote 157, at 329. Biloune & Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v.
Ghana Invs. Ctr. & Gov't of Ghana, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, UNCITRAL, (Oct. 27, 1989),
95 ILR 183, 203; Biloune Case Summary, supranote 156.
167. Siemens A.G. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID No. ARB/02/08, Award, 1 354 (Feb. 6, 2007),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Siemens-Argentina-Award.pdf.
168. Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. & France Manche S.A. v. Gov'ts of U.K. & Fr., Partial Award on
Jurisdiction, 11 124, 135, 152 (Jan. 30, 2007), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload
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limited only to claims concerning the alleged violation of the concession contract
and/or the Treaty. Accordingly, any violation of other international rules of the
European Convention on Human Rights or EC law was beyond jurisdiction.
However, the Arbitral Tribunal did not exclude the possibility that violations of the
Treaty and the contract could be examined in light of rules of general public
international law. As some authors have pointed out, "[i]n other words, even if the
direct violation of such rules was beyond its jurisdiction, the evaluation of a
violation of the concession contract in comparison with these provisions was not
' 169
excluded."
International judicial borrowing, that is, borrowing decisions from other
international fora in the interpretation of international law, would be compatible
with the unity of public international law and would promote its coherence.
Judicial dialogue is feasible and possible: informal linkages already exist. Some
arbitrators have been professors of public international law or judges in other
international fora. 170 More substantially, other subsystems of public international
law may provide interpretative guidance to arbitral tribunals.
However, on a cautionary note, it is important to highlight that distinctions
exist between the different legal sub-systems. Textual differences need to be taken
into account, as interpretation cannot be used to transpose obligations from one
field to another, or to create new obligations. For instance, in Victor Pey Casado v.
Chile, the Arbitral Tribunal made reference to the ICJ LaGrandjudgment, which
found that the provisional measures under Article 41 of the ICJ statute were
binding. 171 However, Article 47 of the ICSID Convention contains different
wording, as it states that arbitral tribunals shall have the power to "recommend"
and not to "indicate" provisional measures. 172 While one may agree that such an
/files/ET PAen.pdf (referencing the jurisprudence of the ICJ, the Permanent Court of International

Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Award, at
135, 124, and
152
respectively).
169. Mathias Audit, The Channel Tunnel Group Ltd and France-Manche SA v. United Kingdom
andFrance,57 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 724, 728 (2008) (emphasis added).

170. For instance, arbitrators may have served as former Presidents or judges of the ICJ (Bedjaoui,
Guillaume, Higgins, Schwebel), former members of the WTO AB (Feliciano, Bacchus), former Judges
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Nikken, Cangado Trindade), former President of the UN
Security Council (Fortier); or may be academics (Berman, Bernini, Bdckstiegel, Brower, Crawford,
Dupuy, Giardina, Kauffmann-Kohler, Higgins, Lowe, Stem, Weiler). See, e.g., International Council
for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA), ICCA Officers & Members, http://www.arbitrationicca.org/officers-and-members.html#/officers-and-members/MEMBERS.html
(last visited Sept. 9,
2010); Law.com, Arbitration Scorecard 2007: Top 50 Treaty Disputes, The American Lawyer, June 13,
2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1181639136817

(listing the top 50 2007 arbitration

disputes with many of the aforementioned judges and scholars named as the arbitrators).
171. Victor Pey Casado & President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No.
ARB/98/2, Decision on Provisional Measures,
17 (Sept. 25, 2001), 16 ICSID Rep. 603 (2001),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Victor-French.pdf
Spanish or French).

(French version, only available in

172. See Brown, supra note 147, at 4 (criticizing this approach as inappropriate use of precedent,
subsequently followed by the arbitral tribunal in Tokio Tokeles v. Ukraine (Tokio Tokeles v. Ukr.,
ICSID ARB/02/18, Procedural Order No. 1, 4 (Jul. 1, 2003), 20 ICSID Rep. 205 (2005), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/tokios-orderl .pdf)).
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interpretation favors the effectiveness of the ICSID Convention, and can be
justified by the inherent powers of international courts to grant provisional
measures, without a doubt such line of reasoning involves the expansion of the
treaty terms beyond the purpose of the treaty makers, 173 clearly contributing to the
development and evolution of law, but determining margins of uncertainty. In
other cases, arbitral tribunals have followed the literal treaty terms vis-A-vis other
jurisdictional trends. For instance, in the Methanex case, when the claimant sought
to show that it was a producer "in like circumstances" as US domestic producers
by arguing that Methanex produced "like products" and relying on related WTO
jurisprudence, the Tribunal declined to rely on such jurisprudence, because
NAFTA Chapter 11 did not contain the term of art "like product" which is relevant
in the interpretation of GATT Article 111.174 In addition, investment law does not
incorporate a necessity standard in its disciplines, and in cases of breach its
remedies include compensation, not cessation.
The problem with judicial borrowing is that it is a very powerful instrument
which needs to be handled properly. The major risk consists of adopting an
ideology of free decision making 175 and creating anarchy. In the case selection
there may be a certain bias, as relying on human rights case law rather than WTO
jurisprudence makes a difference in the context of a specific case. 176 Some have
pointed out that "the dissimilar architecture of treaties, including objectives,
obligations, defenses, and remedies, advises against attempts of outright
transposition of rules, methodologies, or solutions....
C. Reference to the Jurisprudenceof NationalCourts
As consideration of other legal regimes is conceptually possible in investment
treaty arbitration, some arbitral tribunals expressly refer to national cases. 178 Is
national case law applicable to foreign investment-related disputes? To answer this
question, a distinction needs to be made. If the applicable law is that of the host
173. CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 758 (2001) (Professor
Schreuer underlined that the "Convention's legislative history shows clearly that a conscious decision
was made not to grant the Tribunal the power to order binding provisional measures." (emphasis
added)).
174. Methanex Corp. v. U.S., NAFTA, Final Award, Part IV, ch. B,
23-35 (Jan. 15, 2001),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf.
175. See, e.g., RAIMO SILTALA, A THEORY OF PRECEDENT- FROM ANALYTICAL POSITIVISM TO A
POST-ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4 (2000) (analyzing free judicial decision making); see also
RICCARDO GUASTINI, LE FONTI DEL DIRITTO E L'INTERPRETAZIONE (1993) (examining the sources of
law and their interpretation under a judicial decision making context).
176. See Ran Hischl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, 53 AM. J.
COMP. L. 125 (2005).
177. Marcos A. Orellana, Science, Risk and Uncertainty: Public Health Measures and Investment
Disciplines, in NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 671, 788 (Philippe Kahn &
Thomas W. Walde eds., 2007).
178. See, e.g., Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. U.S., Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction,
77, n.34 (July 20, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
69499.pdf (referencing U.S national cases, U.S. v. Nancy, 189 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999) and Christoph
v. U.S., 931 F. Supp. 1564 (S.D. GA. 1996), to validate the concept that "a person may "incur"
expenses before he or she actually dispense any fund.").
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state, reference to its jurisprudence in order to clarify relevant provisions may be
made ipso jure.179 Questions arise with regard to reference to jurisprudence of
other national courts.1 80 Adopting a functionalist approach, some emphasize that
that the issue of regulatory expropriation, and other similar issues identified in
investor-state dispute settlement, initially emerged as "constitutional issue[s] in
national law."1 81 According to Walde and Kolo, the debate on regulatory taking in
the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court presents a constitutional character that
would make it "particularly apposite to serve as a laboratory - but also as relative
precedent for the interpretative challenges" in international dispute
settlement. 182 The functionalist approach is based on the praesumptio
similitudini, 183 and holds that "[c]omparative constitutional law seems
to provide
1 84
the most suitable analogy and precedent" to investor-state arbitration.
However, such a functionalist approach reduces the law to a formal technique
of conflict resolution denying its political underpinnings. The functionalists
deprive legal provisions of their systemic context and "integrat[e] them in an
artificial universal typology of 'solutions.' 185 Nonetheless, one of the main
features of investment arbitration is its detachment or separation from national
courts and their potential biases. From an international law perspective, investment
treaties do not amount to "constitutional charters"; rather, they institutionalize 186a
limited set of obligations to which sovereign states have voluntarily consented.
Also, it may be practically impossible to take the wide variety of national
jurisprudence into account. Ideally, an arbitral tribunal should make a thorough
survey of comparative law, making use of the scholarly work that has been done
on the issue in order to devise the most efficient legal system. But this does not
happen in practice. Usually only the laws of a small number of countries are
cited. 187 Therefore, it may be difficult to eliminate cultural biases and possible
hegemonic thinking. For example, some authors have criticized reference to the
179. See A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, State Contracts in Contemporary International Law: Monist
Versus Dualist Controversies, 12 EuR. J. INT'L L. 309, 320 (2001).
180. For a seminal study on the importance of comparative law in international law and arbitration,
see HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1927).

181. Walde & Kolo, supranote 90, at 821.
182. Id. at 847.
183. Konrad Zweigert,
Die
"Praesumptio Similitudinis" als
Grundsatzvermutung
rechtsvergleichenderMethod, in BUTS ET METHODS DU DROIT COMPARE/AIMS AND METHODS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 735 (M. Rotondi ed., 1973) (examining the "practice of similitude" as a
fundamental assumption of comparative law).
184. Walde & Kolo, supranote 90, at 822.
185. Frankenberg, supranote 63, at 411.
186. Gus V. Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global
Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121, 130 (2006).
187. See Nedim Peter Vogt, The InternationalPractice of Law and the Anglo-Internationalization
of Law and Language, in FESTSCHRIFT LIBER AMICORUM TUGRUL ANSAY 455, 459 (Sabih Arkan &
Aynur Yongalik eds., 2006) (scrutinizing "advent of English as the Language of Law within the context
of the Anglo-Internationalization of the practice of law .... ); see also Frankenberg, supra note 185,
442 ("Despite all these claims that the comparatist be open-minded and think supra-nationally, the civil
and common law still rule over the comparatists' world.").
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US jurisprudence because this would be tantamount to rewriting other countries'
constitutional culture and experience.1 88 Somehow, drawing on the particular
constitutional experience of a country would re-politicize investment disputes,
against more neutral international canons. 189 Finally, one may question whether
this might amount to extraterritorial application of law.
In conclusion, as an eminent comparative law scholar pointed out, "[t]he
conscious and limited use of national legal traditions is advantageous in that it
enriches international law with useful source materials, analogies and
techniques."1 90 However, "preconceptions" are dangerous, and every case would
deserve ad hoc consideration. More than a century ago, Oppenheim warned that
"the science of international law must be careful in the appreciation of such
municipal case-law."1 91 If the applicable law is the law of the host state, of course
reference may be made to the administrative law and jurisprudence of the host
state. Where the applicable law is international law, reference to national cases
becomes a more sensitive issue which the arbitrators must decide. In any case, if
national precedents as well as international ones may be taken into account for the
persuasiveness of their ratio decidendi, they are not binding on international
arbitrators.
VI. CONCLUSION

This paper has focused on the use of the comparative method in international
investment arbitration. Comparison is a mode of thinking and is consistently used
in both literary and legal sources. While poets have the amplest freedom to
compare extremely different elements,19 2 lawyers need to follow strict rules. In
legal systems and investment arbitrations comparisons are consistently being
made; the phenomenon is far from new. Why then does it need to be scrutinized?
There are two main reasons for doing so. First, it seems that while comparisons
are made, they are often done without full awareness of their implications from a
systemic perspective. Second, although investment treaty arbitration has become
the most common method for settling investor-state disputes, some authors have
nonetheless harshly criticized it because of its alleged lack of human rights

188. E.g., David Schneiderman, NAFTA's Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to
Canada 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 499 (1996); David Schneiderman, Constitution or Model Treaty?
Struggling over the InterpretativeAuthority of NAFTA, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS

294 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006).
189. Kennedy, supranote 1, at 606-08.
190. LINDELL V. PROTT, THE LATENT POWER OF CULTURE AND THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE 230

(1979).
191. Lassa Oppenheim, The Science ofInternationalLaw: Its Tasks and Methods, 2 AM. J. INT'L L.
313, 336 (1908); Id at 338 (The author added: "I do not deny ... that the intrinsic value of many such
decisions and the convincing arguments which accompany them had their bearing upon courts of other
countries and thereby in fact made these cases precedents which are followed by the courts of all or
many other countries, but in law and per se they are and remain precedents for the judges of their own
country only.").
192. For instance, Shakespeare famously compared the beloved friend to a summer day. WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, SONNETS, SONNET XVIII.
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consideration. This paper has questioned whether the mechanism may actually
benefit from a wider use of comparative law.
Like any other kind of adjudication, consistent patterns, attitudes, values and
opinions characterize investment treaty arbitration. All these elements form what
may be called a legal culture.1 93 The culture of investment treaty arbitration
constitutes a sort of melting pot of different legal traditions as it presents mixed
characteristics of common law and civil law traditions. While previous studies
have focused on the procedural dimension of the phenomenon, this article has
focused on its substantive dimension. While other studies have compared the
different legal frameworks which regulate foreign investments at the national level,
this study has focused on the role of the comparative method in international
investment law and arbitration.
After scrutinizing arbitrators' use of comparative law in investment treaty
disputes, this paper critically assessed this approach. Arbitrators may use analogies
and judicial borrowing; this is part of legal reasoning and it is legitimate to do so,
in light of customary rules of treaty interpretation. According to these rules,
contextual interpretation is a legitimate tool of interpretation. Furthermore,
arbitrators may detect international principles of law through the analysis of
relevant jurisprudence of other courts and tribunals. However, they need to pay
attention to methodology issues. Judicial borrowing cannot be an uncritical
exercise. As many comparative lawyers well know, legal norms express a certain
political position, 194 being the outcome of certain historical evolution.1 95 The case
selection and the selection of the tertium comparationismay affect the outcome of
the case.
This study highlights the fact that reference to national case law may be
problematic in consideration of extraterritorial character of such application and of
the risk of re-politicizing investment treaty disputes. National case law becomes
relevant where the applicable law is the lex loci. By contrast, reliance on
persuasive precedents of previous arbitral tribunals may lead to the coalescence of
different legal traditions and experiences and to an increased coherence of the
system. 196 As Lauterpacht pointed out, "[i]nternational arbitral law has produced a
body of precedent which is full of instruction and authority. Numerous arbitral
awards have made a distinct contribution to international law by reason of their
scope, their elaboration,
and the conscientiousness with which they have examined
' 19 7
the issue before them."

193. See, e.g., LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 15

(1975); Roger Cotterell, The Concept of Legal Culture, in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES 13-14 (David
Nelken ed., 1997).
194. RENE RODIERE, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT COMPARE 4 (1979) (explaining that "les r~gles de

droit n'intdressent pas le comparatiste dans leur expression normative, mais tant qu'elles manifestent
une certain position politique" or as translated from French, "the comparatist is not interested in the
rules of law in their normative expression, but as they manifest a certain political position.").
195. Id.
196. McLachlan, supranote 115.
197. Paulsson, supra note 83, at 97 (citing HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
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In parallel, the increasing reliance on cases of other international courts and
tribunals may increase the perceived legitimacy of the system especially in cases in
which constitutional dilemmas are at stake. This comparative mood of arbitral
panels should not be read as arbitral activism or as articulation offree law doctrine,
but as an interpretative tool allowed for in customary rules of treaty
interpretation. 198 Furthermore, insofar as certain legal principles have become
norms of customary law they may be applied to the disputes as applicable law. In
conclusion, given the attitude of arbitral tribunals to borrow from the experience of
other courts and tribunals and the comparative trend of scholarly analysis, a more
conscious use of the comparative method needs to be promoted. Comparisons are
not a neutral or objective phenomenon: "[T]he comparativist has to regard herself
as being involved: involved in an ongoing social practice constituted and pervaded
by law; involved in a given legal tradition.. .; and involved in a specific mode of
thinking and talking about law." 199 Once aware of perspective, arbitral tribunals
and interpreters can make conscious use of the instruments of law. Not only would
such awareness limit eventual abuses of the comparative method, but it would also
favor the coherence of the international legal system. While investment law is
closely associated with what arbitrators say it is, the two are distinct: "[P]rior cases
provide evidence of the law, but they cannot be conclusive. 20 0

17-18 (1958).
198. Campbell McLachlan, Investment Treaties and GeneralInternationalLaw, 57 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 361 (2008).
199. Frankenberg, supranote 63, at 443.
200. Peter Wesley-Smith, Theories of Adjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis, in PRECEDENT
IN LAW 73, 80 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987).
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT

DRONE WARFARE AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
RYAN J. VOGEL*

"[I]n all of our operations involving the use of force, including those in the
armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, the Obama
Administration is committed by word and deed to conducting ourselves in
accordance with all applicable law.... [I]t is the considered view of this
Administration... that U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations
conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable
law, including the laws of war."
HaroldKoh, U.S. State DepartmentLegal Adviser 1

"My concern is that these drones, these Predators, are being operated in a
framework which may well violate international humanitarian law and
international human rights law."
-Philip Alston, UnitedNations Special Rapporteuron
2
Extrajudicial,Summary, or ArbitraryExecutions

The United States has increasingly relied upon unmanned aerial vehicles
(IA Vs), or "drones," to target and kill enemies in its current armed conflicts.
Drone strikes have proven to be spectacularly successful-both in terms offinding
and killing targeted enemies and in avoiding most of the challenges and
controversies that accompany using traditionalforces. However, critics have
begun to challenge on a number of grounds the legality and morality of using
drones to kill belligerents in the non-traditional conflicts in which the United
States continues to fight. As drones become a growingfixture in the application of
modern military force, it bears examining whether their use for lethal targeting
* Foreign Affairs Specialist, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. B.S.
(Integrated Studies), magna cum laude, Utah Valley University; M.A. (International Affairs), magna
cum laude, American University; J.D., American University; L.L.M. candidate (Public International
Law, National Security Law), Georgetown University. The opinions expressed in this article are the
views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the United States
Government or of the Department of Defense. All statements and information used in this article are
drawn from the public record.
1. Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote Address at the American Society for
International Law Annual Meeting: The Obama Administration and International Law (March 25,
2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
2. US Warned on Deadly Drone Attacks, BBC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/8329412.stm.
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operations violates the letter or spirit of the law of armed conflict. In this articleI
identify the legalframework and sources of law applicable to the current conflicts
in which drones are employed; examine whether, and if so in what circumstances,
using drones for targeting operations violates the jus in bello principles of
proportionality,military necessity, distinction, and humanity and determine what
legal boundaries or limitations apply to the seemingly limitless capabilities of
drone warfare. I then evaluate whether the law of armed conflict is adequatefor
dealing with the use of drones to target belligerents and terrorists in this nontraditionalarmed conflict and ascertain whether new rules or laws are needed to
govern their use. I conclude by proposing legal and policy guidelines for the
lawful use of drones in armed conflict.
In an effort to reach remote territory and targets, save American blood and
treasure, achieve optimal accuracy and efficiency in targeting operations, and
perhaps to avoid the controversies 3 surrounding the insertion of ground forces, the
United States has increasingly relied upon unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or
"drones," 4 to target and kill enemies in its current armed conflicts.5 The United
States has utilized drones to support combat and counterterrorism efforts across its
theaters of armed conflict. 6 Drone targeting has proven to be spectacularly
successful-both in terms of finding and killing targeted enemies and in avoiding
most of the challenges and controversies that accompany using traditional forces.
However, critics have begun to challenge on a number of grounds the legality and
morality of using drones to kill belligerents in the non-traditional conflicts in
3. In particular, relying on drones to remotely attack targets avoids the thorniest byproduct of
inserting ground forces in America's current conflicts: detention of enemy belligerents and security
threats.
4. In this paper I use the terms "drone" and "UAV" interchangeably. Recently, some have begun
to use the term "remotely-piloted aircraft," or "RPA," to describe UAVs, likely in an effort to
emphasize the human element of control with UAVs. However, while the RPA may be a more accurate
term, I use the terms UAV and drone in this paper for purposes of consistency and audience familiarity.
5. As explained by U.S. State Department Legal Adviser, Harold Koh, and mirroring the posture
taken by the U.S. Government in the Guantanamo habeas litigation and in its first universal periodic
review submission to the Human Rights Council, the Obama Administration considers the United States
to be "engaged in several armed conflicts": one in Iraq, one in Afghanistan, and importantly to this
discussion, another against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces both "in Afghanistan and
elsewhere." While the Obama Administration publicly purged the term "global war on tenror" from its
official lexicon, and wisely so, since the U.S. Government likely never intended to fight any form of
terrorism anywhere in the world, Harold Koh's expression of the Administration's position amounts to
a global war against specific terrorists- namely, al Qaeda, Taliban, and associated forces, including
those who substantially support or harbor them. This is no mere insignificant rhetorical modification:
the Obama Administration has expressly taken the previous administration's posture of fighting the
parties contemplated by the AUMF in a wartime framework anywhere in the world and applying the
law of armed conflict to any individuals they encounter in that fight, subject of course to
"considerations specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of the threat, the
sovereignty of the other states involved, and the willingness and ability of those states to suppress the
threat the target poses." See Koh, supra note 1. See also Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith,
CongressionalAuthorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2047 (2005).
6. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on
Targeted Killings, Human Rights Council,
7, 18-22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010)
(by Phillip Alston).
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which the United States continues to fight.7 After much anticipation and
speculation in the international law community, and after promptings by the UN
and other organizations for the United States to deliver a legal justification for its
drone strikes, U.S. State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh addressed the
American Society for International Law's (ASIL) 2010 Annual Meeting and used
the occasion to present the "considered view" of the Obama Administration in
regards to U.S. targeting operations, particularly those conducted with drones.8
Koh explained that "great care is taken to adhere to [the principles of distinction
and proportionality].., in both planning and execution" of lethal targeting
operations, and asserted that such operations "comply with all applicable law,
including the laws of war." 9 As drones become a growing fixture in the
application of modem military force, it bears examining whether their use for
lethal targeting operations violates the letter or spirit of the law of armed conflict.10
In this article, I identify the legal framework and sources of law applicable to
the current conflicts in which drones are employed;11 examine whether, and in
what circumstances, using drones for targeting operations violates the jus in bello
principles of proportionality, military necessity, distinction, and humanity; and
determine what legal boundaries or limitations apply to the seemingly limitless
capabilities of drone warfare. I then evaluate whether the law of armed conflict is
adequate for dealing with the use of drones to target belligerents and terrorists in
this non-traditional armed conflict and ascertain whether new rules or laws are
needed to govern their use. I conclude that the law of armed conflict adequately
governs drone warfare and provides guiding principles for conducting drone strikes
within the letter and spirit of the law.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background
The use of unmanned drones to target belligerents presents complex legal
issues for modem warfare. However, the appearance of new and advanced
weapons in warfare is hardly a new challenge in the history of armed conflict.
Technological progress has produced increasingly sophisticated means for
fighting, while laws to moderate or police their use have typically lagged far
behind. At different times in history, developments such as the crossbow,
gunpowder, machine guns, tanks, airplanes, noxious gasses, nuclear bombs, and a
number of other deadly inventions, irreversibly changed the landscape of warfare
and required groups and states to reassess the laws governing armed conflict. The
United Nations' call, then, for the United States to justify the legality of its drone
7. Id. at
18-22.
8. Koh, supra note 1.
9. Koh, supra note 1.
10. While experts have recognized substantive distinctions in the names used to describe the rules
governing armed conflicts, I prefer the term "law of armed conflict" and use it interchangeably with the
"law of war" and "international humanitarian law" in this article.
11. While I draw on U.S. law to help characterize the conflict, this article aims to examine the
issue of drone warfare through the lens of the internationallaw of armed conflict. U.S. domestic law
applicable to the issue at hand is not the focus of this article.
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strike program 12 should not come as a surprise. Public officials, experts,
practitioners, operators, and lawyers are just now coming to grapple with the rules
and legal framework for the emerging use13 of drones in order to determine
guidelines for the use of this new technology.
Some of this concern is understandable, as drones seem to have moved
overnight to the front line of America's current armed conflicts. In reality, UAVs
languished for years in development and obscurity 14 before becoming, as CIA
Director Leon Panetta famously put it, "the only game in town."15 Even in the
early years of the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military rarely
utilized the emerging technology. In 2001, the Predator UAV fleet numbered only
ten and was typically relegated to reconnaissance missions, when used at all. 16 By
2007, Predators numbered more than 180, with plans to nearly double that number
over the next few years. 17 In addition to the Predator drone (about 27 feet long and
capable of flying for 24 hours at up to 26,000 feet), the best known of the
American UAV fleet, the United States has increasingly employed a number of
other drones in the current conflicts, including the Global Hawk (the largest of the
fleet at 40 feet long and capable of flying for 35 hours and up to 65,000 feet), the
Shadow (only 12 feet long and capable of flying for 5 hours or 70 miles), the
Hunter (around 24 feet long and capable of flying twice as long as the Shadow),
the Raven Gust 38 inches long and only 4 pounds, capable of flying for 90 minutes
at about 400 feet), and the Wasp (even smaller than the Raven). 18 The smaller
drones of the UAV fleet are used primarily for reconnaissance and target
acquisition, while the larger drones are armed with Hellfire missiles and used to
conduct strikes, in addition to higher altitude reconnaissance.1 9 A number of other
UAVs are expected to be operated in the near future to update and expand
capabilities, including the Reaper, the Peregrine, and the Vulture. 20 The Pentagon
12. US Warned on Deadly Drone Attacks, supranote 2.
13. A recent story in the Harvard National Security Journal poignantly illustrated the need for
such guidelines. Brett H. McGurk writes:
There is yet another reason to define clear standards for the drone program: 'In
warfare, what comes around - goes around' Tas Oelstrom emphasized that
simple maxim during the symposium, a point driven home by MIT's Mary
Cummings, who showed with alarming detail how easily drone technology is
patterned and even piloted with an iPhone. 'Yes,' she said, 'there is an app for
that.'
Brett H. McGurk, Lawyers: A PredatorDrone's Achilles Heel?, HARVARD NAT'L SEC. J. (Mar. 11,
2010), http://www.harvardnsj.com/2010/03/lawyers-a-predator-drone's-achilles-heel/.
14. For a detailed history of the development and deployment of UAVs, see generally P.W.
Singer, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(2009).
15. U.S. Air Strikes in Pakistan Called 'Very Effective,' CNN.COM (May 18, 2009, 6:48 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/18/cia.pakistan.airstrikes/.
16. P.W. Singer, Military Robots and the Laws of War, 23 THE NEW ATLANTIS 25, 37 (2009),
available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/military-robots-and-the-laws-of-war.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 37-39.
19. Id.at39.
20. Id.
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has made producing and evolving all aspects of its drone fleet a top budgetary and
strategic priority for the coming years.21
B. Framingthe Issues
It seems clear that the United States intends to advance and expand its UAV
program, including for lethal strike operations.22 Reportedly, more drone strikes
were carried out in President Barack Obama's first year in office than in the
previous eight years combined under George W. Bush, and 2010 has almost
doubled the pace of 2009.23 Indeed, over the past two years, a number of senior
Obama Administration officials have come out in defense of drone warfare.24
However, while the U.S. Government has been clear about its intent to use drones
for targeting operations, and while it has broadly defended its policy of conducting
strikes against parties contemplated by the Authorization for the Use of Military
Force (AUMF) the government's public proponents have rarely delved into
some of the weightier issues presented by drone warfare. A few hypotheticals may
help illustrate the preeminent issues:
Hypothetical 1: A military operator in Afghanistan identifies a Taliban target
within Afghanistan, determines through intelligence sources that the target is
reachable at his home and that the operation would meet the proportionality,
necessity, and humanity requirements under the law of armed conflict, and
employs a drone to conduct the kill operation.
Hypothetical2: A military operator on a ship off the Horn of Africa identifies
a high-level al Qaeda target within Yemen, determines through intelligence
sources that the target is reachable while at a funeral and that the operation would

21. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW viii, 10-12, 18, 22, 101, 104,
available at http://www.defense.gov/qdr/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2010); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF.,
QUADRENNIAL ROLES AND MISSIONS 24-29 (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.defense.
gov/news/Jan2009/QRMFinalReport v26Jan.pdft see generally U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., FY 2009-2034
UNMANNED
SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP 1, available at http://www.jointrobotics.com/
documents/library/UMS o20lntegrated o20Roadmap o202009.pdf.
22. Id.
23. Pakistandenies U.S. request to expand drone access, official says, CNN.COM (Nov. 22, 2010,
11:04 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/I 1/22/pakistan.us.drones/index.html.
24. See, e.g., Koh, supranote 1; U.S, Airstrikes in PakistanCalled 'Very Effective,' supra note 15
(recounting CIA Director Leon Panetta's defense of drone strikes); Future of Military Aviation Lies
with Drones: US Admiral, SPACE WAR (May 14, 2009), http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Future
of militaryaviation lies with drones US admiral_999.html (quoting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
Admiral Mullen, and Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, on the future use of UAVs in the military).
25. In this article, I will use the term "AUMF" as an adjective to reference the parties with which
the United States is at war under the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (Taliban, al
Qaeda, and associated forces) and the conflict in which the United States is engaged (e.g., AUMF foes,
AUMF enemies, AUMF parties, and AUMF conflict). Because both the Bush and the Obama
administrations rely on the AUMF for authority to conduct hostilities against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and
associated forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and because the label "global war on terrorism" has
been (wisely) abandoned, the tag "AUMF" most succinctly and accurately describes the conflict and
parties involved. See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., RS 22357,
AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN RESPONSE TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS 3-4 (2007)

[hereinafter AUMF].
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meet the proportionality, necessity, and humanity requirements under the law of
armed conflict, and employs a drone to conduct the kill operation.
Hypothetical 3: A CIA operator in Kabul identifies a group of Jaish-eMuhammad fighters (known al Qaeda affiliates) in a Waziristan "safe house,"
determines through intelligence sources that the target is reachable and that the
operation would meet the proportionality, necessity, and humanity requirements
under the law of armed conflict, and employs a drone to conduct the kill operation.
Hypothetical 4: A CIA operator in Djibouti identifies al-Shabaab leaders
(loosely aligned with al Qaeda) in Somalia, determines through intelligence
sources that the targets are reachable at a meeting of associates and that the
operation would meet the proportionality, necessity, and humanity requirements
under the law of armed conflict, and employs a drone to conduct the kill operation.
A number of recurrent issues present themselves in these examples: (1)
Consent of the government where the strike occurs. Does it matter if the host
government consents to the strike, expressly opposes the strike, or is silent on the
matter? (2) Rank or importance of the targeted individual. Does a target need to
have sufficient rank or importance to be targeted? Do certain targets, because of
their seniority or importance, justify more latitude in regards to determining what
constitutes "acceptable" collateral damage? (3) Foreseeabilityof civilian losses.
Does it matter if the strike causes unforeseeable but disproportionate civilian
losses? In a conflict where the enemy intentionally fails to distinguish himself, and
indeed intentionally seeks to mask his combatant status as a matter of course, is
there a requirement to subject intelligence assessments to heightened levels of
scrutiny before targeting civilians who have lost their protected status by
participating in the hostilities? (4) Humanitarian objective. Does the United
States have an affirmative obligation to seek the less harmful option if a target
might just as easily, or within a reasonable range of practicability, be captured and
detained? (5) Location of the strike. Does the answer of legality differ if the strike
takes place within the recognized battlefield of Afghanistan, the border region of
Pakistan, the ungoverned spaces of Somalia, or the terrorist havens of Yemen?
Will the answer change if the strike occurs on the high seas or in a "neutral"
country or zone? (6) Location of the operator. Does it matter if the operator is
located within the same zone of hostilities or somewhere outside it? What if the
operator is located on a ship or in Nevada or Virginia? (7) Status of the operator.
Does it matter if the operator conducting the strike is a civilian or combatant
uniformed member of the armed forces? Where do CIA personnel fit into this
status characterization? In the proceeding sections, I will address each of these
questions and issues within the context of both current law governing armed
conflict and the realities of a new kind of war.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND SOURCES OF LAW
A. Wartime or CriminalLegal Framework?
At the outset, it is important to identify the proper legal framework on which
to base our analysis. It should be noted, however, that the application of one legal
framework need not be exclusive to the application of another. In the war against
al Qaeda and its terrorist associates, if the government reasonably concludes that it
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is involved in an "armed conflict," the government may properly utilize law of war
methods as well as criminal law enforcement methods for enforcement, detention,
and prosecution of terrorists, depending on the circumstances. In fact, the U.S.
Government has frequently used law enforcement personnel and resources, the
criminal code, and civilian courts to thwart, identify, apprehend, and try terrorists
before and since 9/11,26 and the Justice Department has signaled its intent to
continue
to do so, including by trying some of the Guantanamo detainees in federal
27
court.

That said, the U.S. Government has made clear that it considers itself at war
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and with the parties contemplated by the AUMF. 2 ' From
Koh's formal explanation in his 2010 ASIL speech, to language in presidential and
executive orders, court filings, human rights reports, and statements by senior
officials in both the Bush and Obama Administrations, the Executive Branch has
consistently characterized the current conflicts to be armed conflicts, governed
primarily by the lex specialis of the laws of war.29 Congress has also consistently,
and without exception, confirmed the Executive's characterization of the current
conflicts as armed conflicts.30 In addition, as the courts have reviewed issues of
detention and treatment of detainees, they have also dependably upheld the
political branches' characterization of the current conflicts as armed conflicts, to
which unique rules apply, from the Supreme Court's decisions in Hamdi and
Boumediene, to the most recent habeas decisions in the D.C. Circuit and the D.C.
District Court.31 Thus, all three branches of government,1 2 in both Republican and
26. See, e.g., JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR. & RICHARD B. ZABEL, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT
OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 2009 UPDATE AND RECENT

DEVELOPMENTS 6 (2009) available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/090723-LS-in-pursuitjustice-09-update.pdf.
27. See, e.g., Attorney General Announces Forum Decisions for Guantanamo Detainees, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 13, 2009) available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech091113.html; DOJSays Some Terror Suspects to be Tried in FederalCourt,AM. CONSTITUTION SOC'Y
BLOG (Nov. 13, 2009, 12:48 PM), available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/14808. While there has
been controversy about trying terrorists in federal courts, in particular the 9/11 co-conspirators, the
Attorney General has consistently supported using federal courts for trying detainees at Guantanamo
and future captures.
28. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 1; Exec. Order No. 13234, 66 Fed. Reg. 221 (Nov. 9, 2001); Exec.
Order No. 13239, 66 Fed. Reg. 241 (Dec. 12, 2001); Military Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 222 (Nov. 13, 2001);
Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relative to Detainees
Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, No. 08-442, 3 (D.C. March 13,
2009); President Barack Obarna, Remarks by the President on National Security, National Archives
(May 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/Remarks-by-the-PresidentOn-National-Security-5-21-09; Human Rights Council, U.S., Nat'l Report Submitted in Accordance
with Para.15 (a) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Res. 51, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/9USA/1
(Aug. 23, 2010) available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/GIO/155/69/PDF/
G1015569.pdfOpenElement.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., AUMF, supra note 25, at 3-4; Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. §
2241(e)(2)); Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948(2)(a); see generally, National Defense
Authorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-84 (2009).
31. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,
630-31 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 518-19 (2004); see also, Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F.
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Democrat Administrations and Congresses, have consistently characterized the
situations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and with Taliban, al Qaeda, and associated forces
as that of an armed conflict governed by the laws of war.
As evidenced by Koh's ASIL speech, the United States couches its
foundational legal authority to target AUMF belligerents within the self-defense
terms of Article 51 from the UN Charter.33 The U.S. Government takes the
position that the events of September 11, 2001 constituted an "armed attack" by a
transnational terrorist organization, thereby triggering application of the laws of
armed conflict.34 Congress emphasized this fact when, in response to the 9/11
attacks, it authorized the President to exercise the country's "rights to self-defense"
and to "use all necessary and appropriate force" in order to prevent future acts of
terrorism against the United States.35 The Obama Administration, like its
predecessor, continues to rely on that statutory authority to use military force
against the parties described in the AUMF.
However, while the AUMF clearly provides the authority for the use of
military force, it offers a great deal of ambiguity for its application. For example,
the AUMF grants the president sweeping power to determine who falls within the
enemy forces.36 In a war against a shadowy and purposefully indistinct adversary,
this power to define the enemy is significant, even if operationally necessary.
37
Additionally, the AUMF does not impose geographical limitations of any kind.
While the law does not seem to contemplate a "global war on terror," it certainly
provides for a global war against specific terrorists- namely, al Qaeda, Taliban,
and associated forces, including those that substantially support or harbor them.38

Supp. 2d 43, 55 (DDC 2009).
32. The fact that all three branches agree on the characterization of the conflict places it squarely
within Justice Jackson's category of maximum executive authority in his Youngstown concurrence.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-39 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring).
33. See Koh, supranote 1; U.N. Charter art. 51.
34. AUMF, supra note 25, at 5 (referencing article 5 of the Washington Treaty). The UN and
NATO also recognized that a state of armed conflict existed between the United States and the
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism
Resolution, U.N. Press Release SC/7158 (Sep. 28, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm; G.A. Res. 56/1,
3-4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/1 (Sep. 12, 2001),
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/agresolution.htm;
Press Release, Security
Council, Security Council Condemns in Strongest Terms Terrorist Attacks on United States, U.N. Press
Release SC/7143 (Sep. 12, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/SC714
3.doc.htm; Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, Statement by NATO Secretary General (Oct. 2,
2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm.
35. AUMF, supranote 25, at 6.
36. Id. at 4.
37. Instead, the AUMF provided the President authority to use force against specific targets those "nations, organizations, or persons" the President determined "planned, authorized, committed, or
aided" the terrorist attacks on 9/11 as well as those who "harbored such organizations or persons." Id. at
6. See also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5.
38. AUMF, supranote 25, at 3.
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This geographical expansiveness, and the line of logic that flows from it,39 has
been a lightning rod for criticism both within the United States and abroad. In fact,
some have argued that targeting operations conducted outside the geographical
battlefield do not fall under the law of armed conflict at all, but under the criminal
law, and therefore such operations constitute unlawful killings. 40 Those who take
this position typically oppose the idea of a "global battlefield," preferring the more
traditional territorially-contained battlefield - in this case, the territory of
Afghanistan.41 Of course, in practice, the United States will almost certainly not
embrace the broadest application of a "global battlefield" with regard to targeting
operations. If there is a government willing and able to either capture or kill a
sought-after belligerent within its territory, the United States is not likely to
undermine that state's sovereignty and risk the certain diplomatic blowback by
targeting the individual anyway. However, in countries such as Pakistan, Somalia,
and Yemen, where the respective governments maintain only partial control over
their territory and have proven incapable of eliminating, or unwilling to eliminate,
terrorist actors and activities, the United States has resorted to territorial incursions
through drone strikes.42 Koh notes that the decision of "whether a particular
individual will be targeted in a particular location will depend upon considerations
specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of the threat, the
sovereignty of the other states involved, and the willingness and ability of those
states to suppress the threat the target poses. '43 According to the United States, it
may conduct such strikes as long as the individuals (e.g., AUMF parties) are

39. Pressed on whether a "little old lady in Switzerland" could be considered an enemy combatant
if she donated money to al Qaeda, the United States Government responded in the affirmative. In re
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005). The Obama Administration
may have come up with a different response, but it seems apparent that the underlying policy continues
of taking the fight to al Qaeda and their supporters wherever the United States finds them.
40. See, e.g., Rise of Drones II: Unmanned Systems and the Future of Warfare: Hearing before the
U.S. House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 2 (Apr. 28, 2010)
(written testimony of Mary Ellen O'Connell, Professor, University of Notre Dame Law School),
available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/subcommittees/NS -Subcommittee/4.28. 10Drones Il/OConnell Statement.pdf [hereinafter Rise of Drones II]; Anthony D. Romero, Open Letter
to President Obama, COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM (Apr. 28, 2010),
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/subcommittees/NS-Subcommittee/4.28. 10-Drones-11/2010 0
4 28 ACLU ADR Letter to PresidentObama.pdf, Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 16-20, AlAulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-cv-01469 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 2010), available athttp://www.aclu.org/
files/assets/ReplyBrief FINAL_100810.pdf.
41. See, e.g.,
Bridget Johnson, Kucinich: Policy of Drone Strikes Helping Stoke 'Fanaticism,'
'Radicalism,' The Hill: Blog, (Apr. 24, 2010, 12:20 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefingroom/news/94127-kucinich-obama-policy-of-drone-strikes-helping-inspire-fanatacism-and-radicalism
(Representative Dennis Kucinich claims that the United States is violating international law by
attacking a country-Pakistan-we are not at war with and who has not attacked us).
42. See, e.g.,
Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti & Robert F.Worth, A Secret Assault on Terror Widens
on Two Continents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/
world/15shadowwar.html.
43. Koh, supra note 1.
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lawfully targetable as belligerents or civilians who have forfeited their protected
status."
B. Characterizationof the Conflict
While the three branches of the government agree that a state of armed
conflict exists and primarily rely upon the law of armed conflict to govern the fight
with the groups listed in the AUMF, particularly with regard to lethal targeting
operations, the inquiry to identify the proper legal framework does not end there the law of armed conflict has different rules for the different types of conflict.
"International armed conflicts" are traditional armed conflicts between states and
are governed by the 1907 Hague Conventions, the four Geneva Conventions of
1949,46 custom, and, to those that are party, the first Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions (AP 1). 47 "Conflicts not of an international character" (or
"non-international armed conflicts") are armed conflicts between states and nonstate actors, including but not limited to internal armed conflicts, and are governed
by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,48 custom, domestic law, and,49
44. See infra section III(B)(1) for a fuller explanation on the implications of civilians losing their
protected status.
45. Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague IV].
46. See The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3114, 3116, T.I.A.S. No.3362, at 3, 75
U.N.T.S. 31, 32 [GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3217, 3220,
T.I.A.S. No.3363, at 4, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86 [GC II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment to
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, T.I.A.S. No. 3364., at 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136
[GC III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, T.I.A.S. No.3365, at 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288 [GC IV] [all four hereinafter
Geneva Conventions].
47. The United States signed AP I but never submitted it to the Senate for advice and consent. See
Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification ofAdditional Protocol
1, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109, 110 (1985). The U.S. Government has been consistently critical of some of its
terms throughout the years, particularly with regard to rules concerning unlawful participants in
hostilities and the combatant's privilege. See, e.g., George H. Aldrich, Prospectsfor the United States
Ratification ofAdditional ProtocolI to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1991).
However, many in the international community, including the United States, have argued that large
parts of Protocol I reflect custom. See, e.g., Hans-Peter Gasser, An Appeal for Ratification by the United
States, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 912, 914 (1987). The U.S. government has taken the position in the past that
the provisions of Article 75 represent "an articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of
an enemy are entitled." Hlamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 663 (2006) (quoting William H. Taft IV,
Law of Armed Conflict After 911: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 322 (2003)).
Nevertheless, the scope of customary international law (CIL) is controversial within the United States
Government. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, openedfor signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N.
Doc. A/32/144, reprintedin 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter AP I].
48. Common Article 3 is the only article in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 to provide rules
for "armed conflict[s] not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties." GC I-IV, supranote 46, art. 3.
49. Some experts have argued that the lack of substantive law for non-international armed
conflicts, or internal armed conflicts, reflects the intent for either domestic law or human rights law to
fill in the gaps. See, e.g., Gabor Rona, Obama Administration Must Define "Enemy Combatant"
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to those that are party, the second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
(AP II).50

Some have pointed to the

existence

of a third category-

internationalizednon-international armed conflicts, or conflicts between states and
non-state actors that feature additional states on one or both sides-and have
argued that, because these conflicts are not expressly contemplated by the
traditional laws of war, rules from both types of conflict should govern where
appropriate.51
With these categories in mind, the AUMF conflict presents challenges for
proper characterization. The United States was not and has never been in an
international armed conflict with al Qaeda, since al Qaeda is not a state and has no
government and is therefore incapable of fighting as a party to an inter-state
conflict. 52 It is arguable, however, that the United States was at least initially

engaged in an international armed conflict with the Taliban as the functional
government of Afghanistan, and with al Qaeda forces supporting the Taliban as a

Consistent With Traditional Laws of War, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (February 17, 2009),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/091020-LS-rona-obama-admin-define-combatant.pdf.
The U.S.
Government has asserted that only Common Article 3 applies directly as applicable treaty law to the
AUMF conflict, but has preferred to draw analogies from the law of international armed conflict to fill
gaps rather than apply human rights law or domestic law. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630-31.
50. The United States signed AP II and submitted it to the Senate for advice and consent in 1987
where it remains before Senate subcommittees. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977)
[hereinafter AP II]; see also Gasser, supra note 47, at 912; Roberts, supra note 47, at 110. Much like
with Protocol I, many have asserted that certain provisions in Protocol II have achieved the status of
custom. See, e.g., Gasser, supra note 47, at 912.
51. See, e.g., ROBERT K. GOLDMAN & BRIAN TITTEMORE, UNPRIVILEGED COMBATANTS AND THE
HOSTILITIES IN AFGHANISTAN: THEIR STATUS AND RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 24 n. 82 (2002), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/goldman.pdf In
the report he notes that such conflicts are:
Hybrid conflicts in that they are not governed entirely by either international or
internal armed conflict rules. Because the Geneva Conventions contain no
provisions applicable to these kinds of conflicts, the solution followed by most
international lawyers has been to break down the armed conflict into its
international and domestic components and, based on this differentiation, to
identify the humanitarian law rules governing relations between the various
warring parties.
See also Dietrich Schindler, InternationalHumanitarianLaw and InternationalizedInternal Armed
Conflicts, 22 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 255, 258-61 (1982).
52. But see Brief for Respondents at 48, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184),
2006 WL 460875 (arguing that "[a]s the President determined, because the conflict between the United
States and al Qaeda has taken place and is ongoing in several countries, the conflict is 'of an
international character'). However, the Hamdan Court disagreed with the government's position,
finding:
The Court of Appeals thought, and the Government asserts, that Common Article
3 does not apply to Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda, being
'international in scope,' does not qualify as a 'conflict not of an international
character.' ... That reasoning is erroneous.... In context, then, the phrase 'not
of an international character' bears its literal meaning.
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630-31.
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kind of militia.53 The Taliban maintained some form of governance over
Afghanistan, occupied the capital, conducted foreign relations, and proved to be
the most powerful military force in the country with its defeat of rival tribal
alliances. 4 However, because the Taliban was only recognized by a handful of
states as the rightful government of Afghanistan,55 did not occupy Afghanistan's
seat at the UN, and maintained only erratic control over large portions of its own
territory, the Taliban may not have met the basic requirements for recognition as
Afghanistan's government.56 Additionally, while most of the conflict with Taliban
forces occurred within the borders of Afghanistan, fighting and targeting, including
through drone strikes, of non-Taliban belligerents and terrorists took place
throughout the region.57 In any event, after Afghanistan ratified a new constitution
and elected a democratic government in January and October of 2004,
respectively, followed by the new government fighting alongside U.S. Forces and
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), the conflict would no longer
qualify as "international."
However, characterization of the conflict as non-international is also difficult.
Although there are no states fighting against states in the current conflict, the
drafters of the Geneva Conventions seemed to be thinking more of internal armed
conflicts when they provided the sparse terms for "armed conflicts not of an
international character" in Common Article 3 and not of global struggles with
transnational non-state actors.58 It seems at least debatable, then, that the AUMF
53. Even if al Qaeda forces acted as a Taliban militia, fought alongside them in defense of Afghan
territory, and considered themselves a part of the opposition force, it is doubtful that al Qaeda fighters
would have qualified for the protected status outlined in GC III, art. 4(A)(1) and (2). Al Qaeda fighters
were not a regular militia or volunteer corps forming "part of' Afghanistan's armed forces as
contemplated by art. 4(A)(1); similarly, al Qaeda did not satisfy three of the four listed criteria in art.
4(A)(2) required of "other militias" to earn protected combatant status: they did not wear a fixed sign,
they did not carry arms openly, and they did not conduct their activities in compliance with the law of
war.
54. See Greg Bruno, The Taliban in Afghanistan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS:
BACKGROUNDER (August 3, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/publication/10551/taliban in afghanistan.html;
see also Saeed Shah, Taliban Rivals Unite to Fight US Troop Surge, THE GUARDIAN (March 3, 2009),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/03/taliban-pakistan-afghanistan-us-surge.
55. On September 11, 2001, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
recognized the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan. Tony Karon, Time. com Primer: The Taliban
and Afghanistan, TIME.COM (Sept. 18, 2001), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/ 0,8599,175372,
00.html.
56. At a basic level, state practice suggests that a political entity must fulfill four criteria to
achieve international recognition as a country's government: (1) assume a permanent character, (2)
prove itself to be substantially in control of the country, (3) demonstrate the support of the majority of
the country, and (4) show the ability to abide by international agreements. See Convention on Rights
and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. Some have argued that the Taliban
met the first three of these criteria, but its abhorrent human rights record and failure to comply with
international agreements led all but three countries to refuse recognition of the Taliban as the
government of Afghanistan. See Karon, supranote 55.
57. See, e.g.,
Ismail Khan & Salman Masood, Drone Strikes Reported in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/07/world/asia/07drones.html.
58. See, e.g.,
Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum for
Alberto R. Gonzales Counsel to the President, Treaties and Laws Applicable to the Conflict in
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conflict may transcend the characterization of "non-international" and more
closely resemble an "international armed conflict," since the United States not only
fights in a number of countries but fights alongside both Afghan forces and a
coalition of UN-sanctioned ISAF forces. At least for purposes of filling gaps in
the law, analogizing the AUMF conflict to international armed conflicts might
provide a fuller and more comprehensive set of rules than by looking to the
customary rules supporting non-international armed conflicts or to some other less
relevant body of law. The Bush Administration consistently asserted that the
conflict with AUMF parties was international - particularly with regard to the
global fight against al Qaeda. 59 However, taking its position from the Supreme
Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,6 the Obama Administration now takes
the position that the conflict is non-international in nature. 61 For purposes of
determining the proper legal framework for targeting operations in the AUMF
conflict, the Court's determination that the fight with al Qaeda and associates is a
non-international armed conflict and the current Administration's adoption of that
characterization sufficiently answers this preliminary question.
C. Sources ofLaw
It follows, then, that the primary legal framework applicable to drone attacks
conducted in the current conflict is the lex specialis of armed conflict, and that the
status of this conflict is non-international. As a result, as noted above, Common
Article 3 and customary international law, including provisions from Additional
Protocols I and II, expressly apply as sources of law for this conflict. In addition,

Afghanistan and to the Treatment of Persons Captured by U.S. Armed Forces In that Conflict (Nov. 30,

2001), http://wwwjustice.gov/olc/docs/aclu-ii-113001.pdf (Yoo argues that while the rules of
international armed conflict do not apply to al Qaeda, Common Article 3 also does not cover the
conflict between a state Party and a non-state actor:
There is substantial reason to think that this language [common Article 3] refers
specifically to a condition of civil war, or a large-scale armed conflict between a
State and an armed movement within its territory.... Analysis of the background
to the adoption of the Geneva Conventions in 1949 confirms our understanding

of common Article 3. It appears that the drafters of the Conventions had in mind
only the two forms of armed conflict that were regarded as matters of general

internationalconcern at the time: armed conflict between Nation States (subject
to Article 2), and large-scale civil war within a Nation State (subject to Article 3).
• . . [C]ommon Article 3 should not be read to include all forms of noninternational armed conflict.).
59. See, e.g., Memorandum from George W. Bush, Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda

Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.pegc.us/archive/WhiteHouse/bush-memo_20020207

ed.pdf.

60. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630, 633 (2006). The Court did not take a position on

whether the conflict had always been non-international or whether that mattered, but it did expressly
reject the Executive's argument that the conflict was international. In finding that the conflict with the
Taliban and al Qaeda is non-international in character, the Hamdan Court correctly determined that
Common Article 3 governs. Id. at 630. Interestingly, though, the Court looked to Article 75 of
Protocol I to flesh out the terms of Common Article 3 instead of Articles 4-6 of Protocol II. Id at 633.
Protocol I expressly supplements the rules for international armed conflicts, while Protocol II
supplements the rules for non-international armed conflicts. See AP I, supranote 47; AP II, supra note
50.
61. See, e.g., Koh, supranote 1.
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the UN Charter provides basic jus ad bellum rules for the application and use of
force.62 So, too, do other treaties generally applicable to armed conflict apply to
targeting operations in a non-international armed conflict, including the 1980
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW), and the customary provisions within the 1998 Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court.63 In order to supplement the relatively sparse
terms of the law of non-international armed conflicts, the United States has also
chosen to use international armed conflict principles from the Hague and Geneva
Conventions by analogy.64 And, of course, whatever domestic rules Congress, the
President, or the Department of Defense prescribe for the current conflicts apply as
sources of law, subject to an expanding role for the courts in reviewing aspects of
the rules adopted by the Executive or Legislative branches (e.g., in Hamdan and
Boumediene).
The President may still choose to treat belligerents as criminals within a law
enforcement framework, including by apprehending suspects and prosecuting them
in federal courts for violations of federal criminal law, including the War Crimes
Act. But he is under no obligation to do so, and he may continue to use the law of
war framework for targeting operations for as long as hostilities endure between
the United States and the Taliban and al Qaeda, respectively.65
III.

DRONE STRIKES UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT'S FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES

The Obama Administration has been quick to note that targeting operations
against the AUMF foes not only meets the requirements of black letter law and
relevant custom, but is "conducted consistently with law of war principles," with
"great care.., taken to adhere to these principles in both planning and execution. '' 66
Traditionally, the fundamental principles of the jus in bello are composed of (a)
military necessity, (b) distinction, and (c) proportionality, with many now adding
to the list (d) the principle of humanity.

62. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; U.N. Charter art. 51, para. 1; see also Karma Nabulsi,
Jus ad BellumIJus in Bello in CRIMES OF WAR A-Z GUIDE (2nd ed. 2007), available at
http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/jus-ad-bellum.html.
63. See Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980,
1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 I.L.M. 1523, available at http://lawofwar.org/cxonventional
weapons
convention.htm [hereinafter CCW]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, 37 I.L.M. 1002 [hereinafter ICC].
64. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 603-04.
65. As recognized by GC III, art. 118, parties to a conflict may hold captured belligerents until the
cessation of hostilities. In addition, because the belligerents in the AUMF conflict are unprivileged,
they are susceptible to criminal punishment even if detained under the law of armed conflict (LOAC).
See Goldman & Tittemore, supra note 51, at 1, 4.
66. Koh, supra note 1.
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A. The Principleof MilitaryNecessity
Because it is military necessity that drives targeting operations, I begin the
67
analysis with this principle. Generally considered to reflect international custom,
Article 52 of Geneva Protocol I requires that armed attacks in wartime be "limited
strictly to military objectives" and offer "a definite military advantage. 68 The
U.S. Army adds in its field manual on the law of war that military necessity is
"[t]hat principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law
which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as
soon as possible., 69 Also of note, Article 23 of Hague IV forbids "destroy[ing] or
seiz[ing] the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war,, 70 and Article 8 of the Rome Statute defines
as a war crime attacks against civilian objects and "[d]estroying or seizing the
enemy's property unless
such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by
71
the necessities of war.
For purposes of this analysis, then, the general question of whether drone
strikes meet a military necessity is a relatively easy one. As noted above, a
number of U.S. Government officials have over the past few years confirmed that
drones are an invaluable tool against al Qaeda, Taliban, and associated terrorist
forces. 72 In some areas, they are, as the CIA director put it, "the only game in
town" because of their ability to find and identify targeted persons and reach into
territory that ground forces cannot enter, either for military or political reasons. In
one reported case, the United States targeted a senior Taliban official in the
impenetrable border region of Pakistan, while he was resting on the roof of a house
with his wife and hooked up to a drip for kidney problems .73 He was wanted for

his involvement in a number of suicide bombings and the assassination of
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The United States would surely assert
that in such a situation and others like them, the drone strike offers a "definite
military advantage," particularly in a war that is transnational in scope and with
enemies intent on hiding among civilians and within failed or semi-failed states
and territories. Likewise, the United States would likely argue that such attacks
67. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 14

(2005) [hereinafter FM 27-10]; see also Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the
Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 420 (1987).

68. AP I, supra note 47, art. 52(2).
69. F.M. 27-10, supranote 67, at 164.
70. Hague IV, supranote 45, art. 23(g).
71. ICC, supra note 63, art. 8. The ICC creates a distinction between international and noninternational armed conflicts, with more rules for the former.
72. See US, Airstrikes in Pakistan Called 'Very Effective,' supra note 15. CIA Director Leon

Panetta famously stated in May 2009 that drones were "the only game in town in terms of confronting
or trying to disrupt the al Qaeda leadership," asserting that they have been "very precise" and "very
limited in terms of collateral damage." Id.
73. Peter Finn & Joby Warrick, Under Panetta,A More Aggressive CIA, WASH. POST, Mar. 21,

2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/20/AR2010032
003343.html. See also Radio Interview by Michael Smerconish with President Obama (Aug. 20, 2009),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/radio-interview-president-michael-smerconish.
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against belligerents when and where they present themselves is "indispensable for
securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible. 74 All reports
indicate that drone attacks have become a central part of the U.S. arsenal in the
current conflicts and officials have consistently commented on the significant
military advantage they offer.75
However, evaluating whether conducting a lethal drone strike operation is a
military necessity, like evaluating the use of any weapon or weapon platform,
requires a case-by-case analysis. In each application, the commander or operator
must affirmatively answer that the particular attack in question offers a distinct
military advantage for the accomplishment of a military goal. Drone strikes are no
different than any other tool or application of force in this respect.
B. The Principleof Distinction
Of course, military necessity is weighed against the other three constraining
principles, including the principle of distinction. Considered to reflect a customary
defimition of distinction, Article 48 of AP I requires that parties to a conflict "at all
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, and between
civilian objects and military objectives. '76 Article 52 then defines those military
objectives as "those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make
an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite
military advantage., 77 Focusing on the non-combatants in close proximity to the
conflict, Article 51 of AP I requires parties to ensure that "[t]he civilian population
and individual civilians ...enjoy general protection against dangers arising from
military operations," and "not be the object of attack. 78 Article 51 also prohibits
and defines "indiscriminate attacks. 79
Ambiguously, and therefore more

74. F.M. 27-10, supranote 67, at 164.
75. See, e.g., U.S, Airstrikes in Pakistan Called 'Very Effective,' supranote 15.
76. AP I, supra note 47, art. 48.
77. Id. art. 52(2). Notably, where there is doubt as to whether a civilian object is being used to
"make an effective contribution to military action," article 52(3) stipulates that: it shall be presumed not
to be so used." Id. art. 52(2), (3). The U.S. Army Field Manual adds more detail at para. 40(c):
Military objectives include, for example, factories producing munitions and
military supplies, military camps, warehouses storing munitions and military
supplies, ports and railroads being used for the transportation of military supplies,
and other places that are for the accommodation of troops or the support of
military operations. Pursuant to the provisions of [Hague IV, art. 25], however,
cities, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which may be classified as military
objectives, but which are undefended (para. 39 b), are not permissible objects of
attack.
F.M. 27-10, supranote 67, para. 40(c).
78. AP I, supra note 47, arts. 51(1), (2). The provisions from Article 51 are considered to reflect
custom. F.M. 27-10, supranote 67, para. 25.
79. AP I, supra note 47, art. 51(4). According to Article 51(4):
Indiscriminate attacks are: (a) those which are not directed at a specific military
objective; (b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be
directed at a specific military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or
means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this
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controversially, Article 51(3) forbids the targeting of civilians "unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities. 80 Significantly for this analysis,
Article 13 of AP II, governing non-international armed conflicts, provides a
8
version of these provisions from AP I, albeit in pared-down form?.
Also of note,
the Rome Statute includes as war crimes a number of offenses against civilians and
civilian objects stemming from failures to adequately distinguish.
More specific to air strikes, Article 25 of the 1907 Hague IV Convention
prohibits aerial bombardment "by whatever means" of undefended towns, villages,
or dwellings.83 And, Article 26 requires a commander to do "all in his power" to

Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction." Id. In addition,
Article 51(5) lists "the following types of attacks" as examples of those that are
indiscriminate: "(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which
treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a
similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and (b) an attack which may
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Id. art. 51(5).
80. AP I, supra note 47, art. 51(3). Notably, AP II, article 13(3) contains the same provision. AP
II, supra note 50, art. 13(3). Sections III(B)(1) and IV(C) of this article address the controversy
surrounding this language in detail.
81. Art. 13 provides:
1) The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection
against the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this
protection, the following rules shall be observed in all circumstances. 2) The
civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object
of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread
terror among the civilian population are prohibited. 3) Civilians shall enjoy the
protection afforded by this part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part
in hostilities.
AP II, supranote 50, art. 13.
82. In Article 8(2)(b) the following represent "serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in international armed conflict," and constitute war crimes under the statute for international
armed conflicts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or
against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which
are not military objectives;
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated;
(v) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or
buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives.
ICC, supra note 63, arts. 8(2)(b), (e). Note that only (i) is repeated in Article 8(2)(e) as a war crime for
non-international armed conflicts. Id art. 8(2)(e).
83. Hague IV, supranote 45, art. 25.
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warn "authorities" before an aerial bombardment, "except in cases of assault. 84 In
addition, while never formally entered into force, the 1923 Hague Rules
Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare
provides a number of specific rules that may reflect custom for aerial warfare that
apply to all air targeting operations, including those conducted with drones.
Article 22 forbids "[a]ny air bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civil
population or destroying or damaging private property without military character
or injuring non-combatants. 86 Article 24(1) then provides that "[a]n air
bombardment is legitimate only when it is directed against a military objective, i.e.
an objective whereof the total or partial destruction would constitute an obvious
military advantage for the belligerent., 87 Moreover, Article 24(3) forbids aircraft
from conducting "undiscriminating bombardment. 88
Thus, it seems clear from convention and customary law that in order for a
drone strike to comply with the principle of distinction, the operator may target
only combatants or military objectives, and not civilians or civilian objects, unless
the civilian or object has forfeited his protected status by participating in the
hostilities. The difficulty with the AUMF conflict is that the line between
combatant and civilian, and military objective and civilian object, is often blurry
and undefined. Therefore, in order to determine whether U.S. drone strikes meet
the requirements of distinction we must establish (i) whether the strikes
sufficiently distinguish between civilian and military targets, taking into account
the loss of civilian protected status by direct participants, and (ii) whether the
attacks are conducted indiscriminately, or without regard to the effects on the
civilian population.
1. Do Drone Strikes Distinguish Between Civilian and Military Targets?
The difficulty with the AUMF conflict is that the enemy intentionally fails to
distinguish himself-indeed purposefully obfuscating his belligerent status by
posing as a civilian-and in many cases targets civilians and conducts operations
in civilian settings. Al Qaeda and its associates also routinely use protected
persons and objects as shields. 89 The United States is thus often forced to fight
AUMF parties in a civilian context. This situation requires the United States to do
all it can to ensure that it is targeting the right kind of individuals (belligerents),
and, if civilians are targeted, to ensure that such individuals have forfeited their
protected status by directly participating in hostilities.
84. Id. art 26.
85. Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare.
Drafted by a Commission of Jurists at the Hague, December 1922 - February 1923.
86. Id. art. 22.
87. Id. art. 24(1).
88. Id. art. 24(3).
89. See, e.g., Ron Synovitz, U.S. Says AJ-Qaeda UsedAfghan Children as Human Shields, RADIO
FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (June 18, 2007), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077179.html;
Afghanistan Midyear Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2010, UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN, (Aug. 2010), http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/LUNAMA/
0
Publication/August102010 MID-YEAR%20REPORT o202010_Protection o2ofo2oCivilians
o20in
o20Armed o20Conflict.pdf.
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As noted above, only combatants (or civilians who directly participate in
hostilities) 90 may be lawfully targeted in an armed conflict. 91 Lawful combatants
are those individuals who fight for a state's armed forces or militia, or belong to
one of the groups described in GC III, Article 4 and report to a responsible chain of
command, distinguish themselves, carry their arms openly, and conduct their
actions in compliance with the laws and customs of war.9 2 If an individual does
not meet these criteria, he is not a lawful combatant and is engaging in the conflict
without privilege; therefore, he is either an unlawful combatant (or unprivileged
belligerent) or a civilian who has forfeited his protected status.93 Members of al
Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associates do not meet the requirements of lawful
combatancy, 94 and therefore are unlawful combatants or unprotected civilians.
The question of when, or under what circumstances, a civilian loses his
protected status has long been debated and is of great import to the issue at hand.
In an attempt to flesh out the meaning of the phrase, "unless and for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities," 95 the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) conducted a five-year study and consultation with experts, resulting
in its issuing guidance for determining the proper interpretation. 96 According to
the ICRC report, a person must perform a "continuous combat function" in order to
be targetable as a combatant.97 The ICRC distinguishes the case of civilians

90. The concept of civilian participation in hostilities is addressed in the immediate paragraphs
below.
91. In a non-international armed conflict, some argue that the law of war does not recognize a
combatant status for any but the state actor's armed forces. Thus, it becomes even more important to
determine when civilians lose their protected status and become targetable.
92. GC III, supra note 46, art. 4. For a comprehensive and authoritative analysis on
privileged/unprivileged belligerency, see Richard R. Baxter, So Called Unprivileged Belligerency:
Spies, Guerrillasand Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 323-46 (1951); see also GOLDMAN &
TITTEMORE, supra note 51, at 2-4 (identifying the characteristics of lawful combatants/privileged
belligerents, and unlawful combatants/unprivileged belligerents).
93. But see Marco Sassoli, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the "War on Terrorism," 22
LAW & INEQ. 195, 209 (2004); Goldman & Tittemore, supra note 51, at 32 n.108. Some in the
international community have refuted the notion that there is a third category in the law of war, separate
from combatants and civilians. However, such critics note that even characterizing terrorists as
civilians does not lead to perverse results - so long as such individuals "take a direct part in hostilities"
and directly aid the efforts of the enemy, they forfeit their protected civilian status and become as
targetable as combatants.
94. Members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associates do not meet any of the requirements
from GC III, art. 4, i.e., they do not belong to a state party, do not constitute an accompanying militia,
and do not meet the four criteria (distinctive sign or uniform, carry arms openly, chain of command, and
compliance with the laws of war) to grant them the combatant's privilege. But see POWs or Unlawful
Combatants? CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, (Jan. 2002), http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/powintro.html (taking the position that the Taliban and possibly al Qaeda met the requirements for POW
status as of 2002).
95. AP I, supra note 47, art. 51(3); AP II, supranote 50, art. 13(3).
96. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 33-35 (2009), available

at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0990/$FileICRC
ICRC DPH Guidance].
97. Id. at 34. The ICRC continues:

002 0990.PDF
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engaged in a "continuous combat function," who make up the "organized fighting
forces" of a non-state actor, from "civilians who directly participate in hostilities
on a merely spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized basis, or who assume
exclusively political, administrative or other non-combat functions. 98 Civilians
who engage in such temporary or non-combat conduct, the ICRC argues, may only
be targeted for the time they are engaged in hostile conduct.99
Of course, many disagree with the ICRC's position on the meaning of direct
participation in hostilities. 100 The Obama Administration, for example, suggests
that individuals who are merely "part of.. an armed group are belligerents and,
therefore, lawful targets under international law."10 1 "Indeed," Koh asserts,

Continuous combat function requires lasting integration into an organized armed
group acting as the armed forces of a non-State party to an armed conflict. Thus,
individuals whose continuous function involves the preparation, execution, or
command of acts or operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities are
assuming a continuous combat function. An individual recruited, trained and
equipped by such a group to continuously and directly participate in hostilities on
its behalf can be considered to assume a continuous combat function even before
he or she first carries out a hostile act.
Id.
98. Id. at 33-34. More specifically, the ICRC continues, those designated as engaged in
"continuous combat function" must be distinguished from:
Persons comparable to reservists who, after a period of basic training or active
membership, leave the armed group and reintegrate into civilian life. Such
,reservists' are civilians until and for such time as they are called back to active
duty. Individuals who continuously accompany or support an organized armed
group, but whose function does not involve direct participation in hostilities, are
not members of that group within the meaning of IHL. Instead, they remain
civilians assuming support functions, similar to private contractors and civilian
employees accompanying State armed forces. Thus, recruiters, trainers,
financiers and propagandists may continuously contribute to the general war
effort of a non-State party, but they are not members of an organized armed
group belonging to that party unless their function additionally includes activities
amounting to direct participation in hostilities. The same applies to individuals
whose function is limited to the purchasing, smuggling, manufacturing and
maintaining of weapons and other equipment outside specific military operations
or to the collection of intelligence other than of a tactical nature. Although such
persons may accompany organized armed groups and provide substantial support
to a party to the conflict, they do not assume continuous combat function and, for
the purposes of the principle of distinction, cannot be regarded as members of an
organized armed group. As civilians, they benefit from protection against direct
attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities, even
though their activities or location may increase their exposure to incidental death
or injury.
Id. at 34-35.
99. Id. at 70 (conceding that civilians may be targeted if they are on their way or returning from
hostilities, but insisting that the "'revolving door' of civilian protection is an integral part, not a
malfunction, of IHL").
100. See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Direct Participationin Hostilities: Perspectives on the ICRC
Interpretive Guidance: Part IX of the ICRC "DirectParticipationIn Hostilities" Study: No Mandate,
No Expertise, andLegally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 769 (2010).
101. Koh, supra note 1.
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"targeting particular individuals serves to narrow the focus when force is employed
and to avoid broader harm to civilians and civilian objects. ' 102 Yoram Dinstein
similarly argues:
[A] person is not allowed to wear simultaneously two caps: the hat of a
civilian and the helmet of a soldier. A person who engages in military
raids by night, while purporting to be an innocent civilian by day, is
neither a civilian nor a lawful combatant. He is an unlawful combatant.
He is a combatant in the sense that he can be lawfully targeted by the
enemy, but he cannot claim the privileges appertaining 1to
lawful
03
combatancy. Nor does he enjoy the benefits of civilian status.
The ICRC's position that participants who only "sporadically" involve
themselves in hostilities or who are not engaged in combat-type functions (and
therefore not part of an organized fighting force) may not be targeted seems to
misunderstand grossly the nature of the AUMF conflict. As a transnational nonstate terrorist organization, al Qaeda's sole purpose is to achieve ideological
objectives through violent means. Presumably, every member of al Qaeda and its
affiliates supports that unlawful mission - from the propagandists to the financiers,
and from the religious leaders to the front-line fighters. In fact, al Qaeda members
are often ordered to remove themselves from the fight for a time in order to re1 4
group, train, switch theaters, join "sleeper cells," and a variety of other reasons. 0
In each scenario, the member is still very much engaged in hostilities (or
performing a "continuous combat function") against the United States by actively
following orders and participating according to his assigned duties. But under the
ICRC's definition, such individuals would likely not be covered under the
designation. Thus, to allow a state to target a terrorist only for such time as he is
engaged in an actual hostile act is to give the terrorist the best of both worlds - the
protections of a civilian and the rights of a combatant. Presumably, it is for this
reason that the U.S. government takes a broader view of which individuals fall
under the category of belligerents or unprotected civilians who are targetable under
the law of war.
So, too, is there debate on when, or under what circumstances, a civilian
object gives up its protected status. The argument turns upon the "nature, location,
purpose, or use" of the object. 10 5 If a civilian object is employed in such a way that
its nature, location, purpose, or use meets the criteria for a military objective as
defined in Article 52 of AP I, that object loses its protected status and may be
targeted. 106
Of course, military objectives must also make an "effective

102. Id.
103. YORAM DINSTEN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL

29 (2004).
104. Eric Schmitt & Jane Perlez, Strikes Worsen Qaeda Threat, Pakistan Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
25, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/world/asia/25drones.html.
105. AP I, supranote 47, art 52(2).
106. Dinstein, supranote 103, at 88. Dinstein offers a definition for each of these terms:
Nature denotes the intrinsic character of the military objective. . . . [T]he
'purpose' of a military objective is determined either by its (inherent) nature or
ARMED CONFLICT
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contribution to military action" and "offer[] a definite military advantage."1 0 7 In
the AUMF conflict, this analysis comes up frequently; drones often strike civilian
houses, businesses, and vehicles, which by their nature, location, purpose, or use
have become militarized. Consider the examples described in the hypothetical
scenarios above, where AUMF foes gather in civilian settings, such as homes and
boarding houses. There is no doubt that a person's residence is civilian in status,
but when the home is used to house belligerents, store weapons, plan or conduct
attacks, regroup for future hostilities, train, or any number of other activities that
make an effective contribution to the war effort, that home's nature, location,
purpose, or use arguably changes in such a way that it forfeits its protected civilian
status and becomes a military objective. Again, there is still much debate on this
point, and some may apply similar rules for civilian objects as the ICRC applies to
civilians directly participating in hostilities.
Therefore, the answer to the question of whether U.S. drone strikes properly
distinguish between civilian and combatant, and between civilian object and
military objective depends upon the interpretation of when a civilian or civilian
object loses its protected status and becomes lawfully targetable. While a good
number of U.S. operations in the AUMF conflict occur in traditional skirmishes
with enemy forces, the United States typically uses drones to target individuals
outside the traditional battlefield, in civilian areas where they may or may not be
engaged in hostile activities at the time they are struck. As described in open
press, drones have targeted individuals in a number of civilian settings, including
homes and urban centers. 108 It seems that if the ICRC's interpretation of direct
participation in hostilities is used, then many of the United States' drone strikes
may not properly distinguish between combatant and civilian-particularly those
attacks against "civilians" (e.g., members of al Qaeda, Taliban, and associated
forces who perform only political, religious, or other "non-combat" functions for
the group) located in their homes. However, if one concludes that membership in
an inherently violent non-state armed group within a recognized armed conflict
severs an individual's civilian protected status, then drone strikes that target such
individuals likely meet the requirement to distinguish.
2. Are Drone Strikes Conducted Indiscriminately?
Even if drone strikes properly distinguish between combatant and civilian, the
United States must still ensure that it conducts strike operations discriminately to
meet the requirements of distinction. An indiscriminate attack can be described as
"one in which the attacker does not take measures to avoid hitting non-military
objectives, that is, civilians and civilian objects," including by "using means and
methods that... cannot be directed at specific military objectives or whose effects
by its (defacto) use.... Actual 'use' of an objective does not depend necessarily
on its original nature or on any (later) intended purpose.

Id.at 88-90.
107. AP I, supranote 47, art 52(2).
108. Joby Warrick & Peter Finn, Amid Outrage Over Civilian Deaths in Pakistan, CIA Turns to
Smaller Missiles, WASH. POST, April 26, 2010, at A8, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/04/25/AR2010042503114.html.
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cannot be limited." 10 9 In other words, indiscriminate attacks are those that by their
nature are so imprecise or ill-defimed that collateral effects are assured. Customary
law, reflected in Article 57(1) and (4) of AP 1,110 requires parties to an armed
conflict to exercise "constant care" and to "take all reasonable precautions" to
spare the civilian population and avoid damage to civilian objects. 1 Article 57(3)
further requires that when given the option, parties select the military objective
'1 12
most likely to "cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects."
With their ability to surveil for hours or days at a time, and to perform
surgical strikes with pinpoint accuracy, drones typically offer a cleaner alternative
to other forms of aerial bombardment or missile strikes. 13 P.W. Singer writes that
"[u]nmanned systems seem to offer several ways of reducing the mistakes and
unintended costs of war," including by using "far better sensors and processing
power.. .allow[ing] decisions to be made in a more deliberate manner," and
"remov[ing] the anger and emotion from the humans behind them." 114 "Such
exactness," Singer argues, "can lessen the number of mistakes made, as well as the
number of civilians inadvertently killed."1' 15 Senior U.S. officials have consistently
stated that "procedures and practices for identifying lawful targets" in the AUMF
conflict "are extremely robust, and advanced technologies have helped to make our
targeting even more precise."'1 16 Indeed, U.S. officials would certainly argue that

109. RoY GUTMAN & DAouD KUTTAB, IndiscriminateAttacks, in CRIMES OF WAR 2.0, 239, 23940 (2007).
110. See AP I, supranote 47, art. 57(1), (4).
111. Id. More specifically, Article 57(2) provides:
With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: (a) those who
plan or decide upon an attack shall: (i) do everything feasible to verify that the
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not
subject to special protection but are military objectives within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this
Protocol to attack them; (ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means
and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing,
incidental loss or civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated; (b) an attack shall be cancelled or
suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is
subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated; (c) effective advance warning shall be
given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances
do not permit.
Id.at art. 57(2).
112. Id. at art. 57(3).
113. See Singer, supranote 14, at 397-98.
114. Military Robots and the Laws of War, supranote 16.
115. Id.
116. Koh, supra note 1. Koh continues: "In my experience, the principles of distinction and
proportionality that the United States applies are not just recited at meetings. They are implemented
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an advantage of using drones for targeting operations is that it actually promotes
the humanitarian objective of sparing civilians by conducting more precise attacks
on belligerents. 11 7 Still, because of the location of the strikes-typically in civilian
settings-there are almost always civilian casualties.1 1 8 Although one could argue
that drones offer a more discriminating alternative to aerial bombing or traditional
ground applications of force (tanks, long-range guns and missiles, etc.), it is
incumbent upon a drone operator and commander to exercise judgment in
determining when to conduct an attack where there are co-located civilians or
where the targets themselves are difficult to identify.
Thus, insofar as drone strikes target military objectives, combatants, or
unprivileged civilians (i.e., those who are directly participating in hostilities at the
time of the attack), and as long as such attacks are conducted with constant care,
reasonable precaution, and proper consideration of the likely collateral effects,
drones offer a more precise and adaptable means for bombardment than traditional
weapons and meet the requirement of discrimination. There may still be concern
that because of this precision and effectiveness, the decision to use force becomes
easier and more frequent. And there may also be concern with drone strikes'
dependency on reliable intelligence for acquisition of targets. However, neither
concern is unique to the employment of drones in warfare, and both are the kinds
of questions that merit consideration before any application of force, including
with drones.
C. The Principle ofProportionality
Much like the discussion on indiscriminate attacks, the principle of
proportionality considers the effects of an attack on civilian objects and civilians in
relation to the achievement of a military goal. Reflecting this principle, Article
51(5) of AP I prohibits "attack[s] which may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated."'1 9 Similarly, Article 57 requires military planners and
decision-makers to "[r]efrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be
expected to cause incidental... [but] excessive [losses]... in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated. 1 20 The U.S. Army Field Manual on
counterinsurgency, which is not a restatement of law of war requirements but does
reflect law of war-influenced U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) policy, adds to this
definition two positive commitments for combatants: (1) to "[p]reserve
noncombatant lives by limiting the damage
they do," and (2) to "[a]ssume
' 12 1
additional risk to minimize potential harm."
rigorously throughout the planning and execution of lethal operations to ensure that such operations are
conducted in accordance with all applicable law."

Id.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Finn, supranote 73.
119. AP I, supra note 47, art. 51(5)(b) (emphasis added).
120. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii) (emphasis added).
121. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY,

FIELD MANUAL 3-24:

COUNTERINSURGENCY

7-30 (2006)
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Notably, the Rome Statute includes proportionality-related war crimes within
the ICC's jurisdiction - in Article 8(2)(a)(iv) for "[e]xtensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly," 122 and in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) for "[i]ntentionally
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of
life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects... which would be clearly
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage
anticipated., 123 In other words, attacks that result in civilian casualties do not by
themselves constitute war crimes; but reckless attacks that result in civilian deaths
or destruction, or attacks that knowingly take civilian lives clearly in excess of
what is necessary for accomplishing the military objective could violate the
principle of proportionality and constitute war crimes.
Importantly for the AUMF and Afghanistan conflicts, although not
necessarily reflecting a legal requirement, the Field Manual on counterinsurgency
adds:
In conventional operations, proportionality is usually calculated in
simple utilitarian terms: civilian lives and property lost versus enemy
destroyed and military advantage gained. But in COIN operations,
advantage is best calculated not in terms of how many insurgents are
killed or detained, but rather which enemies are killed or detained. If
certain key insurgent leaders are essential to the insurgents' ability to
conduct operations, then military leaders need to consider their relative
importance when determining how best to pursue them. In COIN
environments, the number of civilian lives lost and property destroyed
needs to be measured against how much harm the targeted insurgent
could do if allowed to escape. If the target in question is relatively
inconsequential, then proportionality requires combatants to forego
severe action, or seek noncombative means of engagement. 124
In its current conflicts, the U.S. military has often determined that
proportionality concerns with co-located civilians prevented it from striking certain
military objectives. 125 However, in the recently reported targeting of Hussein alYemeni, 126 like the reported strike on Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah
Mehsud, 127 and in addition to many other similar attacks against senior terrorist
[hereinafter FM 3-24].

122. ICC, supranote 63, art. 8(2)(a)(iv) (emphasis added).
123. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iv) (emphasis added).
124. FM 3-24, supranote 121 (emphasis added).
125. See, e.g., Koh, supranote 1; Secrecy of U.S. Drone Strikes in PakistanCriticized, DAWN.COM
(Jan. 30, 2010, 11:08 AM), http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/
news/pakistan/04-drone-secrecy-criticised-qs-02.
126. David E. Sanger, Drone Strike Said to Kill a Leader ofAl Qaeda,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2010,
at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/18/world/asia/18terror.html.
Al-Yemeni was
reportedly a senior al Qaeda leader located in Waziristan and wanted for his involvement in the killings
of several CIA operatives in December 2009.
127. Pir Zubair Shah, Sabrina Tavernise & Mark Mazzetti, Taliban Leader in Pakistan Is
Reportedly Killed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.conV
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leaders in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere, 128 the United States has also
demonstrated at times a determination that the risks to co-located civilians were
justifiable since the targets were of sufficiently high rank and capable of
substantial future harm. Indeed, as U.S. officials have noted, targeting particular
individuals with advanced technologies often
serves the purpose of avoiding
129
broader harm to civilians and civilian objects.
However, there is great disagreement on this point. Critics of drone targeting
allege that the number and frequency of civilian deaths are immensely
disproportionate to the military advantage they provide.130 Using public news
reports as sources, some estimates put civilian losses at approximately one out of
every three fatalities caused by drone attack. 3 A recent survey of Pakistanis
revealed that they thought almost all the casualties from drone strikes were
133
civilian.132 Still others, including the Long War Journal
and intelligence
134
officials,
place the number much lower. Some also assert that the military
advantage of many of the drone attacks is minimal to nil, because either the
importance of the target is often overstated or, more importantly, because the
civilian losses generate increased hostility among the civilian population, thereby
fueling and prolonging the hostilities.135

2009/08/08/world/asia/08pstan.html.
128. The Long War Journal reports that 1,438 al Qaeda, Taliban, and affiliate leaders and
operatives have been killed by drones since 2006. Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer, Chartingthe Data
for US Airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 2010, THE LONG WAR JOURNAL (Sept. 21, 2010, 8:22 PM),
http://www.longwarjoumal.org/pakistan-strikes.php.
129. Koh, supra note 1.
130. Secrecy of US. Drone Strikes in Pakistan Criticized, supranote 125; Rise of Drones II, supra
note 40, at 5-6.
131. NSJ Analysis: Turning Off Autopilot: Towards a Sustainable Drone Policy, HARVARD
NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL (Mar. 6, 2010), http://www.harvardnsj.con2010/03/nsj-analysisturing-off-autopilot-towards-a-sustainable-drone-policy/ (citing an analysis of the U.S. policy of UAV
drones strikes against al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives in Pakistan by Peter Bergen and Katherine
Tiedemann).
132. Secrecy of U.S. Drone Strikes in PakistanCriticized, supranote 125.
133. Roggio & Mayer, supra note 128 (referencing data that indicates 6.7% of airstrike fatalities
since 2006 have been civilian).
134. Finn & Warrick, supranote 73.
135. See, e.g., Rise of Drones II, supra note 40, at 5-6. O'Connell concluded her testimony by
arguing that:
The use of military force in counter-terrorism operations has been counterproductive. Military force is a blunt instrument. Inevitably unintended victims
are the result of almost any military action. Drone attacks in Pakistan have
resulted in large numbers of deaths and are generally seen as fueling terrorism,
not abating it. In Congressional testimony in March 2009, counter-terrorism
expert, David Kilcullen, said drones in Pakistan are giving 'rise to a feeling of
anger that coalesces the population around the extremists and leads to spikes of
extremism well outside the parts of the country where we are mounting those
attacks.' Another expert told the New York Times, 'The more the drone
campaign works, the more it fails-as increased attacks only make the Pakistanis
angrier at the collateral damage and sustained violation of their sovereignty.'
Id. at 6.
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Determining whether drone strikes meet the requirements of proportionality
will always be a case-by-case analysis. Higher numbers of civilian casualties may
meet the proportionality test, for example, if the target is a very senior leader of the
enemy whose elimination may more likely lead to a quicker cessation of hostilities
and fewer military and non-military deaths. On the other hand, striking low-level
fighters or supporters in public places, where collateral damage is virtually
assured, may not meet the test. Thus, the number of civilians killed, or of terrorists
killed, is only the first part of the analysis-whether the target was of sufficient
value and whether the strike offered a real military advantage and was conducted
with all due caution and concern for civilians establishes the operation's
proportionality. Again, this test is not unique to drone attacks, but because drones
are used primarily and frequently in civilian contexts, the proportionality analysis
merits greater examination.
It bears noting, before moving on, that the fact that drones represent a vastly
superior tool for the application of force when compared to the enemy's
technological capabilities does not make the use of drones inherently
disproportionate. For one, the enemy's "inferior" weapons (e.g., small arms and
improvised explosive devices) have proven to be abundantly lethal. But more
importantly, the law of war does not require parties to fight with equal strength or
ability-only with equal respect for and compliance with the rules. Just as one
army's superior discipline and training does not constitute a disproportionate
advantage over an opponent's poorly-trained and undisciplined forces, use of
superior technology does not by itself violate the principles of the law of war.
Thus, remotely firing Hellfire missiles from thousands of feet in the air on
belligerents engaged in lethal operations using rudimentary explosives does not by
itself violate the principle of proportionality.
D. The Principleof Humanity
The final principle in this analysis is that of humanity. Article 22 of Hague
IV reflects the purpose of the humanity principle, affirming that "[t]he right of
belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."1 36 Likewise,
Article 23 prohibits parties from "employ[ing] arms, projectiles, or material
calculated to cause unnecessarysuffering."1 37 These same provisions are repeated
in Article 35 of AP j,138 in paragraphs 33 and 34 of the U.S. Army Field Manual on
the law of war,1 39 and in the preamble to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed
to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW).1 40 The
principle of humanity may be understood as the capstone of the other constraining
principles, requiring parties to a conflict to exercise restraint when an act would

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Hague IV, supranote 45, art. 22 (emphasis added).
Id. art. 23 (emphasis added).
AP I, supra note 47, art. 35.
FM 27-10, supranote 67, at 33-34.
CCW, supranote 63.
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cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, even if it meets the
requirements of necessity, distinction, and proportionality.
To be sure, not many would assert that the application of drones as a military
tool inherently violates the principle of humanity. There is no evidence that drone
strikes themselves cause any more injury or suffering than traditional forms of
bombardment. But because of the setting in which drones are most often
employed, and because of the difficulty in ensuring that the right individuals are
being targeted, drone warfare invites more scrutiny than other forms of force. A
growing chorus of critics is claiming (perhaps a little ironically, due to their
criticism of the United States' detention policy and practices) that drone strikes are
taking the place of the more humanitarian option with regard to engaging
belligerents - capture and detention. 141 Of course, no official policy exists that
instructs operators to kill rather than detain, but critics have pointed to the fact that
since the Obama Administration came into office in 2009, hundreds of drone
strikes have been
launched against high-level terrorists with no high-level captures
142
and detentions.
Compounding this challenge is the inability of, or extreme difficulty for,
143
drones to accept surrender or call back strikes at late stages of deployment.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical operation where, as a drone heads for its
position, but before its missile hits its mark, the target looks to the skies and
unambiguously demonstrates his intent to surrender, thus rendering himself hors
de combat. On the one hand, one might argue that when conducting an aerial
bombing on a lawful target from a traditional manned aircraft, the target does not
have a right to surrender once the bombs are dropped. However, the technological
ability of drones to survey the ground before and during a strike, and abort a strike
at the latest of stages, may complicate the hypothetical. It is possible that the law
of armed conflict may require a drone to accept surrender until it is no longer
capable of doing so. The implications of such an interpretation, of course, are
considerable. After all, how is a drone flying deep into hostile territory, and
without nearby ground support (presumably the reason for the drone's use in the
first place), to accept surrender and remove the person or persons from the
battlefield? And even if this were possible, how is a drone to inform the now hors
de combat target that he is to stay in place until picked up and detained by

141. See, e.g., Asim Qureshi, The 'Obama doctrine': kill, don't detain, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 11,
2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/apr/ 1/obama-national-securitydrone-guantanamo; Karen DeYoung & Joby Warrick, Under Obama, More Targeted Killings Than
Captures in Counterterrorism Efforts, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2010, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/13/AR2010021303748.html?nav =
emailpage.
142. See, e.g., DeYoung & Warrick, supra note 141; Richard Murphy & John Radsan, Due Process
and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 405, 406-14 (2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1349357.
143. The scenario of surrendering to a drone has occurred at least once. P.W. Singer writes:
"In one case, a group of Iraqi soldiers saw a Pioneer flying overhead and, rather than wait to be blown
up, waved white bed sheets and undershirts at the drone - the first time in history that human soldiers
surrendered to an unmanned system." Military Robots and the Laws of War, supra note 16.
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opposing forces? The prospect of surrendering to a drone is fraught with such
practical challenges.
However, in the vast majority of cases, strikes are conducted by surprise and
without forewarning. This fact begs another question: is the United States required
to warn civilian populations about intended drone strikes in advance of the attack?
And if so, what does that warning need to look like? Article 26 of Hague IV
requires a commander to do "all in his power" to warn "authorities" before a
bombardment, "except in cases of assault."' 144 It is not clear under this definition
who is required to receive that notification, although it is widely believed that the
United States receives some level of consent or permission from Afghan, Iraqi,
Pakistani, and Yemeni "authorities" when it conducts strikes in their respective
territories. Recently, a collection of experts gathered at Harvard University to
develop rules for aerial and missile warfare. 145 Of note, Rule 37 from the group's
manual states:
When the attack of a lawful target by air or missile combat operations
may result in death or injury to civilians, effective advance warnings
must be issued to the civilian population, unless circumstances do not
permit. This may be done, for instance, through dropping leaflets or
broadcasting the warnings. Such warnings ought to be as specific as
circumstances permit. 146

It is clear that the law of war contemplates some kind of warning before
attacks on civilian locations. However, it is also clear that there are exceptions to
the requirement to forewarn under certain situations. In the AUMF conflict, where
individuals stage attacks and conduct hostile operations from homes and public
places, the United States often depends upon the ability to strike targets when they
find them-and to do so quickly and by surprise. Presumably, an attack against a
lawful target that depends on the element of surprise for its achievement of the
military objective, if conducted as precisely as possible and with proper
consideration of the potential collateral effects, would be such an exception and fit
within the principle of humanity.
IV.

LEGAL BOUNDARIES AND LIMITATIONS FOR DRONE WARFARE

By examining the law of armed conflict's fundamental principles in relation
to drone strikes, it is evident that there is plenty of law governing drone warfarefrom the Hague and Geneva Conventions and their protocols, to specialized
treaties on specific weapons, to custom and usage, and to domestic laws, rules, and
regulations. Thus far, most of the analysis in this article has been dedicated to the
targets and victims of drone strikes. This section therefore identifies and analyzes

144. Hague IV, supranote 45, art. 26.
145. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICE AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
Forewordto MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2009),
available at http://ihlresearch.org/amw/HPCR Manual.pdf [hereinafter HPCR].
146. Id. at 18. The Manual adds at Rule 39, "the obligation to take feasible precautions in attack
applies equally to UAV/UCAV operations." Id
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some of the most prominent actor-focused issues, assessing what, if any, legal
boundaries exist and some of the implications of those limitations.
A. Location of the Strike
From the hypothetical scenarios outlined in the introduction, it is clear that
location matters when it comes to military operations. When a drone strike occurs
within a recognized and accepted theater of active armed conflict, such as
Afghanistan or Iraq, there is virtually no question that the attack is covered by the
lex specialis of the law of armed conflict by virtue of geography. However, when
such an attack occurs in areas outside the traditional, geographically limited "hot"
battlefield, reasonable people disagree on whether the operation is or should be
covered by the law of armed conflict.
The most obvious current issue in this respect is the question of whether or
not the border areas of sovereign, independent Pakistan should be considered part
of the "Afghanistan theater" of conflict. This issue prompts a few questions: First,
is Pakistan part of either the Afghan conflict or the broader AUMF conflict, such
that its territory is part of a "theater of conflict"? Second, is consent from
Pakistani authorities required to conduct strikes within Pakistani territory? And
third, even without consent, does Pakistan's inability or unwillingness to take on
terrorists within their territory justify the United States from acting itself regardless
of consent? On the first question, some argue that Pakistan is not part of the
Afghan theater of war, and consequently, any drone strikes conducted in Pakistan
violate the law of armed conflict. 147 However, while there is wide disagreement on
whether Pakistan is de jure part of the Afghan theater, there is no question that at
least its border regions are de facto part of the same conflict. Actors regularly
stage attacks from the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan,
conduct operations into Afghanistan, only to retreat back into the FATA. 148 The
non-state participants to the conflict, therefore, do not recognize a territoriallylimited war. Moreover, there is no question that Pakistan's territory falls within
the greater AUMF theater of conflict. 149 U.S. officials have argued that the fight
with AUMF enemies is global, not confined to the territory of one country.150 In
fact, most of the leadership and many of the fighters for the AUMF parties are
located outside of Afghanistan and within Pakistan's borders.1 5 1 Thus, while the
United States may not assert an unconditional right to attack targets throughout
Pakistan at will, if Pakistan's territory is being used to continue the war against the
147. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of
Pakistan 2004-2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE INCONTEXT (Simon
Bronitt ed., forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1501144.
148. The Truth about Talibanistan, TIME.COM (Mar. 22, 2007), http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,1601850,00.html.
149. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL
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(2006),

available at www.fas.org/

irp/nsa/doj0 11906.pdf [hereinafter NSA Report].

150. See, e.g., it. at 5.
151. Joby Warrick, U.S. Cites Big Gains AgainstAl-Qaeda, WASH. POST, May 30, 2008, available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.conm/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/29/AR2008052904116-2.html?
sid=ST2008053100213.
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United States and its allies, and if Pakistan is unwilling or unable to contain the
threat, then strikes on targets in Pakistan do not violate Pakistan's right to
territorial inviolability. The argument that a conflict with a non-state actor must be
confined to a geographical boundary may seem appealing to some, but it is not
supported by law or custom and it becomes dangerously illogical when applied to
conflicts that by their nature cross borders and by definition are not between or
among territorially limited states.
That being said, and as noted above, deciding "whether a particular individual
will be targeted in a particular location will depend upon considerations specific to
each case, including those related to... the sovereignty of the other states involved,
and the willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat the target
poses. 152 Thus, in response to the remaining two questions, obtaining a state's
consent to use force within its territory may be required under the UN Charter,153
but if a state is unable or unwilling to suppress a threat against the security of a
second or third state (in this case, Afghanistan or the United States), that second or
third state may exercise its Charter right to self defense. 15 4 According to public
reports, U.S. officials have regularly consulted Pakistani authorities when drones
have been employed for strike operations in Pakistan. 155 However, as Pakistan
maintains only limited control over large swaths of its territory - and terrorists
have used that ungoverned space to their advantage - both candidate 156 and
President Obama 157 has made clear that the United States will act if and when
Pakistan cannot.

152. Koh, supra note 1.
153. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/
charter/chapterl.shtml [hereinafter UN Charter]. Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations
provides that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Id.; see also, Hague Convention V Respecting
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2310, 205 Consol. T.S. 299 [hereinafter Hague V].
154. See UN Charter, supra note 153, art. 51. See also Koh, supra note 1; U.S. Navy, The
Commander's Handbookon the Law of Naval Operations,NWP 1-14M, 7.3 (2007)
A neutral nation has the duty to prevent the use of its territory as a place of
sanctuary or a base of operations by belligerent forces of any side. If the neutral
nation is unable or unwilling to enforce effectively its right of inviolability, an
aggrieved belligerent may take such acts as are necessary in the neutral territory
to counter the activities of enemy forces, including warships and military aircraft,
making unlawful use of that territory.
155. See, e.g., Amanda Hodge, Pakistan Allowing CIA to Use Airbase For Drone Strikes, THE
AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 19, 2009, available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/pakistan-permits-ciabase-for-strikes/story-e6frg6t6-1 111118893683.
156. See e.g., Steve Holland, Tough Talk on Pakistanfrom Obama, REUTERS, Aug. 1, 2007,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0132206420070801.
157. See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, Candace Rondeaux & Joby Warrick, 2 U.S. Airstrikes Offer a
Concrete Sign of Obama's Pakistan Policy, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2009, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/23/AR2009012304189.html;
James
Joyner, Obama Orders Pakistan Drone Strikes, NEW ATLANTICIST, Jan. 24, 2009, available at
http://www.acus.org/new atlanticist/obama-orders-pakistan-drone-attacks.
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While the AUMF conflict is fought primarily in Afghanistan with the consent
of the Afghan government, and in Pakistan in consultation with the Pakistani
government, the AUMF contemplates a transnational, borderless war with al
Qaeda and associated forces. As al Qaeda maintains a strong presence in a number
of countries, most notably Yemen and Somalia, and uses such states to train for,
plan, and stage attacks against the United States and its allies, the United States has
reportedly conducted limited kinetic operations in such countries. 158 Somalia and
Yemen present an even more compelling case of "unwilling or unable" than
Pakistan, as both states show little semblance of governance or law and order. 159
Accordingly, the United States would likely assert the right of self-defense as the
legal rationale for drone strikes against al Qaeda and their associates in these and
potentially other failed or failing states. More challenging is whether the United
States would opt for attacking high-level targets in neutral states that do have the
capacity and/or willingness to act, such as Kenya, the Philippines, or Saudi Arabia.
Given the likely diplomatic repercussions, it is doubtful that U.S. officials would
opt for a drone strike in such countries without consent at the highest levels of their
governments. And if consent were given and U.S. personnel pulled the trigger on
a targeting operation against AUMF foes, the strike would arguably be covered
under AUMF authority and fall within the law of armed conflict. It bears noting
that to the extent that belligerents are present in the "global commons," such as
international waters, they are targetable there.1 60 However, strike operations
conducted in or from neutral waters or61airspace fall under the same rules for strike
1
operations in or from neutral territory.
Thus, location matters, but it is not overly prohibitive. The United States has
consistently made the case that the war with al Qaeda and its terrorist associates is
of global reach. 162 The epicenter is in Afghanistan (and to a lesser extent Iraq), but
al Qaeda, as a transnational non-state actor, operates in and wages war from states
across the world. Particularly hot are the conflicts in Pakistan, Somalia, and
Yemen, although al Qaeda's presence in other countries, including in Europe, has

158. See Rise of Drones II, supra note 40 (O'Connell describes a situation in November, 2002,
where the U.S. used a drone outside a combat area "to fire laser-guided Hellfire missiles at a passenger

vehicle traveling in a thinly populated region of Yemen." The drone was operated by CIA agents based
in Djibouti).

159. See, e.g., U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Secretary-General 8, U.N. Doc. S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010);
Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Yemen on the Brink: Implications for U.S. Policy (Feb. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/136499.htm.
160. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 19, 301, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S
397. Neutral zones, including the high seas and the air above the high seas, are reserved for "peaceful
purposes," precluding their use to conduct lethal strike operations. Id. art. 88. However, in times of
war, the law of armed conflict allows for the sea to be used for self-defense or other UN Charterauthorized uses of force. See George K. Walker, Self-Defense, the Law of Armed Conflict and Port
Security, 5 S.C.J. INT'L L. & BUS. 347 (2009).
161. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA §1

(Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/560-06?Open
Document.
162. NSA Report, supra note 149.
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led to a number of deadly attacks.163 While the United States has not and will not
respond to every terrorist threat posed by AUMF parties with military force, it has
asserted the right to do so - with the consent or cooperation of the home
government, or, if the home government is unwilling or unable to respond, without
it.164

B. Location of the Operator
One of the most common critiques of drone warfare relates to the location of
the operator. When it became apparent that most of the Predator strikes on al
Qaeda targets were controlled far from the battlefield, in Nevada or at Langley or
any other number of locations outside the traditional battlefield and out of harm's
way, concerns with operators becoming detached and indifferent to the human
costs began to emerge. While drones eliminate many of the issues associated with
human emotion and frailty, leading to increased effectiveness and precision, some
fear that advanced technologies may "make some soldiers too calm, too unaffected
by killing." 165 Army chaplain D. Keith Shurtleff comments that "as wars become
safer and easier, as soldiers are removed from the horrors of war and see the enemy
not as humans but as blips on a screen, there is a very real danger of losing the
deterrent that such horrors provide. 166 A number of operators and commentators
have compared the drone operating experience to playing a video game, 167 with
some commenting that a person playing a video game is usually "not a benevolent
God."' 168 While many of these issues are not unique to drones, drone warfare
seems to 169present a number of particularly challenging ethical and moral
questions.
However, while further ethical or moral exploration may be required with
regard to remotely conducted attacks performed far from the battlefield, the law of
armed conflict does not present any additional limitations or prohibitions in this
respect. There is no difference under the law of war if a ship at sea fires a rocket at
a military objective hundreds or thousands of miles away ashore, or if a plane
flying thousands of feet in the air bombs a military target it never sees, or if a
domestic missile installation fires an intercontinental ballistic missile at a lawful
target half way across the globe, so long as the attacks are carried out within the

163. See Alston, supra note 6, at 7-8; Robert S. Leiken & Steven Brooke, Al Qaeda's Second
Front: Europe, N.Y. Times, July
15, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2005/07/14/opinion/14iht-edleiken.html.
164. Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, The President's
Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting
Them (Sep. 25, 2001).
165. Singer, supranote 14, at 395.
166. Id. at 396.
167. See, e.g., Eric Hagerman, Point. Click. Kill: Inside The Air Force's Frantic Unmanned
Reinvention, POPULAR SCIENCE MAGAZINE, Aug. 18, 2009, available at http://www.popsci.
com/drones.
168. Singer, supranote 14, at 395.
169. See, e.g., Mat Trachok, Predator Strikes Raise Novel Moral, Legal Issues, HARVARD
NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL, Dec. 2, 2009 available at http://www.harvardnsj.com/2009/12/
predator-strikes-raise-novel-moral-legal-issues/.
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rules of armed conflict.1 70 Similarly, the law of armed conflict does not forbid a
military operator from remotely conducting a drone strike from an air force base in
Nevada or some other location far from the target, if the strike is carried out within
the same recognized conventional and customary legal framework that any other
attack in the same armed conflict would be performed. In sum, the location of the
operator in the context of an armed conflict does not make a legal difference as
long as that operator is working under the same rules as any other individual
engaged in the conflict.
C. Status of the Operator
Probably the most controversial aspect of the drone strike program is the
status of the operator. Even some of those who are fully on board with nearly
every other aspect of drone warfare find themselves uneasy with civilian personnel
performing a combat function.1 7 1 In the broader AUMF conflict, it is reportedly
the CIA that almost exclusively operates drones for lethal strike operations.1 72 The
United States has relied heavily on the CIA to perform combat-type functions in its
current conflicts. 17 Proponents would likely argue that this is because the current
conflicts are unlike any others the United States has found itself in - with a greater
need for quick, actionable intelligence, targeting identification and acquisition,
secrecy, and swift decision-making. 174 To be sure, not many would argue that the
CIA may not perform a prominent intelligence role in the current armed conflicts,
even by using drones for reconnaissance and espionage missions. But CIA
operation of drones for lethal combat-type operations prompts a number of legal
questions.
As discussed at length in section III(B)(1) above, only lawful combatants (or
privileged belligerents) are permitted to participate in hostilities.1 75 The CIA is a
civilian agency and not a branch of the U.S. Armed Forces. Even under a liberal
reading of Article 4 from GC III, the CIA would not meet the requirements of
lawful belligerency as a militia or volunteer corps because, while they do report to
a responsible chain of command (albeit not always a military chain of command),
as a group they do not wear uniforms or otherwise distinguish themselves, nor do
they carry their arms openly.
CIA personnel are therefore unprivileged

170. It should be noted here that the same rules regarding neutral zones described in the "location
of the strike" section above apply equally here to the location of the operator. See supra Section IV(A).
171. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Predators Over Pakistan, 15 WEEKLY STANDARD 24, Mar. 8,
2010, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/predators-over-pakistan; David Glazier,
Testimony Before the House Subcommittee on National Security and ForeignAffairs, U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Apr. 28, 2010 available at
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/subcommitteesNSSubcommittee/4.28.10_DronesII/Glazier
_Statement.pdf.
172. See Jane Mayer, The PredatorWar: What are the risks of the C.I.A. 's covert drone program,
NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/09102
6fa fact mayer.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Baxter, supranote 92; GOLDMAN & TITTEMORE, supranote 51, at 2-4.
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belligerents1 76 in this conflict.1 77 This may not prohibit the United States from
using CIA or other civilian personnel to conduct drone strikes, but the participating
civilians join the fight without the combatant's privilege and lose their protected
civilian status. 178 While engaged CIA personnel become targetable as combatants,
it is unclear whether CIA personnel would also be prosecutable as unlawful
belligerents for their participation in the hostilities.1 79 Some have questioned
whether requiring a uniformed service-member to "pull the trigger" in a "right
seat-left seat" situation with the CIA might solve this issue. After all,
reconnaissance, target identification, and remote piloting do not by themselves
constitute acts of belligerency.
However, applying the direct participation
analysis, CIA personnel involved in preparing for, assisting, and setting up hostile
acts perform a combat function, have likely already given up their civilian
protected status, and do not need to actually pull the trigger in order to cross the
line into a combatant role.
There is some speculation that the CIA only conducts drone attacks outside
"traditional battlefields," leaving Afghan and Iraqi operations to the military. Jane
Mayer writes: "The U.S. government runs two drone programs. The military's
176. But see ICRC DPH Guidance, supra note 96, at 39 (stating even the ICRC allows some
civilians, if incorporated into the forces, may take on a combatant status in certain situations:
As long as they are not incorporated into the armed forces, private contractors
and civilian employees do not cease to be civilians simply because they
accompany the armed forces and or assume functions other than the conduct of
hostilities that would traditionally have been performed by military personnel...
• A different conclusion must be reached for contractors and employees who, to
all intents and purposes, have been incorporated into the armed forces of a party
to the conflict, whether through a formal procedure under national law or defacto
by being given a continuous combat function. Under IHL, such personnel would
become members of an organized armed force, group, or unit under a command
responsible to a party to the conflict and, for the purposes of the principle of
distinction, would no longer qualify as civilians.
177. Gary Solis argues exactly this point in a recent Washington Post editorial. See Gary Solis,
CIA Drone Attacks Produce America's Own Unlawful Combatants, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2010,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/1 /AR20100311036
53.html.
178. Id. (asserting that CIA personnel, as unlawful combatants, might be targetable as a class
anywhere by current enemies-even driving to work at Langley).
179. It can be argued that the United States takes the position that unprivileged belligerency is a
violation of the law of war. As an example, the Military Commissions Act of 2009 criminalizes
activities committed by unprivileged belligerents (i.e., conspiracy, material support, and murder in
violation of the law of war) that would not be war crimes if committed by lawful combatants committed
during the course of an international armed conflict. However, this is controversial. The ICRC DPH
Guidance asserts that:
The absence in IHL of an express right for civilians to directly participate in
hostilities does not necessarily imply an international prohibition of such
participation. Indeed, as such, civilian direct participation in hostilities is neither
prohibited by IHL nor criminalized under the statutes of any prior or current
international criminal tribunal or court.
The ICRC notes, though, that such civilians may "not enjoy immunity from domestic prosecution for
lawful acts of war, that is, for having directly participated in hostilities while respecting IHL." ICRC
DPH Guidance, supra note 96, at 83-84.
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version, which is publicly acknowledged, operates in the recognized war zones of
Afghanistan and Iraq, and targets enemies of U.S. troops stationed there. As such,
it is an extension of conventional warfare. The C.I.A.'s program is aimed at terror
suspects around the world, including in countries where U.S. troops are not
based."'180 This may reflect a political or diplomatic decision not to introduce
military elements into countries where the United States does not maintain an
active military presence. However, some suggest that the CIA's role in the
recognized war zones might be greater than Mayer's assessment. 181 Either way,
because the United States treats the AUMF conflict as an armed conflict that
extends beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, the CIA participates within the framework
of that armed conflict whenever they target AUMF enemies.
A number of critics also point to the lack of accountability for CIA drone
strikes as reason for concern. O'Connell, for example, claims that CIA personnel
are not trained in the laws of war and do not take into account the constraints
imposed by that legal framework when conducting strike operations. 18 2 The
military, in contrast, is trained in the laws of war and expected to comply with
them, perform all operations under a strict command structure, and are held
accountable for their actions under the Uniform Code for Military Justice. In
addition, the military is subject to its own internal rules and regulations as well as
the guidance from its commanders that further restrain its personnel.183 Of course,
this is not to say that the CIA does not require its personnel to abide by many of
the same rules with equal rigor and accountability-they certainly may. But the
public does not know what rules apply and neither does the enemy, in contrast to
the military's requirement for transparency in promulgating its rules and
regulations.
Finally, in addition to the civilian-military status issue, there is an obscure but
emerging computer-human status issue in this area. Verging on the stuff of science
fiction, "autonomous UAVs" may become a reality in the near future. Singer
writes,
As military robots gain more and more autonomy... [a]utonomous robots
could, in theory, follow the rules of engagement; they could be
programmed with a list of criteria for determining appropriate targets
and when shooting is permissible. The robot might be programmed to
require human input if any civilians were detected. An example of such
a list at work might go as follows: "Is the target a Soviet-made T-80
tank? Identification confirmed. Is the target located in an authorized

180. Mayer, supranote 172.

181. See e.g., Rise in Drones II, supra note 40, at 6 (recounting an interview with a former drone
commander from Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, where the commander admitted that all Air Force
drone operations were conducted jointly -or with CIA participation).
182. Id. at 8.
183. See FM 3-24, supra note 121; FM 27-10, supra note 67; also consider General Stanley
McChrystal's "zero-tolerance" policy on civilian deaths in Afghanistan. See McChrystal Apologizes as
Airstrike Kills Dozens in Afghanistan, CNN.CoM, Feb. 23, 2010, available at http://www.cnn.
com/2010/ WORLD/asiapcf/02/22/afghanistan.civilian.strike/index.html.
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free-fire zone? Location confirmed. Are there any friendly units within
a 200-meter radius? No friendlies detected. Are there any civilians
within a 200-meter radius? No civilians detected. 184Weapons release
authorized. No human command authority required."
Such a prospect presents serious challenges to the law of war framework. For
one, having a human responsible for his or her actions serves as a deterrent to
violations of the law.185 Allowing a computer to "make" life or death decisions
severs this chain of responsibility. Second, robots do not meet the definition of
16
lawful combatants and may not participate independently in combat operations.
And third, while humans may commit errors due to emotion, fatigue, or other
factors, human judgment is often critical in exercising restraint in armed conflict.
Taking Singer's scenario as an example, it is hard to imagine how a drone might be
programmed to account for distinction when the enemy's status is inherently
unclear, or for proportionality when the situation calls for a difficult decision on
calculating the worth of human life, or for humanity when the strike might not be
worth the human costs. Humans are required by the law of armed conflict to
exercise judgment and restraint, and programming into a drone the standard rules
of engagement is a start, but human judgment ultimately requires human operators.
V. CONCLUSION: DOES THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT PROVIDE ADEQUATE RULES
TO GOVERN DRONE WARFARE?

As this analysis has demonstrated, there are more than enough rules for
governing drone warfare - from the laws governing aerial and missile warfare to
the fundamental principles of the law of armed conflict, to specialized weapons
treaties and the Hague and Geneva conventions, and from customary law to the
UN Charter. The issue is whether these rules are fairly and consistently followed.
Correctly, the Obama Administration has stated that "the rules that govern
targeting do not turn on the type of weapon system used, and there is no
prohibition under the laws of war on the use of technologically advanced weapons
systems in armed conflict-such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs-so
long as they are employed in conformity with applicable laws of war. 187 Drones
may present interesting new challenges because of their sophistication and the
technological advantage they convey to their operators, but the law of armed
conflict is more than adequate to govern their wartime deployment. The United
States has stated that it is committed to ensuring that targeting practices are
lawful. 188 To this end, the Administration has "carefully reviewed the rules
governing targeting operations to ensure that these operations are conducted
consistently with law of war principles," concluding that "targeting practices,
including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles,
comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war., 189 In sum, properly
184. Military Robots and the Laws of War, supranote 16.

185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
Koh, supra note 1.
Id.

189. Id.
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conducted drone attacks, which take into account all the constraining principles
from the law of war, target lawful objectives, and are performed by privileged
belligerents, do not violate the law of armed conflict.
Drawn from the above analysis, then, I close by offering ten guiding
principles for conducting drone strikes within the letter and spirit of the law of war:
One: Any drone strike must be necessary for the accomplishment of an actual
military objective.
Two: A drone strike must be directed only at lawful targets-i.e., combatants,
civilians who have forfeited their protections by directly participating in hostilities,
and military objectives.
Three: Commanders and operators must not authorize a drone strike when
they know or reasonably should know that the strike will cause excessive collateral
effects to civilians or civilian property.
Four: Commanders and operators must strike a proportional balance between
the risk to civilians or civilian objects and the military advantage expected when
using drones to conduct attacks.
Five: Commanders and operators must exercise constant care and reasonable
precaution to spare the civilian population from death and destruction.
Six: Commanders and operators must not conduct drone strikes where there is
a high likelihood that the strike will cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous
injury.
Seven: A drone strike must be conducted within the framework of an actual
armed conflict.
Eight: A drone strike should be conducted only by lawful combatants.
Nine: Commanders and operators should receive prior consent (even if
blanket approval) from the state in whose territory the strike will occur, unless that
state is unwilling or unable to control the threatening activities within its own
territory.
Ten: Although not required by law, commanders and operators may benefit in
certain circumstances from pursuing a non-lethal course of action if a target might
just as easily be captured and detained, within reason and subject to force
protection concerns.

ETHIOPIA'S ARMED INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA:
THE LEGALITY OF SELF-DEFENSE IN RESPONSE TO THE
THREAT OF TERRORISM
AWOL K. ALLO*

Whereas there are debates among some academic circles that the events of 9/11
have constituted a change in the law of self-defense, this article argues againstthe
possibility, even of the desirability, of such an assertion. By situating the law of
self-defense in the context of 'terrorism' and the threat thereof this article argues
that Ethiopia's claim for a lawful exercise of its right to self-defense falls short of
the requirements of the law even if Ethiopia was neither questioned nor
condemned by the UnitedNations Security Council or the African Union.

I. INTRODUCTION
"The Ethiopian government has taken self-defensive measures and started
counterattacking the aggressive forces of the Islamic Courts and foreign terrorist
groups"-was how the Ethiopian Prime Minister declared the official start of the
war between Ethiopia and the Union of Islamic Courts (hereinafter the UIC) on the
night of December 24, 2006. In this sentence, the Prime Minister singled out two
of the four grounds Ethiopia presented as justifying its inherent right to individual
and collective self-defense---aggression and the threat of terrorism.2
Against the backdrop of evolving debates on the adequacy of the rules of
international law governing the use of force and self-defense, this article seeks to
enquire whether these changes represent a change in the law culminating from the
necessary state practice and opinion juris or simply a change in the fact that does
not constitute a new rule of self-defense.
Drawing on governmental statements, policy papers, official correspondences,
and newspaper articles for facts and allegations, this article strives to make a

* LL. B (Addis Ababa University), LL. M (Notre Dame Law School, IN, USA), PhD Candidate,
(Glasgow University Law School: UK); Lecturer in Law, St. Mary's University College, Faculty of

Law (Currently on Study Leave). I am extremely grateful to Professor Christian Tams who read the
manuscript and provided insightful comments. All the views, errors et al remains that of the author's.
1. Emmanuel Fanta, Analysis: Ethiopian Intervention in Somalia in Context, BLOGGER NEWS
NETWORK (Jan. 30, 2007), http://www.bloggemews.net/14238.

2. Ethiopia argued that four factors-a ) the destabilizing mission of the Eritrean government
from the north, b) the declaration of jihad by UIC against Ethiopia, c) the presence in Somalia of
Ethiopian insurgents which seek to overthrow the government of Ethiopia by force; and d) The
presence and continued influx of foreign terrorist groups with the view to advancing the extremist
agenda of the UIC-created a state of "clear and present danger" triggering its lawful right to selfdefense under international law. See infra note 142.
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conceptual analysis of whether the facts on the ground met the standards of the UN
Charter or customary international law when Ethiopia triggered its right to selfdefense. Apart from self-defense, Ethiopia claimed that its intervention is allowed
by the invitation of the "internationally recognized government of Somalia. 3 This
author has examined the validity of Ethiopia's claim to lawful invitation
somewhere else. This article examines the consistency of Ethiopia's claim to the
exercise of its "individual and collective self-defense" with contemporary norms of
international law governing the use of force. Within that frame, the article seeks to
reflect on the failed state scenario of Somalia and the silence of the international
community (UN, AU, EU, individual states) in the face of Ethiopia's intervention
and what that silence says about Ethiopia's action in particular and the evolution of
the law of self-defense in general.
II.

ETHIOPIA'S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA: COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

The United Nations Charter outlaws all aspects of coercive use of force
between sovereign nations while delineating a carefully crafted exception
consistent with its prime purpose of maintaining international peace and security.4
Most experts on the use of force agree on the Charter's two known exceptions to
the general prohibition set forth under Article 2(4).' While the first of these
exceptions pertains to the right of "individual and collective self-defen[s]e"
enunciated under Article 51 of the Charter 6, the second exception relates to the use
of force by the Security Council in response to a "threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or an act of aggression" under Chapter VII of the Charter.7
Ethiopia justified its military intervention in Somalia as a lawful exercise of
its "inherent right of individual or collective self-defen[s]e" embodied under
Article 51 of the UN Charter.8 Article 51 of the Charter in part reads: "Nothing in
the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefen[s]e if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until

3. See Awol Kassim Allo, Counter-Intervention,Invitation,Both or Neither? An Appraisalof the
2006 Ethiopian Military Intervention in Somalia, 3 MizAN L. REV. 201, 214 (2009) (discussing the
legality of Ethiopia's claim to lawful invitation).
4. See U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1, 2.
5. See STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 43-44 (1996); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE
59-60 (2d ed. 2004); HILAIRE McCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICT 30-35 (1992); MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE MYTH OF PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 3 (Am.

Soc'y of Int'l Law Task Force on Terrorism 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/
taskforce/oconnell.pdf; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1123 (6th ed. 2008); THE CURRENT
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 9-10 (A. Cassese ed., 1986).

6. U.N. Charter art. 51.
7. U.N. Charter art. 39; see also U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, arts. 40 - 42, 51; IAN BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 275-78 (1963); O'CONNELL, supranote 5 at

3-4.
8. U.N. Charter art. 51; see also U.N. Sec. Council Comm., Rep. of the Monitoring Group on
Somaliapursuant to Sec. Council resolution 1724, 29, U.N. Doc. S/2007/436 (June 27, 2006).
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the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security." 9

The reference to the term "inherent" is said to have reaffirmed the natural
right of a State under customary international law to defend itself from an armed
attack10 through the use of force. However, although collective self-defense was
not understood to be as "inherent" as a matter of international law at the time the
UN Charter was adopted, the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) in
Nicaragua reaffirmed the "inherent" nature of both variants of self-defense--the
right to individual and collective self-defense.11 In relevant part, the Court stated,
"the language of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the inherent right ("droit
naturel") which any State possesses in the
event of an armed attack, covers both
12
collective and individual self-defen[s]e.,
Following the adoption of the Charter, many States resorted to international
and regional security schemes under a covenant and accordingly agreed to regard
an attack against one as an attack against all.13 In Nicaragua,the ICJ set forth the
cardinal rule for the exercise of the right to collective self-defense in the absence of
a prior treaty agreement. 14 Denying the contention of the United States for the
existence of a lawful ground for collective self-defense, the Court outlined the
essential requirements for the exercise of lawful collective self-defense under the
Charter and customary international law.15 In order for collective self-defense to be
valid under international law, the Court held that there should be a declaration by
the victim state "which must form and declare the view that it has been so
17
attacked," 16 followed by a subsequent request by that "victim of an armed attack"
to another State for help.
According to the judgment in Nicaragua,the Court further emphasized the
existence of the requirement of an armed attack against the victim State. These
requirements are similar to those needed for individual self-defense when a third
State exercises a collective right to self-defense on behalf of the victim State. The
Court made the observation that:

9. U.N. Charter art. 51.
10. Legal Consequences of the Construction of A Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I. C. J 136, 139 (July 9) [hereinafter PalestinianTerritory].
11. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
193 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua];See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 244, 38-39, 96-97 (July 8 [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
12. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 102, 193.
13. See Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, art. 4, May 14, 1955, 219
U.N.T.S. 3; Charter of the Organization of the American States, art. 5(f), Apr. 30, 1948, 2 I.L.M. 235,
119 U.N.T.S. 3; Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and Final Act of the Inter-American
Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, Sept. 2, 1947, Art. 3(1), 4 U.S.T.
559, 21 U.N.T.S. 77; SHAW, supranote 5, at 1290, 1137.
14. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J at 103-05, TT 193-99.
15. Id.
16. Id. T 195.
17. Id. T 199.
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Thus, the lawfulness of the use of force by a State in response to a
wrongful act of which it has not itself been the victim is not admitted
when this wrongful act is not an armed attack. In the view of the Court,
under international law in force today - whether customary international
law or that of the United Nations system - States do not have a right of
'collective' armed response to acts which do not constitute an 'armed
18
attack.'
Ethiopia and Somalia were not parties to any prior bilateral or multilateral
treaty arrangements that called for a collective security scheme comparable to
those of NATO, the now defunct Warsaw Pact, or Inter-American Pacts governing
collective self-defense arrangements examined in Nicaragua.19 For the same
reason, Ethiopia cannot justify an attack against Somalia's Transitional Federal
Government (hereinafter the TFG) through a collective right to self-defense as an
attack against itself to resort to the use of force against other forces within Somalia
in the absence of a prior treaty arrangement. Further, even if such a treaty
arrangement existed, Ethiopia could not have acted in lawful collective selfdefense against the Islamic Courts in a manner consistent with the UN Charter
insofar as attacks emanating from within Somalia are concerned. Such conduct
would constitute an intervention into the domestic affairs of the State and does not
seem to be consistent with the stipulation of the Charter.20 If Somalia had been
under an "armed attack" from another sovereign State, declared that it was a
subject of an armed attack, and accordingly solicited Ethiopia's assistance,
Ethiopia could have lawfully acted pursuant to the request, in light of the Court's
guidance in Nicaragua.21 However, although other States provided military and
other assistance to the UIC, 22 which could have probably amounted to intervention
under Article 2(7) of the Charter, such conduct cannot, of itself, justify a selfdefensive response since such assistance does not constitute an "armed attack" by
the other assisting States. As the ICJ reiterated in Nicaragua, assistance to rebel
groups does not constitute an "armed attack" by the State from which the rebel

18. Id. 211.
19. Evidently, Somalia and Ethiopia were in a fathom of political and military confrontation until
the Seiad Barre regime collapsed, let alone have a NATO or Warsaw style pact. Since 1991 leading to
the recent impasse, Somalia never had any de facto or de jure regime that do the same. Robert I.
Rotberg, FailedStates in a World of Terror, 81 FoREIGN AFF. 127, 128 (2002).
20. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7; Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter
Declarationon Principles ofInternationalLaw].
21. Nicaragua,1986 I.C.J. at 203-05,
195-99 ("[The Court] concludes that the requirement of a
request by the State which is the victim of the alleged attack is additional to the requirement that such a
State should have declared itself to have been attacked.").
22. See U.N. Sec. Council Comm., Rep. of the Monitoring Group on Somalia establishedpursuant
to Sec. Council resolution 751 (1992), 159, U.N. Doc S/2006/229 (May 4, 2006); U.N. Sec. Council
Comm., Rep. of the Monitoring Group on Somalia establishedpursuant to Sec. Council resolution 1587
(2005), 8, 25, U.N. Doc. S/2005/625 (Oct. 4, 2005).
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groups received support or the State whose territory the rebels used, and hence,
cannot justify collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter.23
Following the attack on 9/11, NATO did not require the involvement of a
State to justify its collective-self-defense in Afghanistan. Rather it agreed that "if it
is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it
shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. 24
The extent of the legality of NATO's action is subject to the Washington Treaty. 21
Further, the right to self-defensive measures by the victim State of 9/11 was
affirmed by the UN Security Council. 26 There are three reasons which provided the
gloss of legality to NATO's intervention in Afghanistan, all of which are not
present in Ethiopia's case. Firstly, the Washington Treaty governed the condition
for NATO's intervention while there is no such treaty between Ethiopia and
Somalia. Secondly, there is a Security Council authorization in the case of the
Afghan intervention while there is none in Ethiopia's case. Finally, the attack
against the Somali government comes from within Somalia itself, not "directed"
from abroad as is the case with NATO's intervention, weakening Ethiopia's case
for collective self-defense.
Writing on the controversial right to pre-emptive self-defense in the wake of
9/11, Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell makes a compelling appraisal of the ICJ
27
decision in Nicaragua.
Relying on the ICJ's pronouncement that the supply of
weapons by Nicaragua to El Salvadoran rebels did not amount to an armed attack,
Professor O'Connell insists on seeking the authorization of the Security Council to
lawfully exercise the right to collective self-defense if pressing concerns exist
which do not fit into the parameters of the law .28 Although the Security Council
had considered the military standoff between the various forces within and
neighboring Somalia, as well as Ethiopia's allegation of the mounting threat to its
security and territorial integrity, the Council did not authorize Ethiopia to take selfdefensive measures.29 Indeed, in Resolution 1725 adopted eighteen days before the
culmination of the hostility into a full-scale war, the Council expressly endorsed a
proposal by the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) to exclude
neighboring States of Somalia from the protection and training mission for
Somalia.30 In the Resolution, the Council implied the existence of States with a
vested interest when it called upon "all parties inside Somalia and all other States

23. See Nicaragua,1986 I.C.J. at 203, 195.
24. Press Release, NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council, NATO Press Release (2001)
124 (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/pOl-124e.htm.
25. Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of "Armed Attack" in Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter,43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 41, 48 (2002).
26. See id
27. See O'CONNELL, supranote 5, at 6.
28. Id.
29. The Security Council has not made any statement that has the effect of either implicitly or
explicitly authorizing Ethiopia to use force in Somalia. Rather, in Resolution 1725/2006, the Council
asked neighboring States to exercise restraint. S.C. Res. 1725, 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1725 (Dec. 6,
2006).
30. Id. 3.
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to refrain from action that could provoke or perpetuate violence and violations of
human rights, contribute to unnecessary tension and mistrust, endanger the
31
ceasefire and political process, or further damage the humanitarian situation.,
Under these circumstances, there is no doubt that Eritrea and Ethiopia are among
the States that the Resolution called upon to refrain from actions that "perpetuate
violence" and derail the political process in an already turbulent State.3 2 Thus,
Ethiopia's claim to collective self-defense of Somalia under Article 51 of the
Charter does not seem to be compatible with the stipulation of the Charter.
III. ETHIOPIA'S ARMED INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA: "INDIVIDUAL SELF-DEFENSE?"

The exercise of the right to individual self-defense under Article 51 of the
Charter requires the fulfillment of several rigorous but exceedingly subjective
criteria. A lawful resort to armed force by individual States under Article 51
requires the fulfillment of at least the following conditions: a) there has to be a
significant armed attack against the State acting in self-defense;33 b) the selfdefensive measure must be against a State and aimed at the attacking party;34 c) the
measure must respect the principles of necessity;3 5 and d) the response must be
equivalent to the attack-the principle of proportionality must be observed.36
As the nature of global conflicts change, new actors emerge, and new threats
proliferate, these requirements have continued to generate deeper controversies
between States, legal practitioners, and academics leading to a sustained call for
the redefinition of the rules to meet contemporary threats.37 Nevertheless, the
debate over the precise contents of the vernaculars of U.N. Charter Article 51
continued between the strict constructionists on the one hand and those who
envision a broader scope of interpretation and application on the other.38 The most
vociferous of these debates include such questions as: what constitutes an "armed
attack?" When is an armed attack said to have occurred? When is an armed
response necessary? What is a proportionate response to threats or attacks under
the circumstances? Since Ethiopia strenuously justified its military interventions in
31. Id. at pmbl.

32. Id.
33. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 203,

195 (holding that a "mere frontier incident" does not amount

to an armed attack for the purpose of self-defense under Article 51).
34. Id.
35. See Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 245, 41; Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 106-11,

201-212;

O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 7.
36. See Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with

commentaries, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (part 2),
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9 6 2001 .pdf;
O'CONNELL, supranote 5, at 7; Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, infra note 74, at 839;
Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionalityand Force in InternationalLaw, 87AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 391
(1993).
37. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4370 (Sept. 12, 2001) ("The
magnitude of yesterday's acts goes beyond terrorism as we have known it so far.... We therefore think
that new defmitions, terms and strategies have to be developed for the new realities."); Erin L. Guruli,
The Terrorism Era: Should the InternationalCommunity Redefine its Legal Standards on Use of Force
in Self-Defense?, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DIS. RES. 100, 123.
38. See infran. 44 &45.
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Somalia on the basis of its inherent right to individual self-defense under the
Charter, an examination of the requirements of lawful individual self-defense
under Article 51 of the Charter will follow.
A. The Requirement of an "Armed Attack"
The occurrence of an "armed attack" against the victim State in violation of
the principles enunciated under Article 2(4) of the Charter constitutes the primary
trigger for self-defense.3 9 However, there are extensive debates as to the precise
requirements of Article 51 with respect to the occurrence of an "armed attack."
The question is not so much whether an armed attack has occurred, it is rather:
when is an armed attack said to have occurred? For most strict constructionists, the
cumulative reading of Article 2(4) and Article 51 constituted a rule that defined the
scope and limits of the principle. 40 For them, self-defense is a response to an armed
attack triggered only "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations" and in no other circumstance.41 In that sense, the question is the first,
whether an armed attack has occurred. The literal reading of the semantics used in
Article 51, "if an armed attack occurs," reinforces this view and seems to clearly
require an actual "armed attack" against States.
Other authorities consider the above construction as excessively restrictive
and legalistic to the extreme and point to the opening sentence of Article 51 to
defend their vision of a broader scope of the right to self-defense. They argue that
the phrase "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of...
self-defen[s]e," recognizes the existence of a customary right to self-defense
unencumbered by the narrower scope of the Charter which strictly requires the
occurrence of an armed attack.43 It is also submitted that the travauxpriparatoires
of the Charter supports the view that the "'use of arms in legitimate self-defen[s]e
remains admitted and unimpaired.' 44 Summarizing the views of "some States"
and "most academics," Malcolm N. Shaw portrays "Article 51 as merely
elaborating one kind of self-defense in the context of the primary responsibility of
the Security Council" within the framework of the Charter. 5

39. O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 5.

40. SHAW, supranote 5, at 1132.
41. U.N. Charter art. 2; see EDUARDO JIMtNEZ DE ARECHAGA, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE PAST
THIRD OF A CENTURY 87-98 (Recueil des Cours vol. I, 1978); BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 112-13, 264;
SHAW, supranote 5 at 1132-33.
42. PalestinianTerritory, 2004 I.C.J at 194, 127; Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 203,
194-195; see
also T. D. Gill, Litigation Strategy in the Nicaraguan Case at the International Court, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 197, 223 (Yoram Dinstein, ed. 1989).
43. See D. W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 185-86 (1958); J.L. BRIERLY,
THE LAW OF NATIONS 417-18 (6th ed. 1963); D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 317 (1965);
JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF
AGGRESSION 43, 95-96 (1958); H. WALDOCK, GENERAL COURSE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6,

231-37 (1962).
44. See SHAw, supra note 5 at 1132 n.68 (quoting U.N. Conference of International
Organization).
45. Id.at 1026.
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Even more authoritative and reconciliatory of the above debate is the
reaffirmation of the latter view by the ICJ in Nicaragua. In its extensive
examination of the issue, the Court proclaimed the existence of a conventional and
customary right to self-defense.46 In dismissing the contention of the United States
that Article 51 of the Charter "subsumes and supervenes" the scope of the right
under customary international law, the Court construed the silence of Article 51 on
certain essential rules of self-defense, well-established in customary international
law, as evidencing the inadequacy of Article 51 to independently regulate the
exercise of the right.47 In affirming the existence of a customary rule of selfdefense along side the Charter rule, the Court declared:
It cannot therefore be held that Article 51 is a provision which
'subsumes and supervenes' customary international law. It rather
demonstrates that in the field in question, the importance of which for
the present dispute need hardly be stressed, customary international law
continues to exist alongside treaty law. The areas governed by the two
sources of law thus do not overlap exactly, and the rules do not have the
same content.48
In Nicaragua, although the Court found a customary right of self-defense
governing situations slightly separate from the Charter, it did not go into detail on
how and when States could resort to self-defense in cases of an "imminent threat of
armed attack" short of actual armed attack.49 It did, however, hold that the right to
self-defense under Article 51 requires the occurrence of an armed attack when it
held that "[i]n the case of individual self-defen[s]e, the exercise of this right is
subject to the State concerned having been the victim of an armed attack. 5 °
Nevertheless, the Court clearly implied the availability of the right to self-defense
in response to an imminent threat of an armed attack. 51 Therefore, while Article 51
of the Charter allows self-defense only in response to an armed attack, the inherent
right of States to resort to force against an "imminent threat of attack" under
customary law remained unencumbered by the Charter.
The Ethiopian government and opposition forces within Ethiopia are in
agreement that there has been an attack against Ethiopia by Ethiopian rebel forces

46. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 94, 176.
47. Id. ("[T]he Charter, having itself recognized the existence of this right, does not go on to
regulate directly all aspects of its content. For example, it does not contain any specific rule whereby
self-defense would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to
respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law. Moreover, a definition of the
"armed attack" which, if found to exist, authorizes the exercise of the "inherent right" of self-defense, is
not provided in the Charter, and is not part of treaty law.").
48. Id.
49. Id. at 103, 194.
50. Id. at 103, 195; See also id. at 27-28, 35 ("[W]hat is in issue is the purported exercise by
the United States of a right of collective self-defen[s]e in response to an armed attack on another State.
The possible lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of an armed attack which has not yet taken
place has not been raised.").
51. See id.;
See also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dom. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda) 2005 I.C.J. 168, 144 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter Territoryof the Congo].
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operating from the territories under the control of the UIC. 52 However, the mere
existence of an attack does not necessarily constitute an "armed attack" triggering
Ethiopia's right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. Further, Somalia's
failed State scenario makes it almost impossible to develop a proper allocation of
responsibility for allowing territories under its control to be used by insurgents or
for failing to control 53 the attacks emanating from within its territory.
Theoretically, as a de facto regime, the UIC has the duty to refrain from acts
contrary to the stipulation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.54 But accountability
for breach of international law by defacto regimes remained an elusive normative
conception not yet crystallized into general international law. In the absence of a
responsible government in effective control of the territory of the state, one can
question the extent to which the State that continued to suffer cross-border
skirmishes should exercise restraint. Nevertheless, the attack against Ethiopia by
Ethiopian rebel forces from the areas under the control of the UIC does not justify
Ethiopia's unilateral military operation in Somalia. Ethiopia's intervention is
unjustified and inconsistent with the requirements of Article 51, not only because
the attack has come from Ethiopian insurgents operating from within Somalia, but
also because its actions contradicted Security Council resolution.
B. The Requirement of a "StateActor"
The second major requirement relates to the existence of a nexus between the
armed attack and a State in order for an act to constitute an armed attack under
Article 51 of the Charter.55 Although there is nothing in the Charter or the language
of Article 51 requiring a nexus between the "armed attack" and a State, traditional
international law has tied the notion of armed attack in Article 51 to States. 6 This

is partly because the prohibition set forth in Article 2(4) is stipulated as the duty of
"all Members" to refrain in their international relations from actions which
potentially trigger the application of Article 51. 57 The argument goes, if the
prohibition is addressed to States, the right granted to the State as an exception to
Article 2(4) must also be exercised against recalcitrant States that contradicted the
prohibition under Article 2(4).58

52. See Fanta, supra note 1.
53. See Declaration on Principlesof InternationalLaw, supra note 20, at art. 3(g) ("The sending
by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of
armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial
involvement therein."); G.A. Res. 3314, Annex Art. 3(g), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Nov. 29, 1974); See
also O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 7 (discussing that legal responsibility follows if a state controlled or
supported the attackers).
54. See Carsten Staln, TerroristActs as "Armed Attacks": The Right to Self-Defense, Article 51
(11212) of the UN Charter,and InternationalTerrorism, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 35, 42 (2003).

55. See Nicaragua,1986 I.C.J. at 103-104, 195; Murphy, supranote 25, at 44.
56. See GRAY, supra note 5, at 6, 130 (arguing that, although the International Court of Justice
required a nexus between the armed attack and the State in Nicaragua,most States did not claim a legal
right to the use of force based on the narrow question of whether an attack constituted an armed attack).
57. U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (prohibiting "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state").
58. See O'CONNELL, supranote 5, at 4-5.
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However, modem international life and the growing power of non-state-actors
seem to have rendered the requirement of a nexus between a State and a non-state
actor simply unrealistic. 9/11 sent a powerful message to the world that organized
non-state actors/terrorists could fly commercial airplanes into skyscrapers to rein
shock and panic in one of the most powerful nations on earth without employing
conventional firearms. 59 Following that incident, the international community
came to recognize that a private act could constitute an "armed attack" within the
provision of Article 51 regardless of a nexus between a State and a need for
attribution.60 Observing this tide of progression, Carsten commented, "the
recognition that acts of private actors may give rise to an armed attack is anything
but revolutionary., 61 Thus, 9/11 set a profound change in that tradition and brought
independent acts of private actors/terrorists within the ambit of an armed attack
provided that such an attack is of significant scale and effect. 62 In the aftermath of

the attack, the Security Council, in resolution 1368(2001) and, 1373(2001) stated
the United States' inherent right of self-defense in accordance with the Charter by
declaring the attack of 9/11 as "terrorist attacks" and "threat[s] to international
peace and security., 63 Also, NATO and the Organization of the American States
declared the attack as an "armed attack" and vowed to exercise their right to
collective self-defense.64 NATO, for example, did not require evidence to the
effect that the attack of 9/11 be attributed to the Taliban regime or Afghanistan,
rather it asked whether the "attack was directed from abroad against the United
States" and could therefore "be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty. 65
However, many academics disagree that the events of 9/11 represented a
"rigorous change in the law" or that the decision of NATO, the Security Council,
or the Organization of the American States on the particular facts of the events of
9/11 constituted a general and uniform state practice that constitutes a rule of
customary international law that applies beyond that specific fact.66 They rather see
the change, for several reasons, as a "change in fact" which shifts back as the
euphoria for security subsides.67 Those who refute the argument that 9/11
constituted a "rigorous change in law", point to the uniquely dangerous and
alarming dimension of the 9/11 attack which gave it the political legitimacy and
momentum necessary to galvanize enormous support to broaden the scope of the
rule.68 In refuting the argument that State practice and world opinion after 9/11
constituted a change in the scope of Article 51, they point to the existence of a

59. See Murphy, supra note 25, at 41.
60. See GRAY, supra note 5, at 159.
61. Stahn, supranote 55, at 42.
62. See id.at 45.
63. S.C. Res. 1373, para. 2-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1368, para. 2-3,
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
64. See O'CONNELL, supranote 5, at 10.
65. NATO Press Release, supranote 24.
66. Stahn, supranote 55, at 35-36.
67. Id. at 36.

68. Id. at 35-36.
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State actor, Afghanistan, to whom the acts of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attack is
legally attributable. 69 Although the changing realities of global politics and power
relationships required serious reconsiderations of several rules of international law
relating to use of force and the conduct of hostilities,70 selective revisions
prompted by a single catastrophic event, such as 9/11, carries its own dire
ramifications.71 Some academics see the events of 9/11 as mere 'conventional
crimes' rather than an "armed attack., 72 Summarizing his concern about the
ongoing debate, Carsten Stahn noted:
It may be of greater consequence to admit openly that the requirement
of attributability does not play a role in the definition of armed attack.
Such a step would certainly mark a qualitative change in the application

of Article 51 because
it breaks with the conception of Article 51 as a
73
state-centered norm.

Nonetheless, there are strong arguments, today, that reject the legal
requirement of a state-actor to qualify an act as an armed attack, without however,
ignoring the relevance of such a nexus in identifying the State towards which the
self-defensive measure will be directed 7 4
Nicaragua brought to light a slightly different dimension of what constituted
an "armed attack" under Article 51 in the 80s. The Court required the existence of
a legal attribution of sort, meeting the test of effective control, not even an overall
control, between the acts of a non-state actor and a State to qualify an act as an
"armed attack. 75 Opposing the restrictive approach of the Court to the question of
what constituted an "armed attack," Judge Jennings argued in dissent that "it seems
dangerous to define unnecessarily strictly the conditions for lawful self-defen[s]e,
so as to leave a large area where both a forcible response to force is forbidden, and
yet the United Nations employment of force, which was intended to fill that gap, is
absent. 76 Despite the two Security Council Resolutions issued in the wake of 9/11
and the almost unanimous support given to United State's military intervention in
Afghanistan, the ICJ seems to have stood by its Nicaraguatest in at least two post
9/11 cases.77

In its advisory opinion in the Palestinian Territories, the Court rejected the
Israeli claim to self-defense on the reasoning that self-defense under Article 51 is
69. Guruli, supranote 37, at 109.
70. See id. at 115.
71. See Stahn, supra note 55, at 41; Geir Ulfstein, Terrorism and the Use of Force, 34 SECURITY
DIALOGUE 153, 153-54 (2003).

72. See Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under
InternationalLaw, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 573-74 (2002); Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is
Also DisruptingSome CrucialLegal Categories of InternationalLaw, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 993, 995-98

(2001); Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 839, 840
(2001).

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Stahn, supranote 55, at 42.
See Guruli, supranote 37, at 108-109.
See Nicaragua,1986I.C.J. at 65-65, 115.
Id. at 543-44.
See Territory of the Congo, 2005 I.C.J. 168; PalestinianTerritory,2004 I.C.J. 136.
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not available to Israel against non-state actors operating on the territories under the
control of Israel.78 In Territory of the Congo, the Court required the responsibility
of the Congo for the multifarious offensive actions of Ugandan rebels from the
Congolese territories in order to find Uganda's right to self-defense legitimate.79
In Territory of the Congo, repeating the precedent it set in Nicaragua,80 the
ICJ refuted Uganda's claim to self-defense proclaiming that:
It is further to be noted that, while Uganda claimed to have acted in selfdefen[s]e, it did not ever claim that it had been subjected to an armed
attack by the armed forces of the DRC. The "armed attacks" to which
reference was made came rather from the ADF. The Court has found
above (paragraphs 131-135) that there is no satisfactory proof of the
involvement in these attacks, direct or indirect, of the Government of
the DRC. The attacks did not emanate from armed bands or irregulars
sent by the DRC or on behalf of the DRC, within the sense of Article 3[
](g) of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the definition of
aggression, adopted on 14 December 1974. The Court is of the view
that, on the evidence before it, even if this series of deplorable attacks
could be regarded as cumulative in character, they still remained nonattributable to the DRC. For all these reasons, the Court finds that the
legal and factual circumstances for the exercise of 81a right of selfdefen[s]e by Uganda against the DRC were not present.
Starkly putting the question is Professor Thomas Franck, who criticizes the
majority's view of a narrower construction of Article 51. He asks: "was the state
from which insurgents were operating legally responsible (in the sense of Charter
Article 51) for their activities in El Salvador and Uganda?, 82 Franck continues,
"[p]ut that way, and answered by the Court in the negative," i.e., no sufficient
evidence found for attribution, "the question precluded invocation of the right of
self-defense" by the United States and Uganda.83 Moreover, the State that is
subject to an armed attack is precluded from resorting to force under the Charter
even if the acts of the insurgents, evaluated on their own, amount to an armed
attack justifying self-defense under Article 5 1.84 This holds true unless the acts of
the insurgents operating in the territories of States constitute the act of those States
under the law of State responsibility.85 Professor Frank further observes "the
judges [the majority] could have replaced the question of attribution with a finding

78. PalestinianTerritory,2004 I.C.J. at 194, 139.
79. See Territory of the Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 222, 146.
80. See Nicaragua,1986 I.C.J. 14
81. Territoryof the Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 222-23, 146-47.
82. Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionalityof Countermeasuresin InternationalLaw, 102 AM. J.
INT'L L. 715, 722 (2008).
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 736-37; see Territory of the Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 222, 146; Nicaragua,1986 I.C.J.
at 65, 116.
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of liability of states for injurious effects emanating from their territory and
affecting the rights of neighboring states. 86
It seems that whatever change existed in the context of non-state
actors/terrorist acts of such an alarming magnitude, the change does not of itself
allow States to independently declare such acts as an "armed attack" and entitle
themselves to an armed response.87 The Security Council in accordance with the
Charter authorized the attack against Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/1 188 In
order for terrorist acts of a "significant scale,"8 9 designed and launched by an
independent private actor to be considered as an "armed attack" there should be
Security Council authorization allowing the victim State to exercise its right to
self-defense. 90 In addition, the resort to force must anticipate a proper identification
of the responsible State. 91
That being said, it is important to situate the UIC and Ethiopia's alleged threat
and mounting fear of attack into perspective in the light of these new
developments. According to the Ethiopian and the United States governments,
some elements within the Court's Union are terrorists or at least affiliated with
terrorist organizations. 92 To substantiate their allegations, they pointed to the then
head of the Court's Union, Sheikh Hassen Dahir Awyes, who according to the
Ethiopian government, was the leader of Ali-Itihad-al-Islamia.93 Nevertheless,
neither Ethiopia nor the United States declared the UIC in toto as a terrorist
organization. For the same reason, former members of the Court's Union are now
leading the TFG.94
Be that as it may, whatever change occurred in the law governing the use of
force, it did not affect the scope of Article 51. The US military response to the
attacks of 9/11 followed the second exception to Article 2(4) of the Charter,
namely, Security Council determination of the attack as a breach of international
peace and security and its subsequent authorization of the victim State to self86. Franck, supranote 83, at 722.
87. See O'CONNELL, supranote 5, at 7.
88. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 64.
89. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 104, 195.
90. See, e.g., O'CONNELL, supranote 5, at 5.
91. Id. at 7.
92. See David H. Shinn, United States Somali Relations: Local National and International
Dimensions, EAST AFRICA FORUM, Apr. 26, 2010, http://eastafricaforum.net/2010/4/28/united-statessomali-relations-local-national-and-international-dimensions/; Quick Guide: Somalia's Islamists, BBC
NEWS, Dec. 28, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6043764.stm. On December 16, 2008, the
Assistant Secretary of State was quoted as saying: "The Council of Islamic Courts is now controlled by
al-Qaeda cell individuals, East Africa al-Qaeda cell individuals. The top layer of the [sic] court are
extremists. They are terrorists.... They are killing nuns, they have killed children and they are calling
for ajihad (holy war)." Sue Pleming, U.S. says al Qaeda radicals leadSomali Islamists, REUTERS, Dec.
14, 2006, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N14424846.htm
(internal quotation marks
omitted).
93. See Profile: Somalia's Islamic Courts, BBC NEWS, June 6, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/5051588.stm.
94. U.S. Should Accept Islamist Authority, Report Says, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 12, 2010,
available at WL 3/12/10 allAfrica.com 12:34:08.
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defensive measures. However, NATO's and OAS's characterization of the events
of 9/11 as an 'armed attack', supports the view that 9/11 brought about a change in
the scope and substance of Article 51 of the Charter. However, this one time
practice does not constitute a new rule of customary international law that modifies
the substance of Article 51. Furthermore, nothing in treaty law or state practice
suggests the characterization of a non-state actor as a terrorist or otherwise
modifies the rule under Article 51 of the Charter. A terrorist attack by itself against
a State, if it is not of a significant scale and not attributable to State, does not
qualify as an "armed attack., 95 On the contrary, there is no reason why an attack by
a non-terrorist non-state actors, if it is of a significant scale and effect and
attributable to the State, should not be considered an "armed attack." The rationale
that informed NATO and OAS member States' consideration of 9/11 as an armed
attack seems to relate, among other things, to the gravity of the attack: where the
attack originated from, "the source of the attack (i.e. the actor), the
weapons/method of force used, the gravity of the attack, the location of the attack,
and the national and international reaction" to the attack.96 On the same reasoning,
one could argue, if an attack from the UIC against the Ethiopian State is significant
enough in terms of its scale and effect or in the light of the developments discussed
above, there is no reason why it should not be considered an armed attack within
the meaning of Article 51.
However, one might challenge the above contentions by pointing to Article
2(4) of the Charter which prevents the use of force by a State against another State
to reinforce the argument that the exception under Article 51 is a right to selfdefense in response to an attack occurred in violation of Article 2(4). 97 Thus, since
Article 51 is an exception to Article 2(4), which prohibits use of force by States,
the response under Article 51 must be to an "armed attack" by a State. 98 However,
the factual situations portrayed by the UIC as an entity that was in control of most
parts of Somalia as of December 2006, makes it more than just a non-state actor
and certainly entitles it to a de facto regime status. 99 If the recent change in
contemporary international law recognizes the rights of States to self-defense
against terrorist acts of grave magnitude,100 the right of States to defend themselves
from a de facto regime conforms even better to the raison d'etre that represented
whatever shift in the law.
On a more conceptual level, the characterization of the UIC, at the relevant
time, as a de facto regime rather than a mere terrorist group1 °1 strengthens the

argument of those who supported a broader construction of Article 51 to
95. See Guruli, supranote 37, at 110-14.
96. Id.at 110.
97. See id. at 103.
98. Id.
99. See U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Somalia: UIC Disarms Militia,
Tightens Control Over Kismayo, IRINNEWS.ORG, Sept. 28, 2006, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/library/news/2006/09/mil-060928-irinOl.htm.
100. See Guruli, supranote 37, at 108-09.
101. See Findingan End to the Somali Crisis, U.N. INTEGRATED REG'L INFO.NETWORKS, Aug. 18,
2006, available at Westlaw, 8/18/06 allAfrica.com 16:58:48.
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accommodate not only acts of State but also of non-state actors. 10 2 Furthermore, it
was even contended that de facto regimes are bound by the provisions of Article
2(4) of the Charter regardless of individual or collective international
recognition. 103 Even if Ethiopia and other members of the international community
recognize the TFG, by virtue of actual territorial control, the UIC is bound by the
prohibitions set forth in Article 2(4). 104 It follows that conduct by a non-state actor,
such as the UIC, if it is contrary to the stipulation of Article 2(4) and of significant
scale, can qualify as an "armed attack" and trigger Ethiopia's right of selfdefense.10 5 Therefore, the non-state-actor nature of the UIC does not deny Ethiopia
the right to resort to self-defensive measures if other conditions of the law are
fulfilled.

C. How SignificantMust the Attack Be? The 'Scale' and 'Effect' Test
The third major requirement of Article 51 relates to the gravity of the armed
attack. 10 6 Generally, in order for self-defense to be lawful, a significant armed
attack must have "already occurred ' 10 7 "against the territorial integrity and
political independence of States. 10 8 The application of Article 51 will be triggered
only when an armed attack of a significant scale and effect has already occurred
against a State.10 9 Hence, the Ethiopian State must demonstrate that not only an
attack has already occurred "against its territorial integrity and political
independence," but an attack of a significant scale and effect, have already
110
occurred against its "territorial integrity or political independence."
The language of Article 51 is silent on the requirement of gravity of the
attack.' In considering the question of the "sending by a State of armed bands,"
the ICJ introduced a scale and effect based test when it held that the prohibition of

102. See Guruli, supra note 37, at 107-08 (discussing the two different theories regarding what

constitutes an "armed attack").
103. See Stalin, supra note 55, at 42.
104. Jackson Mbuvi, Only a Spirit of Give and Take will Work,ALLAFRICA.COM, Nov.
available at Westlaw, 11/16/06 allAfrica.com 01:34:41.

16, 2006,

105. See Guruli, supra note 37, at 108 (drawing similarity between the United States right of selfdefense used against the 9/11 attacks, which qualify as an "armed attack" of a significant scale against
the United States, and Ethiopia's possible right of self defense against the UIC).
106. See O'CONNELL, supra note 5,at 5-6.
107. Id.at5.
108. Id.at 4.
109. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103-04,
194-95.
110. U.N. Charter art. 2, 4;Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J.
at 103, 195 (establishing the law regarding
when an attack qualifies as an "armed attack" because of the scale and effect of the attack). The fact
intensive/specific nature of this requirement is apparent. It requires a higher threshold of evidence
usually unavailable for academic research. In addition to the gravity of the attack Ethiopia claimed to
have suffered before the days and months leading to the December 24, 2006, the very existence of any
such attack against the "territorial integrity and political independence" of Ethiopia, cannot be
empirically verified. Since the evidence necessary for the analysis of Ethiopia's conduit is far from
being sufficient, the following discussion relies on governmental statements, official correspondences
between governments and international organizations to examine the legality of resort to force.
111. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
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armed attacks may apply to "the sending by a State of armed bands on to the
territory of another State, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects,
would have been classified as an armed attack [rather than a mere frontier
accident] had it been carried out by regular armed forces. 11 2 Although the Court
did not set an objective threshold that must be reached in order for the use of an
armed band to rise to an armed attack, ' it1 3nevertheless unequivocally stipulated that
it should occur on a "significant scale."
There are voices within the Ethiopian political spectrum and within the
international community unconvinced about the occurrence of such an attack, and
even if such an attack did occur, they question the significance of its scale and
effect as to trigger Ethiopia's self-defensive response.! 14 Some opposition members
of the Ethiopian Parliament echoed concern and skepticism about the gravity of the
danger posed against Ethiopia and the overall intent of the government.115 This
116
sentiment was echoed in a vigorous debate that took place in the parliament.
Responding to a question from opposition MPs on whether Ethiopia is engaging in
preemptive self-defense, the Ethiopian Prime Minister stated unambiguously that
the Country had already come under attack from the UIC, 1 17 without elaborating in
detail the gravity, place and time of that attack.118 Prime Minister Meles Zenawi
refrained from making a public statement about the details of the attack owing to
national security concerns and asked the Speaker of the House to adjourn for a new
session to allow time for deliberation on the evidence with the opposition.1 19 In the
next session of parliament devoted to the consideration of this resolution, major
112. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103-04, T 195 (emphasis added).
113. Id.; W. Michael Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold War
World: Practices,Conditions, and Prospects,in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER
26, 39 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991) (quoting Nicaragua).
114. See Abeje Tesfaye, The Responsibility to Protect Somalia, ETHIOPIAN REPORTER, Aug. 12,
2006, available at Westlaw, 8/12/06 allAfrica.com 07:04:01.
115. Bruck Shewareged, Politics - On the Brink of War - Government Seeks Parliamentary
Backing, ETHIOPIAN REPORTER, Nov. 29, 2006, available at Westlaw, 11/29/06 allAfrica.com

17:56:19.
116. See id. (explaining the differing views of members of the parliament regarding the
adjournment motion).
117. Id.
118. See id. When the PM presented a four-point resolution to the parliament seeking authorization
to take any means necessary to curb possible attack from forces in Somalia, opposition political parties
pressed the PM to provide genuine evidence that Ethiopia s indeed attacked by the UIC. In a televised
parliamentary debate, the PM expressed his willingness to share 'sensitive' national security evidence
with political parties in private so that the house unanimously pass the resolution backing the
government. However, most opposition parties remained opposed to the resolution after deliberating
with the government on the evidence. When the resolution was re-tabled before parliament for voting,
most opposition parties either voted against or abstained. The PM commented that the difference
between the government and the opposition lies at the heart of the third point in the resolution, which
accuses Ethiopian insurgencies based in Eritrea and Somalia collusion with foreign forces to attack
Ethiopia. The resolution was passed by a vote of 311 to 99 with 11 abstentions. See Parliament
Endorses Resolution to Reverse Somali Islamists Aggression, Press Section, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS ETHIOPIA, Dec. 1, 2006, http://mfa.gov.et/Press Section/publication.php? Main Page
Number=3221.
119. Shewareged, supranote 116.
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opposition parties either abstained or voted against the resolution that authorized
12
the government to take "all necessary and legal steps" to repel the danger. 0
Defending UEDF's (Union of Ethiopian Democratic Forces) position on the
resolution, Professor Beyene Petros, then an MP, expressed his doubts in the
following terms:
If sporadic incursion warranted a declaration of war, there would be no
peace any[ ]where. Here, we are only being told of sporadic incursions
and there is nothing to show us... an act of invasion. Therefore we do
not believe the threat is being appropriately defined [nor] that it justifies
such resolution. 121
UEDF's leader, Beyene Petros, agrees with the government: Ethiopia might
have been attacked by Ethiopian rebel forces operating from within an area under
the control of the UIC.12 2 However, his party has opposed the characterization of
such attacks from insurgent groups as "invasion" by the UIC and has refused to
support the resolution that authorized the government to declare war on insurgent
groups.123

For the purpose of self-defense under Article 5 1, Ethiopia must have suffered
an armed attack of a significant magnitude in terms of its scale and effect for its
self-defensive measure to be lawful under the law. 124 From the conditions required
by the law and analyzed above, Ethiopia's self-defensive measure does not seem to
comply with requirement of an armed attack of a significant scale and effect, a
requirement at the very core of the Charter regime on self-defense. 125 However, if
it is established that Ethiopia has been under repeated attacks that are not in and of
themselves individually significant enough to trigger its self-defensive measure,
one might argue that an "accumulation of events" doctrine allows the government
to accumulate the small scale attacks as constituting one serious and significant
attack. 126 However, this doctrine is not well received127in international law and does
not seem consistent with the position of the Charter.
Ethiopia also defended its action before and after the war on the basis of the
existence of what it called a "clear and present danger., 128 Indeed, Ethiopia tended
to favor this line of argument more than the argument that "the right of self
defen[s]e arises only if an armed attack . . . occurs., 129 As discussed above in
120. See Dagnachew Teklu, MPs Vote to Fend Off Islamist "JihadWar", DAILY MONITOR, Dec. 5,
2006, available at Westlaw, 12/5/06 allAfrica.com 01:46:39.
121. Namrud Berhane, Eritrea will Fight to the Last Somali, not the Last Eritrean - Meles,
ETHIOPIAN REPORTER, Dec. 4, 2006, available at Westlaw, 12/4/06 allAfrica.com 15:37:3 1.

122. See Yelibenwork Ayele, Ethiopia: UEDFDefends its Position,ETHIOPIAN REPORTER, Dec. 9,
2006, http://allafrica.com/stories/200612110387.html.
123. See Berhane, supra note 122.
124. See Nicaragua,1986 I.C.J. at 103-04,
194-95.
125. See Tesfaye, supranote 115.
126. Howard A. Wachtel, TargetingOsama Bin Laden: Examining the Legality ofAssassination as
a Tool of US. ForeignPolicy, 55 DuKE L.J. 677, 693 (2005).
127. Id. at 693-94.
128. Shewareged, supranote 116; Teklu, supranote 121.
129. GRAY, supra note 5, at 98. During the discussion in the parliament, the Ethiopian government
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detail, threats, whether imminent or otherwise, do not entitle one to resort to armed
response under the Charter. 130 Since the Charter rules on self-defense have a
separate existence than the rules of self-defense in customary international law, the
next sections will examine the validity of Ethiopia's right to self-defense under
customary international law.
IV. ETHIOPIA'S USE OF FORCE UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Some scholars have argued that customary international law allows the right
to a defensive measure in anticipation of an attack even if an armed attack did not
occur.1 31 Professor Bowett for example contends that Article 2(4) of the Charter

did not impair State's customary right to self-defense and did not confine it to a
response to armed attack. 13 2 In a similar fashion, Sir Humphrey Waldock observed
that "where there is convincing evidence not merely of threats and potential danger
but of an attack being actually mounted, then an armed
attack may be said to have
' 133
begun to occur, though it has not passed the frontier."
The exchange between the United States and United Kingdom following the
Caroline incident is considered an authoritative statement, reflective of customary
international law on the use of force. 134 In this correspondence, the then Secretary
of State, James Webster, articulated the notion that self-defense must be limited to
situations in which "the necessity of that self-defen[s]e is instant, overwhelming,
and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation., 135 Professor
O'Connell contends that the formula in Caroline is consistent with "the letter and
sprit of the Charter., 136 Schachter also observes that the delegates to137the Security
Council discussed the rule in Caroline following the Osirakincident
In that exchange, Mr. Webster neatly articulated the rule that "the act,
justified by the necessity of self-defens[e], must be limited by that necessity, and
kept clearly within it."'1 38 It is from these statements that the touchstone principles
of necessity and proportionality evolved.

has persistently referred to the vernacular of a "clear and present danger" produced by combination of
four points presented to the Parliament as constituting the basis for such a danger. See Shewareged,
supranote 117; Teklu, supranote 122 (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. See O'CONNELL, supranote 5, at 8, 13.
131. Id. at9.
132. BROWNLIE, supranote 7, at 269.
133. O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 8-9.
134. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1635
(1984); see also O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 9 (concluding that the Caroline doctrine is consistent
with the Charter and the Charter by now is considered crystallization of customary international law);
but see GRAY, supra note 5, at 98 (portraying the two differing positions argued with respect to Article
51 through a paradigm called "the Academic Debate"; while some argue that the inherent right of the
State to self-defense allows anticipatory self-defense, others argue that the right is limited to cases when
an armed atta already occurred).
135. Id. at 1635.
136. O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 9.
137. Schachter, supra note 135, at 1635.
138. JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE:

A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 17 (1983).

2010

ETHIOPIA'S ARMED INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

A. Armed Response Should Be Necessary: The Requirement ofNecessity
According to Caroline,the necessity that provokes self-defense should be one
that is "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of
deliberation." 3 9 What is instant and overwhelming depends on a number of factual
circumstances ruling at the relevant time and space and there is no empirical
formula that helps make an objective determination of what fits into this
parameter. Indeed, given the danger posed against States by acts of "terrorism," the
eminence and proximity of the danger should be assessed in relative terms. For
example, a State equipped with some of the most sophisticated and advanced
military technology should not be held to the same standard of necessity as poor
countries that do not possess the necessary intelligence and technical knowledge to
appreciate the eminence and gravity of the threat and the means with which to
respond to it.
The Ethiopian Premier told Parliament that the Islamists in Somalia have
presented a "clear and present danger" against the country's peace and security."'
According to the resolution passed by the Ethiopian Parliament, a combination of
four major factors triggered Ethiopia's right to lawful self-defense: a) The presence
of Eritrean troops in Somalia with the sole purpose of destabilizing the peace and
stability of the Ethiopian State; b) the repeated declaration by UIC of a holy warjihad-against Ethiopia and the flow of arms and financial support to the group
from several Middle Eastern countries; c) the operation of armed Ethiopian
opposition groups from within the areas under the control of the UIC with the view
to overthrowing the legally constituted government of Ethiopia; and d) the
presence of foreign militant fighters alongside the UIC which constituted a

situation of "clear and present danger" against the territorial integrity and political
independence of the Ethiopian State. 141 In particular, the emergence of the UIC as
a real political force while Ethiopia was militarily confronting secessionist

139. CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (1945), reprinted in MARY ELLEN
O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 122 (2005); See

also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 40-41,
51-52 (Sept.
25); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4).
140. See, Jonathan Clayton, Ethiopia Confronts Somali Warlords, SUNDAY TIMES, Nov. 24, 2006,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article648189.ece (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. See Press Conference, Prime Minister of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi (June 26, 2007),
http://www.ethio
embassy.org.uk/Archive/PMo20Meleso2Zenawio2Press%/o2OConference /o27tho2OJune%/2200
6.html, (Last accessed 19 February 2009) ("[Y]ou have the messenger voice of the government of
Eritrea who has been actively involved in the fighting in Mogadishu. Theirs is not a specifically Somali
agenda. And finally, you have the jihadists led by Al-Ithad Islami, which I am sure you know, is
registered by the United Nations as a terrorist organization. And so, for us, the Islamic Courts Union is
not a homogeneous entity. Our beef is with Al-Ithad, the internationally recognized terrorist
organization. It so happens that at the moment the new leadership of the Union of the Courts is
dominated by this particular group. Indeed, the chairman of the new council that they have established
is a certain colonel who also happens to be the head of Al-Ithad. Now, the threat posed to Ethiopia by
the dominance of the Islamic Courts by Al-Ithad is obvious."); See also Clayton, supra note 141;
Ethiopian ParliamentAuthorizes Action Against Somali Islamists, TURKISHPRESS.COM (Nov. 30, 2006),

http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id

=

153555.
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movements in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, heightened142Ethiopia's threat and
strengthened its contention on the inevitability of an attack.
An even more threatening situation was the allegation that the officials of the
UIC divulged their intention of reuniting all Somali speaking regions around
Somalia, signaling the beginning of its vision to integrate the Somali people of
Ethiopia into mainland Somalia contrary to principles of international law. 143 As
one analyst familiar with the geopolitical dynamics of the region commented,
"some leaders in the [UIC], certainly including Hassan Dahir Aweys, wish to
reenergize the Greater Somalia concept by incorporating into Somalia those
Somali-inhabited parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti., 144 The Ethiopian
Parliament Resolution authorizing the government to take all legal and necessary
measures against invasion by the UIC contended that "the [UIC] ha[s] an
expansionist
intent to annex the Somali-speaking parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and
1' 45
Djibouti.
Despite these allegations and bold assertions by the UIC, some analysts
dismissed UIC's propaganda as empty rhetoric and held that the UIC was not a
viable threat to Ethiopia's territorial integrity and political independence at the
time of intervention. 146 In the words of former US Ambassador to Ethiopia,
Professor David Shinn:
The Ethiopian military is far more powerful than the militias of the
Islamic Courts, which cannot at this writing, pose a serious military
threat to the Ethiopian homeland, including the Somali-inhabited
Ogaden region. The Ethiopian military has the capacity to defeat
handily the Islamic Court militias inside Somalia in conventional
engagements. 147
In both the Nicaragua and Congo cases, the ICJ has failed to provide
guidance as to what constitutes an "imminent threat of armed attack" and expressly
stated that:
[R]eliance is placed by the Parties only on the right of self-defense in
the case of an armed attack which has already occurred, and the issue of
the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of armed attack has

142. See Clayton, supra note 141.
143. See Somalia: US. Government Policy and Challenges: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
African Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Hearing]
(statement of Hon. David H. Shinn, Adjunct Professor, Elliott School of Int'l Affairs, George
Washington University), available at http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/109s/34879.txt.
144. See id.
145. Zeray W. Yindego, Ethiopia'smilitary action against the Union of Islamic Courts and others
in Somalia: some legal implications,INT'L & COMP. L.Q., 2007, at 2.
146. See David Shinn, The Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict, NASRET.COM, 3 (Dec. 27 2006),
http://www.nazret.com/php/uploadnews/search.php?misc=search&subaction=showfull&id= 116742276
3&archive=&cnshow-news&ucat-&start from=&.
147. Id.
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not been raised. Accordingly, the Court expresses no view on that
issue.148

Ethiopia holds that Eritrea's multifaceted actions in Somalia are aimed at its
territorial integrity and political independence. 149 It maintained that Eritrea trains,
arms, and hosts Ethiopian opposition armed groups, such as the Ogaden National
Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), with the
manifest desire to destabilize the stability of the Ethiopian state.150 To that effect, it
was indirectly using, at the relevant time, the UIC controlled territories of Somalia
as a launching pad and alludes to the United Nations Report to corroborate its
allegations. 51 More specifically, the Ethiopian government contended that Eritrea
was preparing for another round of armed confrontation as the UIC, foreign
15 2
jihadists, and other forces displayed their unflinching desire to attack Ethiopia.
Ethiopia contends the existence of ever mounting threat by pointing to the repeated
declaration ofjihad by the UIC and the increasing offensive capability of this force
with the material and military support from such countries as Iran, Egypt, SaudiArabia and others.153
Indeed, the various threats facing Ethiopia at the time bring to mind the
surmounting risks that lie ahead. However, even though the cumulative effect of
these four factors could amount to a serious threat to Ethiopia's sovereignty, 154 it is
doubtful that the UIC and the foreign insurgent forces, at the time, presented a
danger so grave and imminent as to amount to a situation that is "instant,
overwhelming" and one that denied Ethiopia the choice of means and a moment
for deliberation. The relative advantage the Ethiopian army has over the UIC is one
such factor distancing the realization of any such eminence. 155 For the Ethiopian
government, however, given the political and legal circumstances ruling at the
time, failure to act would have simply mounted the risk. A delay would have only
postponed the threat, not averted it. This is precisely so because of the role-played
and the pressure exerted by Eritrea and the United States on their respective

148. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103, 195; see also Territory of the Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 222, 143
(quoting Nicaragua).
149. See Blame Game Over Somalia Conflict, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, Apr. 24, 2007,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/ethiopia/2007/O413blame.htm ("Ethiopia's Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs Tekeda Alemu charged that "Eritrea is not simply supporting terrorism, it is
actively involved in terrorism in Ethiopia and our sub-region."').
150. See U.N. Sec. Council Comm., Rep. of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Sec.
Council resolution 1676,

22-23, 26-27, 30, U.N. Doc. S/2006/913 (Oct. 16, 2006) [hereinafter U.N.

Sec. Council Comm. Rep. pursuant to resolution 1676]; see also Blame Game Over Somalia Conflict,
supranote 150.
151. See U.N. Sec. Council Comm., Rep. pursuant to resolution 1676, supranote 151, at 11 22-23,
28, 218. In its 2006 Report to the Security Council, the Monitoring Group announced the participation
of forces of Eritrea, OLF, ONLF and the UIC in the war leading to UIC's occupation of Kismaayo. The
MGO also reported the shipment of arms to ONLF, OLF and the UIC from Eritrea. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.

222.
213.

154. Id. at 6.
155. See Id.1222.
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proxies to act and not delay.15 6 However, these political considerations, which
instigated and created a trump-mood over the legal requirements, do not seem to
create a state of necessity that is of itself "instant,157overwhelming, and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.,
In Territory of the Congo, the ICJ did not fird Uganda's action necessary,
even if Uganda was threatened by a non-state actor operating on the territory of the
Congo. 158 The Court and the applicant States have recognized the existence of an
armed attack against Uganda which the Court referred to as "series of deplorable
attacks."' 159 The fact that the rebel groups threatening Uganda's security received
support from the Sudan and launched an attack from the DRC did not change the
conclusion of the Court. The Court did not fird the threat grave enough as to
justify the resort to armed force against the territories of the Congo. 16 In this
judgment, the Court dismissed Uganda's claim to the exercise of its right to selfdefense on both counts of necessity and proportionality.1 61 Uganda told the Court
that it carried out a military operation on the Congolese soil with the sole purpose
of diffusing "the offensive capabilities" of FUNA, 162 an insurgent organization
163
allegedly bent on destabilizing Uganda using the DRC as a launching pad.
Rejecting Uganda's argument for the existence of a necessary condition that
justified a resort to force, the Court held that "the evidence did not support the
Ugandan claim to have been attacked or threatened on such a scale as to give rise
to a right to resort to military force in self-defense on the territory of the
Congo. , 164
In her analysis of the state of the law relating to the use of force post 9/11,
Professor O'Connell concludes that in the face of an obvious intention, on the part
of the enemy to continue to pose a threat, armed self-defense is legitimate.1 65 The
repeated declaration of a holy war might demonstrate an irrevocable intention of
the UIC to attack Ethiopia whenever it acquires the necessary military capability to
do SO. 1 6 6 However, the level of threat that the UIC posed against the Ethiopian
State is not as grave and imminent as to justify self-defense. The ICJ is clear in
holding that the "series of deplorable attacks" against Uganda do not
justify
167
Uganda's self-defensive measures against the insurgencies in the Congo.

156. See Clayton, supranote 141.
157. HYDE, supranote 140, at 122.
158. Territoryof the Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 223, 147.
159. Id. 146.
160. Id.
161. Id. 147.
162. Id. 45.
163. Id. 120.
164. Id. 147.
165. O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 10. Relying on resolution 1368/2001 and 1373/2001 of the
Security Council and the position of NATO member States, Professor O'Connell argues that whenever
there is a clear and convincing evidence that the enemy the intention or motive to continue to threat a
State, then the State is within its rights to defend it self by use of armed force. Id. at 9.
166. See U.N. Sec. Council Comm., Rep. pursuantto resolution 1676, supra note 151, 204.
167. Territoryof the Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 222-23,
146-147.
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The other requirement relates to the existence of another alternative-a
"choice of means"-other than the use of an armed force that could have prevented
the necessity of self-defense. 168 One of the most resonating contentions advanced
by Ethiopia holds that the forces under the umbrella of the UIC and the Eritrean
government were working on the basis of a common design and motive to achieve
a common purpose-destabilizing and endangering the territorial integrity and
political independence of Ethiopia. 169 However, the UIC was not a proper
government and can hardly be dealt with by diplomatic or legal means. Ethiopia
claimed that it exhausted all diplomatic means available to avoid the confrontation
but to no avail. 170 Although the defacto character of the UIC and the impossibility
of pursuing a legal course against this force are true enough, the absence of this
condition alone does not constitute a condition of necessity justifying Ethiopia's
resort to force. Indeed, the Ethiopian government had serious security concerns at
the time.17 1 However, necessity as a justification requires an exceptionally higher
threshold of mounting peril that is instant, overwhelming and should be one that
does not leave any moment for deliberation. Ethiopia was certainly not under that
kind of situation at the time it went to war.
Ethiopia's contention that the UIC is acting as a proxy for Eritrea and that it is
providing a safe heaven to the Ethiopian rebel forces operating within Eritrea and
172
Somalia is supported by the findings of the UN Monitoring Group.
Accordingly, the official view holds that the only feasible recourse available is to
take a self-defensive measure against the forces that host and infiltrate what
Ethiopia deems as anti-peace elements into its territory and the stationing of
foreign jihadists on its border. 173 In the words of Ethiopia's Ambassador to the UK,
Mr. Birhanu Kebede, "the extremist forces have been training anti-Ethiopian
elements and infiltrating them to Ethiopia as well as repeatedly attacking
Ethiopia. 1 74 Ethiopia's Premier, Meles Zenawi, emphasized the link between the
attack against Ethiopia and the UIC when he accused the UIC of infiltrating antiEthiopian rebel forces "sheltered in areas under its control."1 75 Outlining the effort
of the Ethiopian government to avoid military confrontation, the Prime Minister
said:
168. O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 9.

169. See Blame Game Over Somalia Conflict, supra note 150.
170. See, e.g., Aregu Balleh, Ethiopia Will Continue to Seek Peaceful Options to Deal With UIC State Minister, ETHIOPIAN HERALD, Dec. 3, 2006, available at Westlaw 12/3/06 allAfrica.com
19:32:12.
171. See Ethiopia Has Genuine Security Concerns - U.S., ETHIOPIAN HERALD, Dec. 29, 2006,

available at Westlaw 12/29/06 allAfrica.com 18:09:04.
172. See U.N. Sec. Council Comm., Rep. pursuantto resolution 1676, supra note 151, 28.
173. See TFG Troops seize OLF Fighters, ETHIOPIAN HERALD, Dec. 23 2009 (on file with author)
(noting that the State media said: "Repeated attacks are being launched against Ethiopia by OLF, the
Ogaden Liberation Front (ONLF) and the fundamentalist forces under the Union of Islamic Courtsforces that constitute the front of destruction created by Shaiebia.").
174. Ethiopian military operationdo not target people of Somalia, KILIL 5 ONLINE, Dec. 25, 2006

(2010-09-28 04:16 +0000), http://www.kilil5.com/news/5385_ethiopian-military-operation-do-&print
175. Meles says Ethiopia forced into war: PM Meles, KILIL 5 ONLINE, Dec. 26, 2006,

http://www.kilil5.com/news/5353 meles-says-ethiopia-forced-into- (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
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[T]he group was told to withdraw the anti-Ethiopian forces it gathered
from the areas it controls, to stop sheltering these forces and infiltrating
them into Ethiopia, to lift the war it declared against Ethiopia and
address our differences through negotiation. 176

Therefore, to the extent that these forces are in the areas within the effective
control of the UIC and the UIC is not willing to see to the problem, Somalia is in
breach of its international obligation. 177 But Somalia is a failed state in which no
responsible government exists. 1 78 This unique paradigm of a failed state situation
coupled with the threat of extremist militancy revamps Ethiopia's position.
Although some may hold that the four factors do not to meet the requirements of
the law that seeks to allow force only as a measure of a last resort, the absence of
an internationally responsible actor within Somalia could be seen as an additional
179
factor that dispenses with the excessively restrictive regime of necessity.
Therefore, the failed state situation in Somalia and the cumulative effect of the four
factors that Ethiopia presented as creating what it called a situation of "clear and
present danger", could be seen to have created a state of necessity that allows a
temporary right to use a proportionate force to remove the threat not an all out
invasion.180
1 81
B. Armed Response Must be Proportional:The Proportionality
Test

Thomas M. Franck marvelously captures the hub of the doctrine of
proportionality in the following terms:
The doctrine held that (1) any State resorting to war should calibrate its
response in proportion to the demonstrable wrong perpetrated against it,
and that (2) the means deployed as a countermeasure against a
perpetrator be proportionate to the minimum force necessary to achieve
redress. The doctrine was designed to ensure that States would not resort
to unprincipled and unnecessarily brutal violence under cover of
redressing an alleged wrong.182

176. ETHIOPIAN HERALD, Dec. 26, 2009, at Vol. LXIII, No. 091, p. 9 (on file with author).
177. Since the situation in Somalia is unusual and one marred by militancy and extremism on the
one hand and a failed-state-situation on the other, one might argue that the classical rule of international
law which required States to refrain from these acts may not fit neatly into the Somali paradigm. In
those cases, States might be justified in taking a proportionate response to an armed attack which
already occurred or already begun to occur. Nonetheless, the threshold of threat in this case is much
lower than required by the law. What exacerbated the situation more than the actual threat are the
hostilities of the parties towards one another and the existence of special interest by powerful nations
such as the United States.
178. See Quick Guide: Somalia's Islamists, BBC NEWS (last updated at 08:37 GMT, Thursday, 28
December 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6043764.stm.
179. Franck, On Proportionalityof Countermeasures in InternationalLaw, supra note 83, at 763.
180. See Clayton, supra note 141 (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. Franck, On Proportionalityof Countermeasuresin InternationalLaw, supra note 84, at 715
("Put formulaically, most proportionality discourse occurs when A has done (or threatens to do) Xto B,
and B responds by doing Yto A. The issue then crystallizes as an inquest into whether counter-measure
Y is "equivalent" (i.e., proportionate) to X.").
182. Id. at 719.
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Proportionality is a principle of law inextricably tied to the principle of
necessity and requires the acts of self-defense to be proportionate to "the necessity
provoking them."1 83 The application of this abstract but insurmountably vital
principle to situations of military conflict has never been an easy task.
Proportionality, as a principle that governs both the resort to force and the means
and methods relating to the conduct of hostilities, remains one of the most
controversial principles that involves, to borrow from Thomas Franck, "an
awkward balancing of apples and oranges."' 184 However, the paramount need "to
prevent war but, failing that, to humanize the conflict as much as possible" makes
proportionality one of the most celebrated principles,
even an important conception
185
of law, constantly invoked in international law.
In Nicaragua, the ICJ declared the conduct of the United States as
disproportionate noting that:
[The] United States' mining of Nicaraguan ports and attacks on the
ports, oil installations, etc., do not satisfy the criterion of
proportionality. 'Whatever uncertainty may exist as to the exact scale of
the aid received by the Salvadorian armed opposition from Nicaragua, it
is clear that these latter United States
activities in question could not
186
have been proportionate to that aid.
In the Territory of the Congo, the Court did not find a right of self-defensive
measures by Uganda. 187 However, the Court proceeded to examine the
proportionality of the self-defense measures. On proportionality, the Court
pronounced that "the taking of airports and towns many hundreds of kilometers
from Uganda's borders would not seem proportionate... nor []be necessary.1 88
The principle calls for a right and sensible balance between the threat faced
and the response aimed at removing that threat.18 9 As various fact situations are

peculiar and present unique realities, the universe of proportionality remains
amenable to ambiguity. However, it must not succumb to unprincipled individual
evaluations justifying the use of brute force to aggravate the calamities of resort to
force and the ensuing war. What provoked Ethiopia's resort to force was not a
particular attack against its territory or a single threat against its national security.
As discussed in previous sections, the Ethiopian government identified a wide
range of potential threats including, but not limited to, the declaration of the holy
war against it and the Ethiopian rebels operating from within Somalia which,
according to the Ethiopian government, are working with common design and

183. Schachter, supra note 135, at 1637.
184. Franck, On Proportionalityof Countermeasures in InternationalLaw, supra note 83, at 716.
185. Id at 723.
186. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 367, 211.
187. Territoryof The Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 223, 147.
188. Id.
189. See David DeCosse, Lost in the 'Logic of War', SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY MARKULA
CENTER FOR APPLIED ETmCS, http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/ethicalperspectives/logic.html
(last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
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purpose with the UIC and the Eritrean government. 190 Even if one finds Ethiopia to
be in a state of necessity, Ethiopia's occupation of cities and airports far away from
its borders cannot be a proportionate measure limited at removing the threat that
created the necessity of self-defense.
Ethiopia is certainly under a more threatening situation that justifies the resort
to force compared to Uganda. Uganda could have probably averted the danger
posed to its territorial integrity and political independence by working with the
DRC, or failing that, bringing the issue to the Security Council to seek
authorization in exercising its right to self-defense. Also, Uganda could have
brought the DRC before the ICJ alleging its failure to prevent the rebels from using
its territory for illegal activities aimed at endangering its sovereignty. Ethiopia, on
the other hand, did not have any such choice as the UIC is not a recognized
international actor despite its de facto control of a large portion of the Somali
territory and could not have been stopped through such means. 191
On proportionality, like Uganda, Ethiopia has occupied cities and an airport
far away from its borders.192 After removing the UIC from Mogadishu and other
major towns of Somalia, Ethiopia made its withdrawal contingent upon the
deployment of an African Union peacekeeping force. 193 According to Ethiopia, it
remained in Somalia to assist the internationally recognized transitional
government without an international mandate, and to also ensure that the terrorists
will not return to the position that they were held before they were driven from the
capital. 194 The elimination of the threat against its stability requires the restoration
of peace and an effective government in Somalia. If Somalia remains an insecure
region, it could continue to pose a threat to the peace and security of Ethiopia and

the region.
Writing on the proportionality of self-defensive measures, Oscar Schachter
reached the conclusion that a State that suffered a frontier attack does not "bomb
cities or launch an invasion."' 195 Ethiopia, even if it was under an actual armed
attack at the relevant time, cannot proceed to the hinterlands of Somalia and
remain there for a period of two years in the exercise of self-defensive measures
aimed at removing the danger that created a state of necessity. As stipulated in
Caroline,the necessity of self-defense must be limited to removing the danger that
created the condition of necessity. 196 If Ethiopia's defense has rested on its inherent
190. See TURKISHPRESS.COM supranote 142.

191. See Somalia - Amnesty International Report 2007, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/somalia/report-2007 (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
192. See U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Situation in Somalia, 25, U.N. Doc. S/2007/115 (Feb. 28, 2007).
193. See Ethiopia 'Bogged Down' in Somalia, BBC, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, Nov. 27, 2007,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/199/40868.html;
Jason McLure & Hamsa
Omar, Ethiopia Agrees to Withdraw Troops from Somalia, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 27, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ao7G53sBBsXY&refer-home.
194. See Ethiopia PM,US Intelligence Committee Discuss Terrorism, Somalia, SUDAN TRIBUNE,
Feb. 22, 2007, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article20382.
195. Schachter, supra note 135, at 1637.
196. See British-American Diplomacy: The Caroline Case, Enclosure 1-Extract from Note of April
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right to self-defense and lawful self-defense is accompanied by adherence to the
principles of necessity and proportionality, even if we assume that Ethiopia has
faced an imminent peril to its "essential interests" and hence under a necessary
situation that justifies the use of force, Ethiopia's response goes way beyond what
is necessary to avert the danger and is disproportionate to the threat posed against
its territorial integrity and political independence.
What is interesting, also striking as odd, is the silence of the Security Council,
the General Assembly of the UN, and the African Union in the face of what seems
to be a disproportionate use of force against the territorial integrity and political
independence of Somalia. These organs have envisioned the TFG and the TFG
Charter as the only path to the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia.1 97 At
the same time, the TFG supported the Ethiopian intervention, 198 which could not
have existed had it not been for the protection extended to it from Ethiopia.
Politically speaking, Ethiopia's measure to intervene and remain in Somalia seems
to have accorded with the interests of these international and regional
organizations. 199 However, these organs have not expressly authorized Ethiopia to
20
act as it did and nor did they condemn its action.200 In fact, speaking in retrospect,
the Ethiopian Prime Minister said "the United Nations Security Council did not put
into question the measure we took in self-defense. Similarly various [g]ovemments
in different parts of the world have supported our right to self-defense and have
refrained from putting out any kinds of declarations which might have put into
question our inherent right of self-defense., 20 1 Does the concurrence of will
between Ethiopia and these organizations, the positing of the issue as essentially
part of the global war on terror by both Ethiopia and the United States, and the
attendant silence of the Security Council remove the de-legitimizing aspects of
Ethiopia's military action? Is international law moving to the recognition that the
gravity of the danger and potential threat posed by acts of terrorism, the most
acclaimed problem of the first decade of the 21st century, is subject to a lighter
standard of necessity and proportionality? These are among the problems
international law must confront head-on in the times to come.
Whatever political significance one might ascribe to Ethiopia's decision to
push into the heartlands of Somalia and remain there for two years,20 2 its action
does not appear to be legally proportionate to the needs that triggered the selfdefensive measure. Ethiopia might contend that it has done so to offer the Somali
people the chance to reconcile, solve their differences and form a government.
24, 1981, YALE LAW SCHOOL AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th century/br1842d.asp#web2 (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
197. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supranote 192.
198. See Fanta, supranote 1.
199. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supranote 192.
200. See id.
201. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Speech to the
Parliament (Jan. 2, 2006) available at http://www.mfa.gov.et/Press Section/publication.php?Main_
Page Number=3311.
202. See Sophia Tesfamariam, Somalia: Two Years After the US-Backed Invasion and Occupation,
AM. CHRONICLE, Dec. 4, 2008, http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/83924.
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Indeed, one could argue that Ethiopia created an ample opportunity for the Somalis
and the international community to work towards the creation of an effective and
inclusive Somali government. As complex as Somalia's political problems may be,
an international coalition could have provided a better political and/or military
solution to Somalia's decades of lawlessness. Even in this light, the best
designation that could probably describe Ethiopia's action might be that used in
justifying the illegal bombardment of Kosovo by NATO-may be illegal but
justified.
V. CONCLUSION

The legality of Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia presents a complex
maze of dilemmas dictated by the realities of a failed state scenario and a modem
threat of terrorism. Ethiopia claims that the invitation by the legitimate and
recognized government of Somalia and its lawful right to collective and individual
self-defense justified its military intervention. 20 3 Examining the validity of these
claims involves an appreciation of highly contested facts and unverifiable
allegations.
Ethiopia argued that its actions are consistent with the letter and the spirit of
Article 2(4) since it amounted to a lawful exercise of the right to individual and
collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter.20 4 Although Ethiopia did
not insist on the existence of a significant armed attack, without ruling out the fact
that an armed attack existed, it claimed that a combinations of four factors have
created a condition of "clear and present danger" against its territorial integrity and
political independence: a) the presence of Eritrean troops, a country with an
entirely non-Somali agenda in Somalia; b) the consolidation of power in the hands
of radical Islamic militants part of whom Ethiopia considers as "terrorists" with the
manifest intention of annexing Somali speaking region of Ethiopia; c) UIC's
declaration of a holy war against Ethiopia; and d) the presence of armed Ethiopian
and other foreign forces working with common design and purpose with the
UIC.20 5 Along with the declaration of the Holy war, Ethiopia sees individuals
°
within the UIC leadership as a greater threat than the UIC itself 206
Explaining this
distinction, the Ethiopian government pinpoints to Sheik Hassen Dahir Aweys,
once head of the Al-Itihad, an organization on the United States' list of terrorist
organizations and the man that Ethiopia holds responsible for terrorist acts in its
territories. 207
It contends that the cumulative effect of all these factors put Ethiopia in a
state of necessity that justified self-defense in anticipation of an eminent and
overwhelming attack. Though the standard of what is instant and overwhelming is
203. See Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, supranote 202.
204. See William A M Henderson, The Use Of Force In Somalia And Issues Relating To The
Legality Of Ethiopian And United States Intervention, OPTICON, Spring 2008, at 1, 2, 4, available at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/opticonl826/archive/issue4/ArtLawsHendersonSomaliaIntervention Pub.pdf.
205. See sources cited supra note 143.
206. See Joseph Winter, Profile: Somalia's Islamist leader, BBC NEWS (Friday, 30 June 2006,
07:39 GMT) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5120242.stm.
207. Id.
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very subjective, the cumulative effect of these threats coupled with the failed State
dynamic in Somalia, could be seen to create a state of necessity grave and eminent
enough as to trigger the right to self-defense. However, Ethiopia's armed
penetration deep into the heartlands of Somalia and its occupation of Mogadishu
and other cities, was not in any way proportional to the danger posed against the
Ethiopian state and goes beyond removing the threats that created the necessity of
self-defense. Therefore, on the issue of proportionality, Ethiopia's action goes
beyond what is strictly required under the circumstances to avert the danger posed
against it and hence contravenes one of the conditions for lawful self-defense
under international law.
However, one should also appreciate the nature of the danger Ethiopia faced:
a complex mix of threat posed by Eritrea and UIC, and its own political interests to
wipeout armed opposition groups that operate from within Somalia. 20 8 Ethiopia
being an important ally of the Bush administration on the global war on terror, 209
there is also a global political dimension to the conflict which may explain why
most states have failed to question the legality of the war or require a debate in the
Security Council or elsewhere. Ethiopian government officials have echoed the
notion that Ethiopia's security and respect for its territorial integrity and long term
political independence anticipates the stability of Somalia. 210 They argued that
unless Somalia becomes a stable, democratic and responsible partner in the
international system, it will remain a breeding land for "terrorism" and will
continue to pose a threat not only to Ethiopia and the region but also to the
international community. 211 One could probably attribute the silence of the
Security Council, the General Assembly, and the African Union to the recognition
of this claim or the meeting of minds on this point.
In conclusion, Ethiopia's claim to self-defensive measures does not seem to
be in line with the requirements of the UN Charter because it fails to meet the
requirement of an occurrence of an attack of a significant scale and effect before
recourse to the self-defensive measure. Under customary international law,
although Ethiopia could be seen to be under an imminent threat of attack triggering
the right of recourse to a proportionate response, it certainly went beyond what is
necessary to remove the threat and used a disproportionate force.

208. See Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, supra note 202.
209. Shashank Bengali, Rice's Visit to Ethiopia Puts Focus on Ally Accused of Human Rights
Abuses, MCCLATcHY NEWSPAPERS (December 04, 2007 08:11:05 PM), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/
2007/12/04/2256 1/rices-visit-to-ethiopia-puts-focus.html.
210. See Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, supra note 202.
211. See sources cited supra note 143.
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In THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE FOR Kosovo: A CHRONICLE OF THE AHTISAARI
PLAN, Professor Henry Perrittexplains the Kosovar Albanians' desire for a state
of their own and the process they, and the world, went through to get it. This book
review will first introduce the history of Kosovo. This will be followed by a
summary of Professor Perritt's description of the negotiations between Kosovo
and Serbia and the legal issues considered; the plan that the negotiation team
proposed to the Security Council and the Security Council'sfailure to implement
it; and Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. Finally, this
review will discuss the weaknesses of the book, noting that Professor Perritt'stone
and lack of sources leave the reader questioning whether the book presents an
unbiased account of the dynamic and controversialevents that occurred

I. THE RECENT HISTORY OF Kosovo
Kosovo declared independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008, in
accordance with the Ahtisaari Plan and with the support of the United States, most
members of the European Union, and tens of other states1 The dynamic and
violent history of this region in the last century, which led to Kosovo's declaration
of independence, began when Kosovo became an "administrative region" of Serbia
during the Kingdom of Yugoslavs between the world wars. After WWII, Kosovo
had a similar status within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).2
SFRY was made up of six republics: Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro,

*University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, J.D. expected in 2011; University of Denver, Korbel
School of International Service M.A. in International Studies expected in 2011. Ms. Cohen worked in
Serbia from 2005 to 2008 and in Kosovo for the summer of 2010. The author thanks Professor Cynthia
Alkon for recommending the book, her family for their support, Carrie Golden for her insight, and the
author's friends in Serbia and Kosovo who have helped her to understand the conflict, as well as the
true meanings of peace, freedom, and the strength of the human spirit.
1. Dejan Anastasijevic, Joy in Kosovo, Anger in Serbia, TIME, Feb. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1714164,00.html; see ABA RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE,
LEGAL PROFESSION REFORM INDEX FOR Kosovo, 5 (vol. III 2009), available at http://www.abanet.

org/rol/publications/kosovo lpri vol iii 05 09 en.pdf.
2. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, YUGOSLAVIA: A COUNTRY STUDY (Glenn E. Curtis ed., 1992),

http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+yu0012).
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Serbia, and Slovenia; and two autonomous regions within Serbia: Kosovo and
Vojvodina. Under the 1974 SFRY constitution, Yugoslavia gave Serbia's
autonomous regions an increased limited sovereignty over their police forces,
courts, and civil institutions.3 However, in May of 1989, Slobodan Milosevic was
elected president of Serbia, and immediately started reducing these freedoms.4 As
President, Milosevic controlled the Yugoslav People's Army during the violent
break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990's, during which around 200,000 civilians
were killed through ethnic cleansing and genocide.5 In 1997, Milosevic stepped
down as Serbia's president, in order to serve as the President of greater
Yugoslavia. Just a year later, the conflict in Kosovo would begin.
In the second half of the 20th century, Kosovo had a large ethnic majority of
Kosovar Albanians, and a much smaller minority of ethnic Serbs. In 1989,
President Milosevic introduced a system of martial law in Kosovo and stripped
much of its political autonomy.6 He instituted a policy of ethnic Serb dominance
in industry, policymaking, teaching, the law and its enforcement.7 Throughout the
1990s, young male Kosovar Albanians formed a guerrilla force, known as the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), to oppose the Serbs.8
The KLA guerrilla forces initiated attacks against the Yugoslav National
Forces in early 1998, to fight for the freedom of the Albanian Kosovars from
Serbian oppression.9 The Yugoslav National Forces responded by purposefully
committing acts of ethnic cleansing against the Kosovar Albanians.10 For the next
year, NATO met with the Serbian government intermittently in an attempt to halt
the atrocities in Kosovo. At the same time, NATO provided evacuation and relief
aid to the Kosovar refugees. 1 In March of 1999, after the intensity of the attacks
on civilians increased, United States Ambassador Richard Holbrooke
independently met President Milosevic to persuade him to stop the attacks in
Kosovo or face imminent NATO strikes. 12 When President Milosevic refused,
NATO made the unanimous decision on March 23, 1999 to enter the region on
behalf of the endangered civilians.13 "The Alliance want[ed] to stop further
3. ABA RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, LEGAL PROFESSION REFORM INDEX FOR Kosovo, 5 (vol. III

2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/rol/publications/kosovo lpri vol iii 05 09 en.pdf.
4. Olga Nikoli6, Sefovi Srbge i Jugoslavqe od 1987 do 2000 [Heads of Serbia and Yugolsavia
from 1987 to 2000], GLAS JAVNOSTI, Sept. 18, 2000, http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.rs/arhiva/2000/09/18/
srpski/PO0091701 .shtm.
5. CAROLE ROGEL, THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE WAR IN BOSNIA 37 (1998).
6. ABA RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, supranote 3.
7. ABA RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, supranote 3, at 5, 7.

8. Id. at 5.
9. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA: HUMANITARIAN LAW

VIOLATIONS INKosovo (vol. 10 1998), http://www.hrw.org/reports98/kosovo/ (follow "Violations of
the Rules of War by Government Forces" hyperlink).
10. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, ETHNIC CLEANSING IN KOSOVO: AN ACCOUNTING 5, 9 (2d report
Dec. 1999), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human rights/kosovoii/pdf/kosovii.pdf.
11. NATO's Role In Kosovo: Historical Overview, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION
(July 15, 1999), http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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serious, systematic human rights violations and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe
in Kosovo. 14 NATO forces, entirely airborne, commenced a bombing
campaign
15
against the Yugolsav National Forces that lasted seventy-eight days.
On the final day of the bombing campaign, the United Nations (UN) Security
Council adopted Resolution 1244 which demanded the end to all violence and
repression by Yugoslavia in Kosovo and the withdrawal of all forces. 16 Russia,
Serbia's close ally, sent its envoy Viktor S. Chernomyrdin to inform President
Milosevic that "he had no choice but to accept the West's demands" and President
Milosevic pulled his troops out of Kosovo. 17 In addition, Resolution 1244
authorized member states of the UN to establish two organizations within Kosovo:
an international security presence, Kosovo Force (KFOR),18 and an international
civilian presence, known as the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). 19
UNMIK would act as a "transitional administration while establishing and
overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions
to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo. 2 °
Under UNMIK, this international civilian presence was authorized to facilitate "a
political process designed to determine Kosovo's status., 21 At the time, the United
Nations expected that Kosovo's "status" eventually would return to that of a region
within Serbia.22 However, the United States and the majority of Kosovo expected
otherwise.23
From 1999 to 2004, UNMIK aided the Kosovar Albanians in creating a
government and society for themselves, through civil administration,
democratization and institution building, reconstruction and economic
development, and humanitarian assistance. However, it did not begin the process
of determining Kosovo's final status of whether it would become an independent
nation or return to Serbia as a province until 2004.24 In the meantime, KFOR
14. Press Release, Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroder (Mar. 24, 1999), reprinted in HEIKE
KRIEGER, THE Kosovo CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYTICAL DOCUMENTATION 1974
- 1999 399 (2001).
15. ROGEL, supra note 5, at 80.
16. S.C. Res. 1244, 3, U.N. Doc S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
17. Richard Bourdreaux, With Surrender, Milosevic Now Must Face the Music at Home, L.A.
TIMES, June 4, 1999, at 2, http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jun/04/news/mn-44060/2. By the end of May
1999, NATO estimated that 5,000 Kosovar Albanians had been killed as a result of ethnic cleansing,
and 1.5 million people had been expelled from their homes. NATO's Role In Kosovo: Historical
Overview, supra note 11. Milosevic was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in the Hague in 2002 for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo, as part of an
amended indictment that originally included his crimes in the previous Croatian and Bosnian wars. He
died in 2006 before a verdict could be reached. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, et al., Case No. IT-99-37-I,
Third Amended Indictment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 19, 2002).
18. S.C. Res. 1244, supranote 16, at 7.
19. Id. at 10.
20. Id.
21. Id at 11(e).
22. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE FOR Kosovo: A CHRONICLE OF THE

AHTISAARI PLAN 64 (2010).
23. Id at 63.
24. Id at 79-80, see id. at 91.
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maintained general security, although violent disputes between ethnic Albanians
communities and ethnic Serb communities occasionally erupted.
II.

SUMMARY OF THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE FOR

Kosovo

A. The Negotiations
Professor Perritt begins his book by narrating the 2004 riots initiated by the
Kosovar Albanians in Pristina, Kosovo's capital.
Kosovar Albanians were
frustrated with UNMIK's oversight and delay in the final status negotiation
process that had been called for in Security Council Resolution 1244, five years
prior. On March 16, 2004, Kosovar Albanian youth responded by destroying
UNMIK vehicles and attacking the homes of Serbs with rocks and fire. 26
According to Professor Perritt, the violent riots were the healthy catalyst to start
the international negotiation process, which began in February of 2006 in Vienna,
with direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina representatives. 27
UN Resolution 1244 required UNMIK to facilitate a political process
regarding Kosovo's status. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan selected former
Finland President Maarti Ahtisaari to direct the negotiation process because of his
strong negotiation background in Africa, Asia, and the Balkans.28 Professor Perritt
portrays the negotiations as Serbia pursuing hard line policies and unrelenting
power over Kosovo. 29 Professor Perritt also describes Kosovo's lack of diplomacy
at the beginning of the negotiations, and how the U.S. and European countries
strongly controlled Kosovo during the negotiations.30
The negotiation team and the parties met jointly to discuss the delicate issues
of decentralization (creation of municipal governments); "minority rights" (rights
of the Serb communities in Kosovo); the "right of return" (Serbs rights to return
from northern Serbia to their homes in Kosovo); and protection of religious sites.31
Compromises were difficult to come by, and rarely, if ever, occurred.3 2 The most
difficult negotiations were over the final status of Kosovo, where no real progress
was ever made.33 Although the rounds of negotiations failed, Professor Perritt
commends President Ahtisaari and his team for their role in creating the "Ahtisaari
Plan. 34 The plan, after almost fourteen months of failed negotiations between
Kosovo and Serbia, was presented to the Security Council on March 26, 2007."5 It
detailed a process for creating the independent state of Kosovo and the
development of international oversight in the region. However, international

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 5-11.
PERRITT, supra note 22, at 121.
Id.at 81,145.
Id. at 111-13.
Id.at 144.
Id. at 145, 158.
See id.
at 145-52.
Id.
Id. at 157-60.
Id. at 159-60.
Id. at 165.
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politics, supported by international legal concerns, immobilized the Security
Council, which never voted to enact the plan.
B. Legal Issues in the Negotiations
Professor Perritt explains that the legal premises behind Serbia's (and
Russia's) argument for the return of Kosovo to Serbia were that (1) today's
international system supports state sovereignty, and (2) Resolution 1244 did not
recognize potential independence for Kosovo.36
Rather, Resolution 1244
recognized the need to return the region of Kosovo to Serbia.3 7 Since 1945, new
states have achieved statehood when republics and federations broke up (such as
the USSR) or former colonies separated from their colonial state. In addition, no
state formed since 1945 has been admitted to the UN over objections from its
original overarching state.38 Allowing a portion of a state to secede over the
objection of its larger state is against international norms.39 Kosovo was never
considered a republic with the right to secede from Yugoslavia, rather it was an
autonomous region within the Republic of Serbia.4 ° If the UN allowed Kosovo to
become independent, this would go against the international legal norm of the last
sixty years that prohibits unilateral secession.4 1
Professor Perritt states that Kosovo's legal arguments for an independent state
were that 1) Serbia forfeited the right to govern Kosovo during the war; 2) Serbia
continued to relinquish sovereignty when it did not take governmental control over
the territory of Kosovo after the war; and 3) that Resolution 1244 applied only to
the interim arrangement for Kosovo, not final status.42 According to the emerging
international legal norm responsibility to protect, if a state fails to protect its
citizens, an international or foreign military may enter into the sovereign
territory.43 Thus, Serbia forfeited the right to govern Kosovo when it failed to
protect its Albanian citizens in the 1999 war, and in fact, actually committed
crimes against its citizens." In addition to Serbia forfeiting its right to govern in
1999, sovereignty and statehood depend upon a government's ability to exercise
control over the territory of the State.45 Serbia continued to ignore its governing
role for the Albanian majority living in Kosovo (98% of the population), and
UNMIK and KFOR exercised effective control over the region.46 Thus, Serbia

36. PERRITT, supra note 22, at 121.
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Finally, according to the Kosovar

Albanians, a close reading of UN Resolution 1244 showed that the words
"autonomous," "self-administration" and "self-government" applied to the interim
situation in Kosovo, but did not apply to the future status of the region.48
C. The Failureof the Security Council
The most novel aspect of the book is its discussion of the dichotomy between
the successful creation of the Ahtisaari plan and Security Council's failure to
implement it. The Secretary-General of the UN established the negotiation team to
aid in the final status talks between Kosovo and Serbia. The talks themselves, over
a period of fourteen months, failed. 49 However, President Ahtisaari created a plan
for the UN that would give Kosovo independence, allow for continuing
international oversight and peacekeeping forces in the region, and establish a
system to protect the Serb minority living within Kosovo.5 ° Unfortunately, the UN
did not act on the recommendation because of a deadlock in the Security Council.51
Russia, in an effort to wield its political strength while holding the presidency of
the Security Council, would not bring the plan to a vote, and would likely have
vetoed the plan based on Serbia's legal arguments, had it been put to vote at a later
date.52 This allowed other smaller countries to follow suit, pledging not to support
the recommendation. If the Security Council's role is to prevent war and promote
peace, then by not acting on the Ahtisaari plan, the Security Council failed.53
Regardless, because Kosovo declared unilateral independence with the backing of
the United States and most of Europe, Professor Perritt acknowledges that state
interests can
circumvent the Security Council, at least when powerful states are
4
involved.1
III. CRITIQUE
A. Professor Perritt'sTone
In the first twenty pages of the book, Professor Perritt startles the reader when
he describes how he, as the Dean of Chicago-Kent College of Law, lied to get
visas for a group of faculty and students to travel to Kosovo in December of 1998
(as well as lying to get their rental car).55 This was during the time when the
refugee problem was escalating, and the KLA and Serbian forces were fighting one
another in civilian areas.5 6 Then he "pestered the UNHCR" (UN Refugee Agency)
into taking himself and the students to a KLA stronghold where they could see the
action.57 There is no question that humanitarian support is important during such a
47.
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crisis, but in this case, Professor Perritt took law students through a war zone to
administer "aid"- setting-up internet on a few computers in the UNHCR office in
Pristina.58 Although the reader may be surprised by Professor Perritt's judgment, it
is also important to note that this story illustrates that he has first hand knowledge
of Kosovo in the late 1990's that he contributes to the book.
1. Supporting Documents and Sources
The story of the negotiations and the inner thoughts of the negotiating team
should be bolstered by additional sources. While the results of the negotiations are
publically accessible, the negotiations themselves were held behind closed doors.
Professor Perritt seems to have a deep knowledge and understanding of what
happened in the negotiations, but his numerous citations to anonymous sources and
interviews leave the reader wondering how he gathered information to write this
book. Moreover, the reader must accept blindly that these anonymous sources
were impartial. There is no doubt that many sources would feel uncomfortable
divulging information on record that may portray top-level politicians in a negative
light. Regardless, it is difficult not to be wary of first hand interviews conducted
under complete anonymity. For example, Professor Perritt described the Serbs'
strategy of "delay, destabilize, divide, and discredit" without a single citation or
explanation of how he could have gathered that information.59
2. Possible Bias or Inaccuracies
Professor Perritt adamantly supports Kosovo's independence, which seems to
lead him to portray some of the events concerning Serbia with less accuracy.
Crucial details in the descriptions of events concerning Serbia are sometimes
missing. For example, Professor Perritt comments on the widespread Serbian
nationalism and violent behavior by explaining how at the "Kosovo is Serbia" rally
in Belgrade, five days after Kosovo declared independence, "150,000
demonstrators got out of control and set fire to the U.S. and British embassies in
Belgrade, ransacked the McDonald's again, and looted stores. 60 However, most of
the international news coverage of this incident suggests that Professor Perritt's
account is incorrect. Rather, news sources state that up to 150,000 Serbs marched
peacefully from the parliament building in Belgrade to an orthodox church about a
mile away in an effort to show democratic peaceful resistance toward Kosovo's
declaration, while only up to one thousand young men separated from the peace
march to riot and attack the embassies. 61 There is no question that there are violent
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Serb nationalists, but Professor Perritt leaves out the crucial detail that the majority
of Serbia approached Kosovo's declaration of independence in a democratic way.62
Noting that Professor Perritt never cites to a specific Serbian source throughout the
whole book, these details leave the reader questioning whether Professor Perritt
accurately portrayed the facts concerning the Serbs and their actions throughout
the whole final status process.
B. Professor Perritt'sPromotion of the Ahtisaari Process
Professor Perritt concludes that, "For once in the Balkans, political
transformation occurred through international diplomacy without prolonged
violence as a stimulus. The hope is that the Ahtisaari and Troika processes provide
a model that will be followed in the future. 63 This conclusion is surprising,
considering that Professor Perritt described the failure of the diplomatic efforts in
the negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia, and then the failure of international
diplomacy to convince the Security Council to approve the plan. A new country of
two million people declared unilateral independence because of the failure to
achieve a solution through international diplomacy. Thus, it seems inappropriate
to hope that the Ahtisaari process should be used as a model in the future. While
the Kosovar Albanians did achieve independence, it was in spite of this model,
rather than as a result of it. A stronger argument would be to use the responsibility
to protect as a model in future conflicts. The emerging international norm first
appeared in 1999, to aid in the support of NATO intervention into Kosovo. In the
future, this norm could discourage a State from attacking its own citizens, knowing
that its actions could result in a loss of sovereignty in the region.
The ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE FOR KoSovo is recommended for those who
want to understand the generalities of peace negotiations, the process and struggles
of achieving a new state in the 21t Century, and Kosovo's path to independence.
However, because Professor Perritt's detailed knowledge of the Kosovo-Serbia
negotiations is uncorroborated, readers should find additional sources to verify any
specific information.
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